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PRESIDENT WILSON



PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON.

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PRESIDENT WILSON

HIS PROBLEMS AND HIS POLICY

AN ENGLISH VIEW

BY

H. WILSON HARRIS

NEW YORK

FREDERICK A. STOKES CO.

FOURTH AVENUE

1917

FOREWORD TO AMERICAN READERS

If this book has any value in America it will be as the embodiment of what I think I may claim to be a typical English view of American politics. The term typical perhaps needs a little qualification. I cannot pretend to be entirely free from a certain pro-American bias, though I hope I have not allowed it to colour what I have written.

Quite apart from the circumstances of this war, I am profoundly convinced that America and Great Britain have a great destiny to work out in common which they can never accomplish separately. If that is so it is of the first importance that the two countries should know each other better and understand each other better. Americans are probably better informed about English affairs than Englishmen about American affairs—though my American friends are disposed to question this—but there is manifestly much more room for fuller knowledge on either side.

My sketch of President Wilson has been written with the purpose of introducing current American

problems, as well as a great American personality, to English readers. It may contain false judgments. It must almost inevitably contain technical inaccuracies. But I think it is at least a fair representation of what Englishmen who have tried to understand America think of America. If we misunderstand, this concrete example of the misunderstanding may stimulate some [illegible] American writer to correct our views.

National Liberal Club, London
April 1917

TO

MY WIFE

PREFACE

ONE of the more valuable of the indirect results of the war has been to reveal how little America is understood, and how necessary it is that she should be understood, in this country. At the present moment we are in danger of committing ourselves to a series of false judgments. The average Englishman's real interest in the United States and its present President dates from August 1914, and he is under an inevitable but unfortunate temptation to form sweeping estimates of a nation and a man on the basis of their attitude towards one particular issue, and that an issue of great complexity, over a space of little more than two years.

Such estimates may by an accident be accurate, but if so it can only be by an accident. Without entering into that, I have aimed here at presenting data, bearing on the President of the United States and the problems he has to face, covering a wider field and a longer period. The relations between Great Britain and America will be among the most powerful factors in world politics after the war,

and if those relations are to be what they should be and might be, it is essential that the two peoples should know and understand one another. It is in the hope that it may make some small contribution to the further development of such an understanding that this book has been written. The American biographies of Mr. Wilson are not well known in this country, and, in any case, they take for granted a knowledge of American institutions and traditions which the English reader naturally does not possess. Now that President Wilson is about to enter on a second four years of office it is time an English life was written.

As for myself, my chief title to attempt such a task is a lively consciousness of my own limitations. Having devoted what time I could in the past few years to an endeavour to diminish my own ignorance of America, I have written on the assumption that what I needed to know other people may need to know too. This biography purports to be neither a criticism nor an appreciation, nor what is sometimes a little grandiloquently described as an interpretation. All I have attempted to do is to state the plain facts of President Wilson's career since he first entered public life, and to indicate in broad outline the nature of the political and social problems that are engaging him and all men of thought and action in America to-day. It has seemed to me

more useful to provide material for judgments than to obtrude a series of judgments of my own.

I am greatly indebted to Mr. G. V. Seldes, late of Harvard, who has read my proofs and made a number of valuable suggestions.

H. WILSON HARRIS.

LONDON, *January* 1917.

NOTE

THE breach between America and Germany took place after the manuscript of this book had left my hands. It has not been necessary to alter anything already written, but a few pages have been added to Chapter IX ("The European War"), carrying it down to the actual severance of diplomatic relations.

H. W. H.

February 1917.

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PRESIDENT WILSON

CHAPTER I

EARLY YEARS

We are confused by a war of interests, a clash of classes, a competition of powers, an effort at conquest and restraint, and the great forces which war and toil amongst us can be guided and reconciled only by some man who is truly a man of the people, not caught in the toils of any special interest, united by wide sympathy with many kinds of men, familiar with many aspects of life, and led, through many changes, to a personal experience which unites him with the common mass.—*Lincoln Centenary Address*, 1909.[1]

WOODROW WILSON is an American of the second generation. His father's father, James Wilson, an Ulsterman from County Down, landed at Philadelphia to seek his fortune in 1807. His mother's father, the Rev. Thomas Woodrow, a Scotch Presbyterian minister who had held a charge at Carlisle for sixteen years and then migrated to Canada, crossed the American border in 1837, and settled at Chillicothe, Ohio, as pastor of the first Presbyterian Church in that town.

James Wilson, the immigrant, rapidly found his feet at Philadelphia, where he secured a post on Duane's Democratic journal, the *Aurora*, published

[1] The passages at the head of each chapter are from Mr. Wilson's writings and speeches.

where the greatest of American journalists, Benjamin Franklin, had turned out his unpretentious sheets nearly a century before. But Philadelphia was not to be the goal of young Wilson's pilgrimage. The *drang nach westen* that followed the restoration of peace with England in 1814 laid hold of the young journalist-printer, and carried him inland over the Pennsylvanian border into Ohio. There he settled first at Steubenville, the capital of Jefferson County, and then at Pittsburg, establishing in the former town the *Western Herald* and in the latter (which lies on the eastern side of the Ohio-Pennsylvania border) the *Pennsylvania Advocate*. It was at Steubenville that President Wilson's father and mother first met.

The youngest of James Wilson's seven sons was Joseph Ruggles, who after a sound education a Jefferson College at Canonsburg, in Pennsylvania supplemented by a year at the Western Theological Seminary and another at Princeton, had been licensed as a preacher in the Presbyterian Church, and then appointed, not to a pulpit, but to a post in the Steubenville Male Academy. At the same time Dr. Thomas Woodrow's daughter Janet was a pupil at the companion academy for girls. A friendship, and then an intimacy, sprang up, and in 1849 Joseph Ruggles Wilson and Janet Woodrow were married. Joseph Wilson was ordained by the Presbytery of Ohio almost immediately after his wedding, but he continued his educational work at Steubenville, and then successively at Jefferson College and at Hampden Sydney College, Virginia, till 1855

when he accepted his first pastorate at Staunton, Virginia. In the following year, on December 28, 1856, Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born. There were already two girls in the family, and a younger boy was born ten years later.

There was a singular fitness in the chance that made Staunton Woodrow Wilson's birthplace; for the Old Dominion, *Virginia dives avum*, had given America four out of her first five Presidents—Washington and Jefferson, Madison and Monroe. By his origin no less than by his office Dr. Wilson stands heir to great traditions. Those who will can convince themselves with no great difficulty that the influences of the warm and generous South have left their mark equally with his Scotch and Irish ancestry in salient traits of the President's character.

Little of Woodrow Wilson's childhood was spent at Staunton, for in 1858 the family moved south to Augusta, in Georgia, a prosperous industrial town, where in a twelve years' pastorate the Rev. Joseph Wilson established a solid reputation as one of the foremost ministers of his denomination in the South. When Woodrow was four years old the Civil War broke out. The earliest recollection clear in his memory is that of two men meeting in the street outside his father's house and one of them declaring, "Lincoln is elected, and there'll be war." The Wilsons were strong Southerners, but they came into little personal contact with the war. Till Sherman's men came marching through Georgia in 1864 the State had lain outside the theatres of active warfare,

and Sherman himself left Augusta to his right as he swept north-west from Savannah to Atlanta. There were sundry alarms in the town, but none of them had substance, and all Woodrow Wilson saw of the war was an occasional body of Confederates riding off to join the army, and Jefferson Davis himself passing through in 1865 in the hands of the Federals to his imprisonment in Fort Monroe.

President Wilson was born too late in the nineteenth century for any such romantic boyhood as fell to the lot of Washington on the frontier or Lincoln and Garfield in the backwoods. His education followed conventional lines, and in its earlier stages, at any rate, it brought to light no marked foreshadowings of the gifts that have raised the President to the position he holds today. Joseph Wilson was eminently wise in the training of his son. No attempt was made to force the boy's formal education. He was over nine before he had learned to read; but long before that his mind was being developed and shaped by constant companionship and talk with his father, and he was already familiar with much of Scott and Dickens from the novels read aloud to the family in the Augusta manse. Father and son took long walks together, sometimes in the country, sometimes to inspect the factories and engineering shops and foundries in which the industrial life of Augusta centred. To this best of all forms of education, contact with a fertile, alert, and sympathetic mind, was added such further training as was dealt out to a group of Augusta

youngsters at a school kept by a Mr. J. T. Derry, who had laid aside his rifle after Appomattox and diverted his energies from the destruction of the North to the instruction of the South. After four years under the soldier-schoolmaster's ferule, Woodrow Wilson (known at that time to his family and friends as Tom) rounded off his school life with another period of four years at an academy at Columbia, South Carolina, his father having obtained a professorship at the theological seminary in that town in 1870.

The transition from school to university is a permanent landmark in the experience of every boy whose education is not cut short at the secondary stage; and by the time Woodrow Wilson was taking leave of the Columbia academy and breaking ground at Davidson College, North Carolina, to which he now proceeded, he had reached an age at which public events were likely increasingly to arrest his interest and stimulate his thought. He had been too young at the time of the Civil War to be alive to its issues. He was a child of four when the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter, a little more than eight when the tragic news of Lincoln's murder plunged South and North alike into mourning. The vicissitudes of Andrew Johnson's calamitous administration were little calculated to stir the interest of a boy of twelve; but when, with Grant's succession, the work of reconstruction and reconciliation was put in hand in earnest, it would have been strange if no dawning sense of citizenship and responsibility for a share in the work of

rebuilding the nation had impressed itself on the mind of a youth just passing from school to the larger world of the university.

Wilson, it must be remembered, was a pure Southerner, who never crossed the Potomac till he set out for his first term at Princeton in 1875, but he was born a few years too late to know from experience the embitterment that preceded the actual outbreak. Now secession had been tried and failed. The fundamental principle for which the Northerners had fought, the maintenance of the Union, was vindicated. The South, weary and stricken after its four years' fight against hopeless odds, was as ready as the North to live in the spirit of Lincoln's great exhortation and strive to "bind up the nation's wounds, . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace." It was a time of re-formation and reconstruction. While Woodrow Wilson was building up his manhood the nation was rebuilding its shattered fabric. The South, in particular, was schooling itself to a new conception of political principles. We can hardly be wrong in ascribing to these vital years the origin of that intense interest in the principles of government which Dr. Wilson has exhibited through the whole of his educational and political career.

The terms university and college are practically interchangeable in America, and the institutions so described represent every level of educational efficiency. Davidson College, North Carolina, to which young Wilson passed on from the school at Columbia, was not of the highest grade, but it

formed an adequate stepping-stone to Princeton, whither his father decided to send him after his course at Davidson had been interrupted at the end of his first year by an illness that necessitated a year of comparative rest. This year (1874-5) was spent at Wilmington, a North Carolina seaport, where the Rev. Joseph Wilson now held a charge. The town had considerable historic interest, and migration thither enabled the future President, at the age of seventeen, to get his first glimpse of the sea, an experience still foreign to some millions of his fellow-countrymen.

In September 1875 Woodrow Wilson matriculated at Princeton. The New Jersey foundation, of which it will be necessary to speak more fully in the following chapter, claims to rank third to Harvard and Yale among the greater universities of America. It has a history of 170 years behind it, and has numbered James Madison among its graduates and Jonathan Edwards among its Presidents. In Wilson's year there was an entry of about 130, amongst whom he took a creditable place, but achieved no outstanding distinction. His "class" (i.e. the entry of his year) produced forty-two honours men in the graduating year 1879, Wilson standing forty-first on the list. For the benefit of those to whom such matters seem of moment, it is on record that in his senior year he measured 5 feet 11 inches and weighed 156 pounds. By the time he had graduated A.B. at Princeton, Wilson had concluded that the practice of law (in America the profession has not two branches, as in England)

was his right vocation, and he accordingly decided to supplement his Princeton course by further study in the law school of the University of Virginia. After little more than a year his health broke down, as it had done when he was at Davidson six years earlier. In consequence he spent the year 1881 at home, and in May 1882 established himself as a practising lawyer at Atlanta, Georgia, in association with a partner named Renick.

It is necessary thus to sketch the outlines of the President's education, but the bare facts themselves are of little interest or importance. Preferring deliberately to read discursively and make his explorations in fields of his own choosing, he sacrificed with small regret the prospects of purely academic distinction.

Wilson's bent was definitely historical and political. At Princeton he read widely and wisely, studying particularly Chatham and Burke, Brougham and Macaulay. Bagehot was an inexhaustible mine of suggestion and inspiration. But the first serious stimulus to political thought and investigation came from a less classic source. In the Chancellor Green library at Princeton was a set of bound volumes of the *Gentleman's Magazine*, the later issues of which numbered among their leading features a running commentary on the proceedings of the British House of Commons by "The Member for the Chiltern Hundreds," one of the many pseudonyms of that veteran political journalist Sir Henry Lucy. St. Stephen's in the seventies was the arena of rhetorical battles

well calculated to arrest and hold the interest of any observer capable of appreciating the niceties of constitutional theory or the triumphs of parliamentary oratory and the victories of debate. The great duel between Gladstone and Disraeli was at its height. Dizzy had just "dished the Whigs" over the Reform Bill of 1867 and gone out of office on Irish Church Disestablishment. The Disestablishment Act had followed in 1869 and Forster's Education Act in 1870; Cardwell was carrying through his Army reforms; the Ballot Act was being put on the Statute Book. In 1874, the year before Wilson entered at Princeton, Gladstone had gone out and Disraeli gone in, and though within the next two years one of the two protagonists had withdrawn into nominal retirement and the other into the tranquillity of the House of Lords, they had left behind them in the elective Chamber traditions of controversy that speakers like Bright and Lowe, Stanley and John Russell had done hardly less than themselves to establish. Debates sustained by men of such calibre could lack nothing in inspiration to an eager student of politics in a country whose political history, apart from the great movements led by Washington and Lincoln, and the Webster-Clay-Calhoun controversies, was comparatively uneventful. Mr. Wilson himself has testified in later years to the influence Lucy's pictures of the Chamber at Westminster had on his broadening thought.

The ideas thus absorbed found early expression. At Princeton Wilson wrote and debated. In the

latter field he was a little slow in coming to the front, though in his second, or sophomore, year he was awarded a second prize in Whig Hall, one of the two rival debating societies (the other was the Cliosophic) that flourished at Princeton. But by his fourth year he was recognized as the foremost speaker in Whig Hall, and was, as a matter of course, chosen to represent it in the annual Lynde Debate between the two college societies. The subjects on these occasions were not announced beforehand, the speakers being required to discourse extempore on a topic drawn from a hat. The topic in this particular year was Tariffs, and the chance of the draw condemned Wilson to champion Protection against Free Trade. That settled his part in the contest. Rejecting flatly any sophistic endeavour to make what he conceived to be the worse cause appear the better, he tore up the slip and retired from the debate. A substitute hastily enlisted by the Whigs proving unequal to the occasion, victory went to the Cliosophic.

The interest of an episode trifling in itself lies in the evidence it affords of the depth of Wilson's political convictions at the time. Further proof of that comes from his casual writings at the same period, notable among them an essay on Chatham, for which he was awarded a prize in 1879, others on John Bright and Gladstone printed in the magazine of the University of Virginia in 1880, and an article on "Cabinet Government in the United States," over the signature Thomas W. Wilson,

in the *International Review* of August 1879. The acceptance of such a contribution by a serious review of national reputation was a notable event for a writer still in his undergraduate stage. The essay consisted of a sober and critical discussion of the element of irresponsibility in American government, due to the severance of the executive and the legislative authorities and the growing power of the numerous secret committees of Congress. There is undiminished force to-day in the contention that an essential condition of efficient government is a closer association between the legislative and the executive, and particularly in the conclusion that "there must needs be, as a binding link between them, some body which has no power to coerce the one and is interested in maintaining the independent effectiveness of the other. Such a link is the responsible Cabinet."

This article appeared in August 1879. In the same year the writer took his A.B. degree at Princeton, and, as has been stated, entered the law school at the University of Virginia. With his interrupted course at the latter foundation the period of his formal education would normally have ended, had not the bad judgment of the people of Atlanta in their choice of lawyers led to an unpremeditated change in the young attorney's plans. The establishment of the firm of Renick and Wilson in the Georgian capital has already been mentioned. The partners "hung out their shingle," as the vernacular expression has it, and waited for clients. After a year of waiting the younger partner had had

enough. If there was no opening for him to practice law he could at least teach it, and to qualify himself the better he entered, in the autumn of 1883, on a two years' post-graduate course at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. In 1886 he gained the degree of Ph.D. for a notable thesis on *Congressional Government*, to which it will be necessary to refer again. A year earlier he had accepted his first teaching post, a lectureship in history and political economy at Bryn Mawr, a women's college on the outskirts of Philadelphia. He remained at Bryn Mawr three years, lecturing at the same time at Johns Hopkins, and in 1888 was elected to the chair of history and political economy at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut. Wesleyan was less sectarian than its name would suggest. There was an able faculty and a large nucleus of students (of both sexes) who had come to the university for serious work. But it hardly gave the Professor of History the platform his growing reputation qualified him to occupy, and after two years, in 1890, he was offered, and accepted, the chair of jurisprudence and politics at his old university, Princeton. There the next twenty years of his life were to be spent.

CHAPTER II

PRESIDENT OF PRINCETON

The college should seek to make the men whom it receives something more than excellent servants of a trade or skilled practitioners of a profession. It should give them elasticity of faculty and breadth of vision, so that they shall have a surplus of mind to expend, not upon their profession only, for its liberalization and enlargement, but also upon the broader interests which lie about them, in the spheres in which they are to be not breadwinners merely, but citizens as well, and in their own hearts, where they are to grow to the stature of real nobility. It is this free capital of mind the world most stands in need of—this free capital that awaits investment in undertakings, spiritual as well as material, which advance the race and help all men to a better life.

Inaugural Address as President of Princeton, October 1902.

DR. WILSON'S life at Princeton divides into two periods. From 1890 to 1902 he was a member of the faculty, taking his place with his colleagues as a part of the university machine. From 1902 to 1910 he was President, entrusted with the power, of which he did not hesitate to make full use, of changing the structure and adapting the operations of the machine into accordance with his own ideals. The college—or university, as it became in 1896—was heir to honourable traditions. A Presbyterian foundation, it dates back to 1746, being thus the fourth in age among American universities, Harvard, William and Mary (Virginia), and Yale alone antedating it. The

tide of revolutionary war had flowed round it, leaving the marks of conflict on the college buildings. In 1783 the Continental Congress held temporary session there, and it was from Princeton that Washington issued his farewell address to the Army. In recent years Princeton has been the most popular of the Northern colleges among students from the South, a fact that no doubt had something to do with Woodrow Wilson's entry as a freshman in 1875, and made his return as a professor in 1890 the more congenial.

To-day—and what is true of to-day is true of the nineties of last century—Princeton ranks with Harvard and Yale, Cornell and Columbia and Johns Hopkins, among the group of foundations recognized as representing the highest type of American universities—and the type incidentally which approximates most closely to that familiar in England. The grounds and buildings are extensive. The campus covers over five hundred acres, with a boating-lake four miles long, formed by the widening of the Millstone River at Mr. Andrew Carnegie's expense. The buildings include a number of halls, residential and tutorial, of which Nassau is the oldest and most famous, while Seventy-Nine has a particular interest in connection with Mr. Wilson, since it was built at the expense of alumni of his own class of 1879. Whig and Clio Halls, to which some reference has already been made,[1] are the homes of the two chief literary societies at Princeton. Within the last few years an extensive graduate school has

[1] P. 22.

been added under circumstances which, it will be seen, closely affected Mr. Wilson's position as President of the University. The number of students, which twenty years ago stood at something under a thousand, is now over sixteen hundred.

When the new professor took up his work in September 1890 he had been married just five years. His wife, formerly Miss Ellen Louise Axson, was an old Augusta acquaintance, the daughter of a Savannah minister. Their marriage had taken place in June 1885, a few months before Mr. Wilson began his work at Bryn Mawr. Since this is a political rather than a personal biography, it is sufficient to add here that there were three daughters of the marriage ; that after a married life of twenty-nine years Mrs. Wilson died at the White House in August 1914, in the second year of her husband's Presidency ; and that in December 1915 Mr. Wilson was married to Mrs. Norman Galt, formerly Miss Edith Bolling, of Wythesville, Virginia.

The twelve years of Dr. Wilson's professorship at Princeton were uneventful. As a lecturer his popularity was great, the earnestness of the true teacher being seasoned by a quiet and cultured humour that made attendance at his courses a matter as much of pleasure as of profit. He knew his men personally, and his house in Library Place was always open to the students, who took full advantage of the standing invitation extended to them. While his position at Princeton was being steadily strengthened both by the force of his

personality and by his success as a lecturer, his name was becoming increasingly advertised through the country by the books he found time to publish before the more exacting duties of President of the University curtailed his literary activity. The first and best known of these, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics*, was indeed established as a standard authority on American government before Mr. Wilson's return to Princeton. He had put it in as thesis for his Ph.D. at Johns Hopkins in 1885, and on its publication in the same year it had achieved a success comparable, among university theses, only with Mr. Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire*, first written as an Oxford prize exercise. *Congressional Government* has already run through close on thirty impressions. In 1889, Mr. Wilson's second year at Wesleyan University, *The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics*, a study of different forms of government, had appeared. A pioneer textbook in the field of political science, *The State* gained for its author recognition at the hands of a competent English critic [1] as "the foremost," if not the first, of those who rendered possible the intelligent study of a department of sociology upon which the happiness and good government of the human race essentially depend."

With the exception of these two notable works and *The New Freedom*, a collection of campaign speeches published in 1913, after his election as President, all Mr. Wilson's books were

[1] Oscar Browning, Preface to 1899 edition of *The State*.

issued during the periods of his professorship and presidency at Princeton. In 1893 *Division and Reunion*, 1829-1889, a study of the ultimate springs and effects of the Civil War, appeared, and the same year saw the publication of a collection of essays grouped under the title *An Old Master*. In 1896 *George Washington*, a singularly human and attractive appreciation of the liberator of the American colonies, was published, and coincidently with it another essay volume bearing the name *Mere Literature*. In the year of Dr. Wilson's election to the presidency of the university his lengthiest work, a *History of the American People*, in five volumes, made its appearance, to be followed six years later by the last of his treatises on the theory of government, *Constitutional Government in the United States*. It is hardly matter for surprise that the responsibilities attaching to the Governorship of New Jersey and the Presidency of the United States should in the past six years have left scant leisure for literary production.

In June 1902 the President of Princeton, Dr. Francis Landey Patton, resigned, and three months later, at the beginning of the new academical year, Dr. Woodrow Wilson succeeded to his office, the appointment falling by universal consent to the member of the faculty whose writings and occasional addresses, principally on educational subjects, outside Princeton had won him distinction such as none of his colleagues could claim. The presidency had never before been held by a layman.

The opening of Mr. Wilson's public career may more properly be fixed in 1902, when he became President of Princeton, than in 1910, when he was elected Governor of New Jersey. The importance of a university president in America is not to be appreciated from any analogy drawn between Yale or Harvard or Princeton and Oxford or Cambridge, still less between the American foundations and an individual Oxford or Cambridge college. Parallels have been drawn between the President of Princeton and the Master of Trinity or the Dean of Christ Church. The comparison is misleading. The university in America holds a larger place in the life of the nation than in either England or Scotland, and the prestige attaching to its Presidency is correspondingly enhanced. Lord Bryce in his *American Commonwealth*[1] dwells on the "almost monarchical position" of the President within the university. "His powers," he adds, "in the management of the institution and the selection of professors are much greater than those of the head of an English or Scottish university. But he is often also a leading figure in the State, perhaps even in the nation. No persons in the country, hardly even the greatest railway magnates, are better known, and certainly none are more respected, than the Presidents of the leading universities." It may be observed in addition that geographically Princeton, particularly in view of its strong Southern connection, tended to provide a more effective platform than Harvard in Massachusetts,

[1] Vol. ii. chap. cix.

or Yale in Connecticut, or Cornell in New York State.

But it was less in the public position it gave him than in the opportunity it afforded for the display in action of his fearless and constructive radicalism that his acceptance of the Presidency of Princeton marked a new starting-point in Mr. Wilson's career. Not that there is any breach or revolution in the development of his purposes and principles. His life has been a singularly consistent unity. We can look back from the "direct primary" campaign in New Jersey in 1911 to the *International Review* article of 1879, with its assertion of "America's greatest claim to political honour—the right of every man to a voice in the government under which he lives"; or from the Tariff legislation in 1913 to the declaration made in 1882 by the junior partner in the firm of Renick and Wilson to a tariff commission visiting Atlanta, that "the only thing that free traders contend for is, that there shall be only so much duty laid as will be necessary to defray the expenses of the Government, reduce the public debt, and leave a small surplus for accumulation." But it was election to the Presidency of Princeton that first put administrative power into his hands and enabled him to give concrete application to those principles and doctrines he was later to vindicate before the world on a larger stage.

The keynotes of Mr. Wilson's public career may be stated, at a certain sacrifice of completeness in the interests of brevity, as a profound faith

in democracy and an indomitable enthusiasm for reform. At Princeton the established order was aristocratic and conservative. Conservatism is a common attribute of universities, and in America it is accentuated (though there are other counterbalancing forces) by the close association maintained between a college and its alumni, or former graduates, who naturally tend to turn a suspicious eye on threatened innovations. Dr. Wilson was under no illusions as to the task that faced him. His twelve years as professor had given him ample time to develop his convictions as to what Princeton might and should be, and to realize the gulf that separated the actual from the ideal. He had high visions of the functions of a university in the national life. "We are not at liberty," he maintained, "to use Princeton for our private purposes or to adapt her in any way to our own use and pleasure. It is our bounden duty to make her more and more responsive to the intellectual and moral needs of a great nation." In 1902 Princeton was not so responsive. It was a university for rich men's sons; privilege and luxury—in their best form, indeed, but still privilege and luxury—were entrenched; and the standard of scholastic attainment was unjustifiably low. There was abundant scope for a President who confessed that "if to seek to go to the root is to be a radical, a radical I am." It was after he had held the presidency for some years that he told the Pittsburg alumni that "the colleges of this country must be reconstructed from top to bottom, and America is going to demand it"; but the

conviction was already deeply implanted in his mind long before he was chosen to rule over Princeton.

The new President's first assault was on the mechanism of the instructional system. As a beginning the level of scholarship had to be raised. Almost immediately on taking office, therefore, Dr. Wilson appointed a committee to consider the enforcement of what had become merely nominal standards of attainment. A scheme was formulated under which men had to pass their examinations or go. Some of them went. The others learned to work. There was a short-lived outcry, particularly among the aristocrats. Then the storm died down and Princeton settled quietly into its new stride.

That, however, was no more than a preliminary move. The next reform, more fundamental but less calculated to provoke hostility, was a recasting of the academic curriculum. By the beginning of the twentieth century the revolt against the old cast-iron régime of dead languages and mathematics had opened the door to a freedom of choice that was in grave danger of being carried to excess. Three boys out of ten may be competent on entering college at nineteen to map out their own course of study for the next four years ; but that estimate is probably too high, and, in any case, the remaining seven will not be competent. The right compromise is clearly that the university should impose a certain groundwork of general education, and encourage its men from that starting-point to launch out on the particular study of their choice.

Dr. Wilson was one of the first of American educationists to emphasize that salutary doctrine. In his inaugural address at Princeton in 1902 he had laid it down that out of the host of studies "we must make choice, and suffer the pupil himself to make choice. But the choice we make must be the chief choice, the choice that the pupil makes the subordinate choice. We must supply the synthesis and must see to it that, whatever group of studies the student selects, it shall at least represent the round whole, contain all the elements of modern knowledge, and be itself a complete circle of general subjects." Practically applied, as Dr. Wilson forthwith applied it, that doctrine meant that for their freshman and sophomore years men followed a prescribed course of study, while as juniors and seniors they were allowed wide, though not unfettered, liberty of choice. The "department system," or system of "group electives" (so called because the student's choice must fall within a group of studies so formulated as to give unity and sequence to his whole college course), is now generally accepted throughout American universities, its wide adoption being due, not wholly indeed, but in considerable measure, to Dr. Wilson's pioneer work at Princeton.

The ground thus cleared, the road lay open for the greatest of Dr. Wilson's educational reforms. At the time when he was set in authority at Princeton the provision made by the typical American university for the actual imparting of instruction was gravely inadequate. The old

"recitation," or catechetical, method was being abandoned in favour of set lectures; and outside the two or three hours a day spent in the lecture-room the student was left to his own almost undirected reading. There was a total lack of tutorial guidance, and, what was hardly less serious, the contact of adolescent with maturer minds was practically confined to the few hours a week given to attending lectures, and the value of these varied directly with the lecturer's capacity and the student's attention.

Dr. Wilson met the situation with a bold and constructive reform. He realized the inadequacy of mere classroom teaching and the necessity of somehow providing for the personal touch, the play of mind on mind, that is the condition of true education as opposed to mere instruction. That provision was found in the preceptorial system—the creation of small groups of students associated with a tutor or professor, whose teaching was conducted through the medium of informal conferences, closely resembling the German seminar. The idea of such a system shaped itself early in the President's mind. In addressing a meeting of Princeton alumni at New York three months after his inauguration in 1902 he had sketched the outline of his scheme, pointing to the need for qualified instructors to act as companions and coaches and guides of the undergraduates' reading. "If we could get a body of such tutors at Princeton," he predicted, "we could transform the place from a place where there are youngsters doing tasks to a place where there are men doing

thinking, men who are conversing about the things of thought, men who are eager and interested in the things of thought."

To a large extent that transformation has been effected. To secure the full benefit that might be derived from it, all the students should, as President Wilson realized, be domiciled, with the tutors, in the hostels or dormitories (residential halls), instead of living independently in lodgings in the neighbourhood. That further change he was able to effect in part. For freshmen and sophomores the hostel system became general. In the case of third and fourth year men the attempt to introduce it broke down under circumstances presently to be described. But the essence of the preceptorial system was the subordination of the formal lecture to the conversational conference or discussion. As regards that part of his scheme Dr. Wilson's success was unqualified. Educationally it raised the existing standards to a new level, while its contribution to the social life of the university in establishing new contacts and breaking down old barriers had a different, but hardly inferior, value.

The successes that marked the first half of Dr. Wilson's presidency at Princeton are not more to his credit than the failures that marked the second. He knew well at the outset that to reform Princeton education would be less formidable an undertaking than to democratize Princeton society. But he had no thought of shrinking from either task. At the end of his fifth year as President he laid before the trustees

of the university a scheme intimately affecting the future of the students' clubs. The Princeton clubs were a characteristic feature of the life of the university. The fraternities, college societies usually denominated by two or three Greek letters (such, for example, as the $\delta\kappa\epsilon$), familiar throughout American universities, were forbidden at Princeton, and their absence had stimulated the tendency of the wealthier students, of whom there were many, to associate in luxurious residential club-houses. There were twelve of these in the close vicinity of the campus, accommodating in all between three and four hundred men.

While there was nothing to criticize in the conduct of the clubs, their existence was a standing repudiation of every ideal Dr. Wilson aimed at establishing at Princeton. They perpetuated a spirit of exclusiveness and privilege, and along two distinct lines worked consistently for separation and division in the university. On the one hand, they drove a wedge between the rich man and the poor man, for the clubs were a luxury of the well-to-do; on the other, they erected a permanent barrier between undergraduates of the first two and the last two years, since neither freshmen nor sophomores were eligible for membership. At the same time they were so firmly established in the life of the society that on many men the hope of election to a particular club exerted a much more effective influence than the hope of academic distinction.

Nothing could be more alien to Dr. Wilson's idea of what a university should be, and no one

familiar with his character could suppose that he would be content to leave institutions so detrimental to the true interests of Princeton untouched. He made no direct attack on the system. He rarely chose destructive methods where constructive would serve his ends. In 1907 he laid before the trustees of the university proposals for the reorganization of Princeton on lines approximating to the college system at Oxford or Cambridge, with the difference, however, that the whole of the teaching would remain in the hands of the university itself. The proposed residential halls were therefore to be of the nature of hostels, men being so distributed that rich and poor, elder and younger, would be thrown together in a new and wholesome intimacy. There would be an end of the old aristocracy of wealth or seniority, a breaking-down of the barriers raised by an unhealthy, if time-honoured, tradition.

The merits of the new proposals were beyond challenge; they were, indeed, the logical outcome of the preceptorial system, and without them that admirable reform could not come to full fruition. In June 1907 twenty-four of the twenty-seven trustees (two being absent and one dissentient) gave them their cordial approval. A few weeks later the scheme, thus endorsed, was made public in the university, to be greeted with opposition immediate and intense. The clubs, whose existence was directly threatened (though the hostel scheme was prompted in the first instance by recognition of its own inherent advantages), set the note of the outcry. Alumni of

every generation—once wealthy club members, now substantial financial supporters of the university—rallied to the support of menaced privilege. Warnings of the withdrawal of subscriptions rained in on the Board. The trustees quailed, then yielded, before the storm. In October they called on the President to withdraw his proposals. Dr. Wilson bowed to *force majeure.* He had run his first tilt against the power of the dollar—and the dollar had won.

A second venture in the same quixotic crusade lay not far ahead. During Dr. Wilson's term of office the proposal to establish a graduate school at Princeton, where facilities for post-graduate work were almost non-existent, had taken definite shape. Dr. Andrew West, designated Dean of the Graduate School before the school was in actual being, had drawn up a report embodying his personal views as to its character and constitution. These had been circulated, but the matter rested in abeyance for lack of funds, till at the end of 1906 a legacy of $250,000 (under the will of a Mrs. Swann), coupled with the quite acceptable condition that the new college should be built on the campus as an integral part of the university, enabled the drafting of the plans to be put in hand in earnest. Much time was spent in deliberation and discussion, and in 1909, before building had actually been begun, the university received from a Mr. W. C. Proctor, of Cincinnati, an offer of $500,000, contingent on the raising of a like sum by subscription. That was not the only

condition attached, nor the most stringent. Practically the whole of the second half-million dollars was, in fact, quickly obtained. Unfortunately, the donor stipulated further that the college should be modelled in detail on the plans formulated by Dean West, and that it should be located, not on the chosen site, but in a part of the town remote from the existing university buildings.

An issue involving something far more fundamental than individual taste and preference was directly raised. Dr. Wilson realized immediately how vital a principle was at stake. Was the management of Princeton to rest with those—the President, the faculty, and the trustees—to whom its destinies were committed as perpetual executors of the founders and benefactors of the university? Or was the right of interference and veto to be purchasable by any donor whose offer ran into the necessary number of thousands? The choice was between mind and money as the governing factor. That in itself would have been decisive, even if Dean West's plans and Mr. Proctor's proposed site had been acceptable to President and trustees.


And, as it happened, they were not. What the Dean had planned, and the donor approved, was an ornate and luxurious school, severed both in situation and in mental atmosphere from the rest of Princeton, where an intellectual aristocracy would form an aloof and exclusive society, intent before all things on its own prosperity. The graduate school of Dr. Wilson's ideal was to be an integral part of Princeton. The men who

remained, or who came from other colleges, to follow the higher studies for which provision would be made, were to have as essential a place in Princeton society as freshman and sophomore, junior and senior. Their work would be an incentive to the undergraduates in embodying an ideal of academic attainment above the level of the ordinary A.B. or B.Litt. degree, and their society would effectually stimulate the development of that intellectual companionship which the preceptorial system was designed, and successfully designed, to generate.

The President stood unwavering by a principle it would be fatal to betray. It was money or mind. "When the country is looking to us as men who prefer ideas even to money, are we going," he asked, "to withdraw and say, 'After all, we find we were mistaken: we prefer money to ideas'?" The trustees were in perplexity, for there was much division of opinion among the alumni. Their decision rested in doubt, but a committee of their number appointed to consider the situation advised against accepting the gift if with it they must accept the conditions originally attached. The offer was thereupon withdrawn. Princeton had rejected a benefaction of half a million, with the certainty of another half-million to supplement it. The decision was taken to proceed with the graduate school on the modest scale first contemplated under the old quarter-million Swann bequest. The second tilt with the dollar was to all appearance over, leaving the President this time victor of the field. A great

principle had been vindicated, and Princeton was immeasurably the richer for its sacrifice.

Never had a great contest a more ironical climax. Before the mingled clamour of approval and criticism had died away an aged Princeton alumnus, Isaac Wyman, died, leaving in his will over three million dollars, bequeathed to the Graduate College at Princeton, Dean West and another being nominated as trustees of the bequest. The Dean and his plans had triumphed. The endowment from the grave was conclusive. Simultaneously the Proctor offer was renewed—with its conditions. The trustees, always hesitant, withdrew all opposition. In June 1910 the gift was accepted. Dr. Wilson recognized defeat. The academic year ended a week later, and three months' vacation gave him time to consider his future action. External influences contributed to precipitate a decision. On September 15th the Democratic State Convention nominated Dr. Woodrow Wilson as Governor of New Jersey. The same month he resigned the Presidency of Princeton. He laid down his office under the shadow of defeat, but he left behind him a record of salutary and permanent reform such as no one of his predecessors had ever established.


Newburg
Middletown
Scranton
Port Jervis
Milford
NEW YORK
CONNECTICUT
Hudson
Delaware
Newton
Stroudsburg
Paterson
Hoboken
Belvidere
Newark
NEW YORK Is.
Jersey City
Long I.
Easton
Elizabeth
Brooklyn
Plainfield
Somerville
Bethlehem
Flemington
Staten Is.
N. Brunswick
Sandy Hook
Princeton
Redbank
Long Branch
Freehold
Trenton
Seagirt
Lakewood
Burlington
PHILADELPHIA
Toms River
Mt. Holly
Seaside Park
Camden
Chester
Barnegat Bay
Atsion
Wilmington
Tuckerton
Salem
Bridgeton
Mays's Landing
Atlantic City
Millville
Ocean City
Dover
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State of NEW JERSEY
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CHAPTER III

GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY

You have given the people of this country so many persons to select for office that they have not time to select them, and have to leave it to professionals—that is to say, the professional politicians, which, reduced to its simplest term, is the boss of the district. When you vote the Republican or Democratic ticket, you either vote for the names selected by one machine or the names selected by the other machine. . . . The remedy is contained in one word, *simplification*. Simplify your processes, and you will begin to control; complicate them, and you will get farther and farther away from their control. Simplification! Simplification! Simplification! is the task that awaits us: to reduce the number of persons voted for to the absolute workable minimum—knowing whom you have selected, knowing whom you have trusted, and having so few persons to watch that you can watch them. That is the way we are going to get popular control back in this country, and that is the only way we are going to get popular control back.

Address to the Civic League of St. Louis, March 1909.

THE position of State Governor in the United States has no true analogy in English political life. The forty-eight States differ from a County in England, a Department in France, and a Government in Russia, in that their powers are original, not devolved. The thirteen colonies that banded together in 1775 to fight the War of Independence became in 1783, when the victory had been won, thirteen sovereign States, and when in 1787 the Constitution of the United States

was formulated, it conferred on the Federal Government only such powers as the individual States had chosen voluntarily to surrender. These original thirteen States determined by their precedent the position of the thirty-five subsequently admitted into the Union, the governing factor in their relation to the Federal Government being the principle that any powers not expressly conferred on the latter by the Constitution remain in the hands of the State.

The States themselves differ in the details of their institutions, but under the Constitution all must maintain a Republican form of government, which is invariably represented by a Governor and two Houses of Legislature, a Senate and an Assembly. In its main features, therefore, the State Government is a replica in little of the Federal, the Governor corresponding to the President, and the two branches of the legislature to the Senate and House of Representatives at Washington. The Governor, unlike the bearer of that title in a British colony, is not appointed by the central Government, but elected by the voters of the State, Washington having no concern with or control over him unless he should come into collision with the Constitution or a Federal law.

While each State has its own Constitution, the position of the Governor is substantially the same in all. He holds office in some cases for two years, in some for three or four. His salary varies from as low as 2,500 dollars (Vermont) to as high as 12,000 (Illinois). In New Jersey the

term is three years and the salary 10,000 dollars. The Governor is the chief executive of the State, as the President is of the Union, and he enjoys the same power of veto over legislation. He has extensive powers of appointment, which he regularly exercises in favour of his political supporters, and limited powers of removal. Since he sits in neither of the two Houses of Legislature, and addresses them only in messages delivered annually or on special occasions, his direct influence over legislation is usually comparatively small. His real power depends on his personality. A forceful Governor, like a forceful President, can find means of initiating extensive programmes, as men like Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Wilson have demonstrated in both capacities.

It was as candidate for an office involving such responsibilities that Mr. Wilson was nominated at the New Jersey State Convention in September 1910, the actual election falling in the following November. The choice of the President of Princeton as candidate for the highest executive office in the State, and Mr. Wilson's acceptance of the invitation thus extended, were unexpected, but not intrinsically remarkable, events. It has already been seen that the idea of a public career, if circumstances should so shape themselves, had taken an early hold on the future President's mind, and during his later years at Princeton he had been in much request as a speaker outside the borders both of the university and of the State. He addressed Chambers of Commerce on the control of public companies, Bar Associations on

the constitutions and functions of government, Bankers' Associations on financial topics, Civic Leagues on electoral and administrative reform, and educational gatherings of every variety on subjects with which his position at Princeton particularly qualified him to deal. He was known as a radical and a democrat, and—what is not necessarily implied by the latter term—a Democrat in the political sense.

But if Mr. Wilson's entry into active political life was not in itself remarkable, there were certain features connected with his adoption that did make both the nomination and the acceptance surprising. Nothing could be more antagonistic to Mr. Wilson's political ideals than the principles, if principles they could be called, that governed the tactics of the Democratic (and equally of the Republican) Party in New Jersey; and nothing was calculated to be more fatal to the aims of the professional politicians than the election of the candidate of their choice. But the Democrats wanted office at any cost. They had not a man who could carry the Governorship on his own or the party's merits. Woodrow Wilson could carry it, and the Democratic caucus had little doubt that once they had him elected they could bend him to their purposes, as they bent every holder of public office from Governor to sanitary trustee. That accounts for the party's side of the transaction. Mr. Wilson's acceptance is easier to explain. He had lived for twenty years in New Jersey. He had no illusions on the condition of the public administration, dominated as it had been for a

generation by one or other of two corrupt and unprincipled party gangs, working always in ostensible rivalry, though often in secret collusion. Never did an American State stand in greater need of a "clean up," and if Wilson were invested with the powers that would enable him to carry out that salutary process, he was not the man to shrink from applying them. He warned his supporters that they were running a man who went into politics with his hands free and unpledged to party bosses. They accepted his conditions, conscious of the value of a candidate of Dr. Wilson's personality and character to a party of damaged reputation, and privately satisfied that his assertion of political independence was worth exactly as much as the protestations of a dozen self-styled independents in the past.

The political atmosphere into which the university president plunged when he motored from Princeton to Trenton to make his speech of acceptance in September 1910 could hardly be paralleled in English public life. Democracy in America is theoretically unfettered. Every man votes as he will, and the successful candidate represents the free and spontaneous choice of a majority (or at least a "plurality") of the electors. In actual practice the whole system of government, municipal, State, and Federal, tends to fall into the hands of a narrow party caucus, always astute, often unscrupulous, sometimes corrupt, basing its power on an evil tradition which justifies the doctrine of "the spoils to the victor," and enables the party leader to bind his

followers to him by the actual enjoyment or the confident hope of the countless official appointments to which he holds the patronage. When a change of Administration in the Union, the State, or the city means the removal of an army of officials, who in this country would be permanent national or municipal servants, and the substitution of another army appointed by the victors at the polls, it is quixotic to hope that political life can be clean. As it is, the domination of the "machine," with its rings and bosses, operates to enthrone material interests in politics and reduce the conscientious and independent elector to impotence. Nominations of candidates are made, not by the rank and file of the party direct, but by delegates appointed usually at a carefully packed meeting, at which the party managers rarely have any difficulty in securing the adoption of a list prepared in caucus beforehand and put to the meeting as a whole. At the actual election the free and independent voter, presented with a formidable list of rival candidates for Federal, State, and local office (a New York ballot sheet in the 1916 election measured eight feet in length), backs his party ticket solid, with disciplined and undiscriminating loyalty to the machine.

Legislators thus elected are under a perpetual obligation to consolidate their own and their party's position by devoting themselves consistently to the conciliation of individuals and corporations (public companies) whose goodwill is a party asset. The prevalence of actual cor-

ruption in American public life is probably less than Americans themselves sometimes suggest, but the relations between individual members of a State Senate or Assembly and a railroad apprehensive of regulative legislation, a light or power company playing for the grant of a monopoly, or a contractor angling for the supply of goods to a public institution, are notoriously equivocal. The art of reciprocal back-scratching is nowhere more scientifically developed than in American State politics.

In modification of these strictures it should be added that the standard of political purity is much higher in some States than in others, and that, taking the Union as a whole, the level has been substantially raised in the last twenty years. Many States, by making a "direct primary" (i.e. the choice of party candidates by a direct vote of the rank and file of the party, instead of by a packed delegation) statutory, have done a good deal to weaken the boss and the party machine. New Jersey had adopted the direct primary for certain offices before the date of Dr. Wilson's candidature, but in most respects State politics were still at the mercy of the rival bosses and their subservient and interested followers. The Republicans had held the Governorship for fourteen years, and the Democratic boss, ex-Senator James Smith (who was on such terms with the head of the rival machine as to secure a substantial share of the pickings), was perfectly conscious, not merely that the position could only be won for his party by a candidate of Dr. Wilson's calibre, but that even

so the success of the candidature would largely depend on the extent to which the party nominee remained dissociated from the traditions of the party machine and relied for his appeal on the force of his own personality.

Dr. Wilson's speech of acceptance, after his nomination as candidate had been carried on the first ballot (i.e. by a clear majority over the combined votes of rival candidates) in the Democratic State Convention, defined his attitude on the political issues then immediately pending. He touched on six questions in particular, three regarded as of primary and three as of secondary importance: reorganization and economy in administration; the equalization of taxation; the control of corporations; employers' liability; corrupt practices at elections; and conservation of natural resources for the good of the commonwealth. In reply to questions he declared himself resolutely opposed to the boss system, and determined to break it by promoting the election to office of men who shared his views.

After seven weeks spent in the necessary speech-making throughout the State, Mr. Wilson was, on November 8th, elected Governor of New Jersey with a plurality of nearly fifty thousand votes. At the Presidential election three years before the Republican plurality had been over eighty thousand. The elections for Senate and Assembly gave the Democrats control of the latter, with a majority on a joint ballot of the two chambers, but the Republicans retained command of the Senate. The actual figures were: Senate,

Republican by 12 to 9; Assembly, Democratic by 42 to 18.

The new Governor's principles were early put to the test. The Democratic boss, James Smith, had represented New Jersey in the Senate of the United States, and meant to represent it again whenever there was a prospect of a Democratic majority in the two houses of the State Legislature, with whom the actual election to the Senate at Washington rested. Of that Mr. Wilson was well aware, and having his own opinion of the boss's political record, he had made it a condition of his acceptance of the candidature for the Governorship that Mr. Smith should not run on the same ticket as candidate for the Senate. Mr. Smith agreed, and at the primary at which the party candidates for the various offices were appointed the popular choice of the Democrats for the Senatorship fell on one James E. Martine. Mr. Martine having thus become the official party nominee, it was certain that if the forthcoming elections should yield a Democratic majority in the State Legislature the State Legislature would send Mr. Martine to Washington.

The result of the poll did, as has been seen, yield a joint Democratic majority of twenty-one in the two houses, owing largely to the advantage accruing to Democratic candidates from association on the same ticket with so strong a nominee for the Governorship as Dr. Wilson. When this became clear Mr. James Smith's ideas on the Senatorship rapidly changed. His health, which he had advanced as a guarantee of his good faith

when he assured Mr. Wilson he was not a candidate for Washington, suddenly improved. He decided, in short, that when the Legislature went through the formality of electing a United States Senator the Democratic majority should vote, not for Martine, the choice of the people, but for Smith, the choice of Smith. Whatever term may be applicable to sharp practice of this kind, the manœuvre was not definitely unconstitutional, and there seemed no reason to suppose that a party boss of the power of ex-Senator Smith would find it difficult to enforce his will.

A reason, however, there was, incarnated in the resolute personality of the new Governor. When the would-be Senator first mentioned his intention to Dr. Wilson the latter was amazed at the proposal, and before dismissing the subject, as he quickly did, entered an emphatic protest against so flagrant a disregard of the popular decision. Mr. Smith, none the less, proceeded with his candidature. Public opinion was sharply divided, less on the ethics of the proceeding than on the power of the machine to carry its man through, and all sections looked to the Governor for a lead. Dr. Wilson gave Smith to understand that unless a written assurance of his withdrawal was forthcoming within forty-eight hours he would denounce him publicly. The hour fixed brought no message, and the next day's papers contained a plain and emphatic statement of the Governor's views on the Senatorship question. Nor did he stop at a newspaper statement. Before the Legislature met he had addressed crowded public meet-

ings in the chief cities of the State, insisting, not on the personal qualifications of Martine against Smith, but on the right of the people to have its decision carried out. When the Houses voted Martine was sent to Washington ; Smith was beaten out of the field. It is noteworthy that where the average Governor in such a case would have confined himself to caucusing with the legislators Mr. Wilson went direct to the people. His action was in complete consonance with the doctrine he enunciated in the course of this particular campaign : "Absolute good faith in dealing with the people, an unhesitating fidelity to every principle avowed, is the highest law of political morality under a constitutional government."

This initial and signal victory over the political machine was a fitting prelude to an administration that stamped the public life of New Jersey with the personality of its Governor to a degree unprecedented in its history. The traditional severance between executive and legislative functions in the Constitution both of the Union and of the several States carries with it the inherent defect of leaving the legislature in either case comparatively leaderless. The President and his Ministers cannot sit in Congress ; the Governor cannot sit in the State Legislature. Consequently the man supremely responsible for administering the law, and therefore supremely alive to the need for legislative changes and reforms, has no direct means of laying his view before the legislative body except

through the ineffective medium of an occasional personal message, usually transmitted in writing. Constructive leadership under such conditions is almost—though not, as Mr. Wilson and a few other Governors have shown, entirely—impossible. Congress at Washington and the Legislatures in the State capitals tend alike to be controlled by a party caucus and dominated by groups representing various material interests, and directly susceptible to the vigorous lobbying of individuals and corporations intent on securing some profitable concession or effecting the defeat of regulative and restrictive legislation.

Of these dangers Mr. Wilson was acutely conscious. As far back as 1897, when he was still a Princeton professor, he had expressed his conviction in an address to the Virginia State Bar Association that "successful Governments have never been conducted safely in the midst of complex and critical affairs, except when guided by those who were responsible for carrying out and bringing to an issue the measures they proposed; and the separation of the right to plan from the duty to execute has always led to blundering and inefficiency." That conviction did not grow weaker as the speaker's experience matured, and when he found himself Governor of a State numbering two and a half million citizens he found the problem confronting him in a very concrete form. Since a revolutionary recasting of the State Constitution was not to be considered, it remained to make the best of the system as it stood. In that purpose the Governor's one asset

was his own force of character and indifference to tradition. To these qualities was soon added his victory in the matter of the Senatorship, a success that was manifestly the earnest of further success. While he conceived himself, and not a political boss, to be the rightful leader of his party in the State, he regarded himself in almost equal degree as the representative of the whole electorate—as in his executive capacity he constitutionally was—and he had no intention of allowing party antagonisms to militate against either administrative or legislative efficiency. By 1910 the Progressive, or radical, section of the Republican Party was making itself felt throughout the Union, and Governor Wilson early scandalized the more hidebound of his supporters by taking counsel with the leaders of the New Jersey Progressives, whose support he had strong hope of enlisting for his programme of social reform.

What that programme was had been stated in the Governor's speech of acceptance. Its chief heads may profitably be recalled, for comparison with the actual legislative record registered during Mr. Wilson's first year of office. They concerned reorganization and economy in administration; the equalization of taxation; the control of corporations; employers' liability; corrupt practices at elections; and conservation. Redemption of the pledges that constituted this formidable platform began early in the session of 1911, with a measure introducing the system of the direct primary (i.e. a direct popular vote as opposed to the traditional series of packed delegations and

caucuses) for the nomination of the party candidates for every public office, from President of the United States down to the humblest local official. The whole machinery of party nomination would, under the terms of the Geran Bill (the measure bore the name of the Assemblyman who introduced it), be as much under the control and direction of the State as the actual election itself. The passage of such a measure appeared to spell the inevitable doom of party bosses and machine rule ; and so in a measure it did, though in most electoral areas politicians adept at wire-pulling have revealed sufficient fertility of resource to find means for retaining, even under the Geran Act, something of their threatened domination. Such a Bill was assured of an organized and desperate opposition. Prophets of established reputation foretold a *débâcle* for the Governor. A conference of dissentient Democrats and Republicans was called to concert the defeat of the measure. Governor Wilson invited himself to the conference and addressed it for four hours. He did not kill the opposition, but he detached from it every legislator responsive to the appeal of political morality and democratic principle. The Geran Bill went through the Assembly by what, for so bitterly contested a measure, was almost a luxurious majority. In the Senate, where its rejection was counted as certain, it had a passage of unruffled tranquillity. The first undertaking in the platform programme was redeemed.

The further measures of the session of 1911 need not be considered in intimate detail. A

Corrupt Practices Act required the publication of election expenses; prohibited contributions by corporations to party funds; forbade betting on results and treating by candidates; and imposed on candidates a statutory maximum of expenditure. Together with the Geran Act, the measure went far towards transforming the political atmosphere of New Jersey.

The drafting of an Employers' Liability Bill presented some difficulties, owing to recent legal decisions in another State raising doubts as to the constitutionality of a compulsory measure on the English model. The New Jersey Bill, therefore, was so drawn as to impose liability on the employer in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary between master and man. In actual working practically no advantage has been taken of the loophole thus offered for contracting out. The Act is in almost universal application throughout the State, and has been quoted by high legal authorities as a model for other State legislatures.

There remained the regulation of corporations. State and municipal trading has made little headway in America, most of the public services which in this country are under popular ownership and direction being discharged under contract by private corporations. Hence the ceaseless stream of scheming, lobbying, and intriguing by gas companies, power companies, street-car companies, railroads, road-cleaning contractors, and the like, by which legislators, municipal, State, and Federal, in America are exposed to perpetual

temptation to corruption of varying degree. That is not the only evil effect of the system. Franchises, or contracts, conferred by the Legislature may be paid for directly by secret commissions to the members of a Senate or Assembly, or indirectly by contributions to party funds (very often to the funds of both parties simultaneously), and that outlay is possible largely because the successful company can always recoup itself in enhanced charges to the consumer.

On both grounds Governor Wilson was abundantly justified in his endeavour to put the relations of legislators and corporations on a different footing. The first measure directed to that end was a Public Utilities Bill, establishing a Public Utilities Commission such as was created about the same time in a number of other States. The purpose of the commissions is, as an American constitutional writer[1] succinctly puts it, "to divorce all corporate regulation from politics by taking it out of the hands of the Legislature and placing it in the control of a small administrative body." Such a commission, consisting usually of not more than four members, has jurisdiction over water, gas, telephone, tramway, railway, lighting, and similar companies, with power to regulate their operations and control their charges, having regard equally to the interests of the consumer and of the company shareholder, and to investigate their finances and supervise new issues of capital.

The institution of a Public Utilities Commis-

[1] Young, *The New American Government and its Work*, chap. xviii.

sion in New Jersey was one of the chief products of the first legislative session of Dr. Wilson's Governorship. Its effect has been all that was looked for in the purification of public life and the protection of the interest of the consumer. With the Public Utilities Bill was associated a similar measure providing for the reform of municipal administration by the adoption of the commission form of city government. That system involves the supersession of the municipal council of the old type, whose members are elected on party lines, and subject to the constant solicitations of corporations and their agents, in favour of a small commission, presided over by a salaried mayor, which administers all the affairs of the city, often acquiring and running by direct labour such necessary enterprises as waterworks and electric plant. The commissioners are elected for a two or three year term by a direct popular vote, which appears in most cases to have been successfully emancipated from party influences. The commission system, which the 1911 Act made voluntary, not mandatory, was in 1915 in operation in twenty-four New Jersey cities, including Atlantic City, Jersey City, Trenton, and Hoboken. Only three States of the Union had a larger number of municipalities so governed.

The measures so far enumerated do not comprise the whole harvest of 1911, and the harvest of 1911 does not comprise the whole yield of Mr. Wilson's Governorship; but between the close of that session and his resignation on becoming President of the United States in 1913,

his power of legislative initiative and direction at Trenton was seriously curtailed. The elections to the Senate and Assembly in November 1911 resulted in a Republican victory, and when the Governor met the new Legislature in March 1912 he found his political opponents in command. The handicap was less serious than it would have been under normal conditions. Mr. Wilson had never exaggerated party distinctions, and he had made it a regular practice to consult as freely with individual Republicans as with individual Democrats. None the less his influence over the houses was inevitably less than in the previous year, and in the remaining twelve months of his Governorship the legislative output fell off. That was not necessarily an evil. The main reforms Dr. Wilson had had in view were already effected, and, in any case, efficient administration was as important as sound legislation. The chief measure of 1912, an attempt to reorganize the various State boards and commissions on a basis of economy and efficiency, was largely vitiated by the Legislature, but in the following year the Governor's last official message, an appeal for the further regulation of corporations, led directly to the formulation and passage into law of the series of Bills known as the Seven Sisters, directed to the protection of the public from exploitation by trusts and combinations, and of shareholders from the manipulation and watering of stock.

It is too soon to decide how far the laws have carried out the purpose of their framer. He himself did not remain at Trenton long enough

to give them his official assent. By the time it fell to his successor to put his name to the Bills Dr. Woodrow Wilson was in residence at the White House as President of the United States. His record as Governor tells its own story. For comment it is sufficient to quote three brief but characteristic verdicts, published during his term of office, the first from a Canadian newspaper, the second from an American, the third from a British.

"Dr. Wilson's five months' record" (written in 1911) "as Governor of New Jersey have shown that he is an idealist who can down the politicians and get results."

"He is a giant, who will go far in American politics."

"To read Mr. Wilson's speeches, to study his acts, to talk with the man himself, is to be filled with a new hope for American politics. . . . There was [in his campaign speeches] none of the usual party claptrap and vituperation, no effort to keep alive meaningless party lines or traditions, no dealing in sonorous generalities. From first to last Mr. Wilson appealed to reason and to conscience."

More weighty and authoritative judgments on the Governor of New Jersey could be quoted,[1] but

[1] It is worth while appending here an extract of some length from a speech of Mr. Wilson's, delivered during the Presidential campaign of 1912, while he was still Governor of New Jersey :—

"Let me tell the story of the emancipation of one State—New Jersey. It has surprised the people of the United States to find New Jersey at the front in enterprises of reform. I, who have lived in New Jersey the greater part of my mature life, know that there is

these will suffice. And out of the Governor the President was born.

no State in the Union which, so far as the hearts and intelligence of its people are concerned, has more earnestly desired reform than has New Jersey. There are men who have been prominent in the affairs of the State who again and again advocated, with all the earnestness that was in them, the things that we have at last been able to do. There are men in New Jersey who have spent some of the best energies of their lives in trying to win elections in order to get the support of the citizens of New Jersey for programmes of reform.

"The people had voted or such things very often before the autumn of 1910, but the interesting thing is that nothing happened. They were demanding the benefit of remedial measures such as had been passed in every progressive State of the Union, measures which had proved not only that they did not upset the life of the communities to which they were applied, but that they quickened every force and bettered every condition in those communities But the people of New Jersey could not get them, and there had come upon them a certain pessimistic despair. I used to meet men who shrugged their shoulders and said: 'What difference does it make how we vote? Nothing ever results from our votes.' The force that is behind the new party that has recently been formed, the so-called 'Progressive Party,' is a force of discontent with the old parties of the United States. It is the feeling that men have gone into blind alleys often enough, and that somehow there must be found an open road through which men may pass to some purpose.

"In the year 1910 there came a day when the people of New Jersey took heart to believe that something could be accomplished. I had no merit as a candidate for Governor, except that I said what I really thought, and the compliment that the people paid me was in believing that I meant what I said. Unless they had believed in the Governor whom they then elected, unless they had trusted him deeply and altogether, he could have done absolutely nothing. The force of the public men of a nation lies in the faith and the backing of the people of the country, rather than in any gifts of their own. In proportion as you trust them, in proportion as you back them up, in proportion as you lend them your strength, are they strong. The things that have happened in New Jersey since 1910 have happened because the seed was planted in this fine fertile soil of confidence, of trust, of renewed hope.

"The moment the forces in New Jersey that had resisted reform realized that the people were backing new men who meant what they

had said, they realized that they dare not resist them It was not the personal force of the new officials; it was the moral strength of their backing that accomplished the extraordinary result.

"And what was accomplished? Mere justice to classes that had not been treated justly before. Every schoolboy in the State of New Jersey, if he cared to look into the matter, could comprehend the fact that the laws applying to labouring-men with respect of compensation when they were hurt in their various employments had originated at a time when society was organized very differently from the way in which it is organized now, and that because the law had not been changed, the courts were obliged to go blindly on administering laws which were cruelly unsuitable to existing conditions, so that it was practically impossible for the working-men of New Jersey to get justice from the courts; the legislature of the commonwealth had not come to their assistance with the necessary legislation. Nobody seriously debated the circumstances; everybody knew that the law was antiquated and impossible; everybody knew that justice waited to be done. Very well, then, why wasn't it done?

"There was another thing that we wanted to do: We wanted to regulate our public service corporations so that we could get the proper service for them, and on reasonable terms. That had been done elsewhere, and where it had been done it had proved just as much for the benefit of the corporations themselves as for the benefit of the people. Of course it was somewhat difficult to convince the corporations. It happened that one of the men who knew the least about the subject was the president of the Public Service Corporation of New Jersey. I have heard speeches from that gentleman that exhibited a total lack of acquaintance with the circumstances of our times. I have never known ignorance so complete in its detail; and, being a man of force and ignorance, he naturally set all his energy to resist the things that he did not comprehend.

"I am not interested in questioning the motives of men in such positions. I am only sorry that they don't know more. If they would only join the procession they would find themselves benefited by the healthful exercise, which, for one thing, would renew within them the capacity to learn which I hope they possessed when they were younger. We were not trying to do anything novel in New Jersey in regulating the Public Service Corporation; we were simply trying to adopt there a tested measure of public justice. We adopted it. Has anybody gone bankrupt since? Does anybody now doubt that it was just as much for the benefit of the Public Service Corporation as for the people of the State?

"Then there was another thing that we modestly desired: We wanted fair elections; we did not want candidates to buy themselves

into office. That seemed reasonable. So we adopted a law, unique in one particular, namely: that if you bought an office, you didn't get it. I admit that that is contrary to all commercial principles, but I think it is pretty good political doctrine. It is all very well to put a man in jail for buying an office, but it is very much better, besides putting him in jail, to show him that if he has paid out a single dollar for that office, he does not get it, though a huge majority voted for him. We reversed the laws of trade; when you buy something in politics in New Jersey, you do not get it. It seemed to us that that was the best way of discouraging improper political argument. If your money does not produce the goods, then you are not tempted to spend your money.

"We adopted a Corrupt Practices Act, the reasonable foundation of which no man could question, and an Election Act, which every man predicted was not going to work, but which did work—to the emancipation of the voters of New Jersey.

"All these things are now commonplaces with us. We like the laws that we have passed, and no man ventures to suggest any material change in them. Why didn't we get them long ago? What hindered us? Why, we had a closed Government; not an open Government. It did not belong to us. It was managed by little groups of men whose names we know, but whom somehow we didn't seem able to dislodge. When we elected men pledged to dislodge them, they only went into partnership with them. When the people had taken over control of the Government, a curious change was wrought in the souls of a great many men; a sudden moral awakening took place, and we simply could not find culprits against whom to bring indictments: it was like a Sunday School the way they obeyed the laws" (*The New Freedom*, chap. x).

CHAPTER IV

THE 1912 ELECTION

What the country will demand of the candidate will be, not that he be an astute politician, skilled and practised in affairs, but that he be a man such as it can trust, in character, in intention, in knowledge of its needs, in perception of the best means by which those needs can be met, in capacity to prevail by reason of his own weight and integrity.—*Constitutional Government in U.S.A.* (1908).

DR. WOODROW WILSON was not the obvious Democratic candidate in 1912. That title could more properly be claimed by Mr. W. J. Bryan, who had three times carried the party standard to defeat, in 1896, 1900, and 1908; or by Mr. Champ Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives. But neither was Dr. Wilson an eleventh-hour choice. Even before his election as Governor of New Jersey discerning politicians had written him down as a future candidate for the highest office in the Union. Some of them had given open expression to their predictions. As far back as 1906, when Mr. Wilson was hardly half way through his eight years' Presidency at Princeton, Colonel George Harvey, editor then of *Harper's Weekly* and now of the *North American Review*, had associated his name with the Presidency of the United States, referring to him as "a man combining the activities of the

present with the sobering influences of the past," and as uniting in his personality "the finest instinct of true statesmanship as the effect of his early environment, and the no less valuable capacity for practical application achieved through subsequent endeavours in another field." [1] Five years later, in March 1911, the same authority, in discussing the rift in the Democratic Party, and the improbability of the election of Mr. Bryan, again proposed as the ideal candidate "Woodrow Wilson, the highly Americanized Scotch-Irishman, descended from Ohio, born in Virginia, developed in Maryland, married in Georgia, and now delivering from bondage that faithful old Democratic Commonwealth, the State of New Jersey." [2]

If the earlier appreciation was in advance of contemporary party opinion, the latter faithfully reflected it. The election of Mr. Wilson to the Governorship of New Jersey, and the vigour of his administration from the day of his assumption of office, brought his personality under searching public scrutiny, and a large section of the Democratic Party were already convinced that in the New Jersey Governor they had found the predestined candidate for an election which promised, owing to the Republican split, to introduce to the White House the second Democratic President since the Civil War. In the same year, 1911, Mr. Wilson, who took the position that he was justified neither in seeking nor in declining the weighty responsibilities of Presidential office, con-

[1] Address to Lotos Club of New York, February 1906.
[2] Address to Hibernian Society of Savannah, Ga.

sented to address a series of meetings through the Middle and Far West, and in January 1912, by a powerful speech delivered at the Jackson Day banquet at Washington in the presence of members of the Democratic National Committee, confirmed the hold he had already established on a growing section of the party throughout the Union. The support accorded to the prospective candidate was essentially popular and spontaneous. He had no command over the national party machine. A campaign organization was established in his interest by one of his old Princeton pupils, Mr. William F. McCombs, of New York, subsequently Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and at the National Convention at Baltimore in June 1912 the New Jersey delegation brought forward the name of their State Governor for President.

For what principles did the Democratic Party stand in national politics in 1912? The question cannot be answered without some reference to the history of party divisions in America. The two great opposing sections date back under different names to the first administration of the Republic. The antagonistic forces in Washington's Cabinet were represented by Hamilton and Jefferson, the one standing for the concentration of power in the hands of the central Government, the other for a jealous guardianship of the rights of the individual States. Hamilton, with Washington giving him such tacit support as his high position permitted, headed the Federalists, Jefferson the party at first known as Democratic-Republicans,

then as Republicans, and for the last ninety years as Democrats. The Federalists were in power for the first three Presidential terms (1789-1801), but with Jefferson's election in 1800 a long term of Republican success at the polls began. Federalism had disappeared from American politics by about 1815, and for the next ten or twelve years (the "Era of Good Feeling") a single party held the field. Out of the controversies that marked John Quincy Adams's election in 1824 a new grouping arose, and Andrew Jackson was elected for the first of his two terms in 1828 as a Democrat, the opposition, headed by Henry Clay, acquiring the name of Whig.

Whigs and Democrats divided office and spoils till the middle fifties, when attempts to hedge on the slavery question worked the dissolution of the Whigs. Their traditions were bequeathed to the great party that opposes the Democrats to-day. Frémont ran unsuccessfully for the Presidency as a Republican in 1856 and Lincoln successfully in 1860. Since that day there has been no new party alignment, despite periodic threats of secession and disintegration in either camp. While party nomenclature has changed, the broad lines of division have been in the main preserved. The two sections may with rough accuracy be described as apostles of centripetal and apostles of centrifugal action; Federalists and States Rights men; the party of Order and the party of Liberty; loose constructionists (of the terms of the Constitution) and

strict constructionists ; conservatives and radicals ; but always with the proviso that distinctions valid over a period of generations may be found to have little application to the situation existing at particular moments. In recent years the demarcation has become increasingly indeterminate, and the only generalization on which it would be safe to venture is that of the parties of the twentieth century the Republicans stand, in principle at least, for a strong central Government and a high protective tariff ; the Democrats for the rights of the individual State and a tariff for revenue only. It may perhaps be added that Republicans are, on the whole, more favourably disposed than Democrats towards an Imperialist policy, a question that has become more immediate since the acquisition by America of overseas dominions as a consequence of the war with Spain.

The Democratic Party met in its National Convention at Baltimore in 1912 uncommitted to any definite constructive policy. It had been so long in a minority that opposition had almost come to be regarded as its main function. The controversy on the free coinage of silver had receded into the background, and on the tariff question the attitude of the party was so fixed by tradition that no new issue arose. The Democrats, like the Republicans, though in a less marked degree, were divided into conservatives and radicals, the latter represented by Mr. W. J. Bryan, of Nebraska, who had run unsuccessfully for the Presidency against McKinley in 1896 and 1900 and against Taft in 1908. The "platform"

adopted on July 2nd was calculated to consolidate the support of all sections of the party. It called, *inter alia*, for downward revision of the tariff; anti-trust legislation; the institution of Presidential primaries (i.e. the expression by each voter in the party of his personal preference instead of the existing nominations by conventions of delegates); a federal income-tax; publicity of campaign contributions; restriction of a President's tenure to a single term; rural credits; free passage through the Panama Canal for coastwise shipping; conservation of national resources; independence for the Philippines "as soon as a stable Government can be established."

A Party Convention in America is an institution *sui generis*. Its main business is to formulate a platform and adopt a candidate. It is composed of a specified number of delegates from each State, and one of the first duties of the Committee on Credentials, appointed at the beginning of the Convention, is to scrutinize the claims of the rival delegations in cases where a party division in a State has resulted in the dispatch to the Convention of two sets of delegates. When those preliminaries have been settled, and extravagant speeches of nomination have been duly enunciated and elaborately applauded by each potential candidate's supporters, the solid business of balloting is taken in hand.

The first day or two devoted to that process is of little account. While there are usually three or four outstanding candidates, on one of whom the final choice is certain to fall,

every Convention produces a crowd of secondary runners, most of them "favourite sons," men prominent in local politics but unknown outside their own State. The effect of the running of a number of candidates is a wide scattering of votes on the early ballots, making it extremely unlikely that any one of the candidates will in the first instance obtain the total necessary for election, a two-thirds majority being required in a Democratic Convention and a bare majority in a Republican. The voting therefore proceeds towards a decision through the gradual transference of support in the successive ballots from the candidates at the bottom to one of the two or three at the top, a manœuvre stimulated by assiduous solicitation and bargaining on the part of the bosses running the candidates high on the list.

At Baltimore the more prominent nominees included Governor Woodrow Wilson, of New Jersey; Governor Harmon, of Ohio; and Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker of the House of Representatives. The voting on the early ballots favoured Clark, who ran head for some time, actually commanding a clear majority of the Convention (though not the necessary two-thirds) on eight separate votes. He failed to hold his position and Mr. Wilson's total was steadily rising, when Mr. Bryan, whose influence with the advanced wing of the party was great, threw his support on to Mr. Wilson's side. On the forty-sixth ballot Wilson was chosen Democratic candidate for the November contest. It must be put on solemn record that when Governor Wilson was first nomi-

nated early in the Convention his name was cheered for one hour and fifteen minutes, as against one hour and five minutes of applause for Mr. Champ Clark. Both candidates, however, had a less enthusiastic reception than that accorded to Mr. Bryan in the 1908 Convention, when voices, feet, and arms saluted him for one hour and twenty-seven minutes on end.

By the first week in August Mr. Wilson had in the field against him the official Republican nominee, President William H. Taft, and Mr. Roosevelt, running as a Progressive. There was little prospect of Mr. Roosevelt's election. He had served practically the whole of two Presidential terms, and no candidate had ever so far triumphed over the fixed sentiment against a third term as to secure himself twelve years of office. The result of the split he effected in the Republican Party by detaching the radical wing and creating a new "Progressive" organization could only be to ensure Mr. Taft's defeat as well as his own.

The cleavage is to be attributed to no single cause. Personality had a good deal to do with it. Mr. Taft was an able and upright President, but he inspired no enthusiasm. He had, moreover, alienated important interests by his attitude on the tariff and on Canadian Reciprocity. His predecessor and opponent with a restless and quixotic temper combined a genuine enthusiasm for social reform—provided it followed his own prescribed formulæ—which gained him a considerable following among the more

advanced sections of the old Republican Party. The Progressive platform was a curious amalgam of the Republican and the Democratic. Mr. Taft stood on his own record as President, reinforced by a programme of trust prosecution, currency reform, conservation, and a strong Navy. The Progressives, meeting in Convention at Chicago after both the Republicans and the Democrats, issued a voluminous statement demanding extensive ameliorative action by the Central Government and the fullest measure of direct popular control over election and legislation.

Mr. Wilson, in his acceptance speech to the delegation that conveyed a formal intimation of his choice by the Convention, substantially endorsed the Convention platform (though, as his subsequent action showed, he did not hold himself bound by it), and emphasized in particular the need of so directing the currency reform measures as to consult the interests of farmers and merchants as well as bankers, and of "setting up the rule of justice and right in respect of such matters as the tariff, control of trusts, and labour legislation."

The four months intervening between the earlier Conventions and the elections at the beginning of November were devoted to the usual oratorical tours throughout the Union. Mr. Wilson's campaign speeches, their permanent value emphasized by the excision of passages of purely ephemeral importance, have been preserved in the volume edited by Mr. W. B. Hale, and entitled *The New Freedom*. As the campaign

ran its course it became increasingly clear that the Democratic candidate had victory in sight, though the abortive attempt of a demented Socialist to assassinate Mr. Roosevelt at Milwaukee in October gave a momentary impetus to the Progressive canvass.

The procedure followed at a Presidential election is to be ascribed to the attempt of the framers of the American Constitution to place the choice of President in the hands of men of proved integrity and sober judgment, who would select the occupant of the White House under a due sense of responsibility and with minds detached from the turmoil of party politics. Accordingly the election was made indirect. The voters of each State, instead of choosing a President, chose electoral delegates, with whom the selection of a President would rest. The number of delegates was to be equal to that of the State's representation in the Senate and House of Representatives combined. Since every State, great or small, sends two representatives to the Senate, but is represented in the House on the basis of population (from New York, which returns forty-three members, to New Mexico, which returns one), it follows that the electoral college is also chosen on what is practically a population basis. New York has forty-five electoral votes and Pennsylvania thirty-eight, while Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming, and others still stand at the irreducible minimum of three.

The theory of an election uninfluenced by party politics had broken down before the Republic

had been in being for a dozen years. The Presidential candidates to-day—and it has been the same for generations back—are chosen by the Party Conventions, and though the individual citizen cannot vote for his party candidate direct, he can vote for a panel of electors pledged to the party ticket. The elections for the electoral college are conducted on purely party lines. In Illinois, for example, which sends twenty-nine members to the electoral college, the voter is confronted at the polling-booth in November with a Democratic ticket of twenty-nine names and a Republican ticket of another twenty-nine. In 1912 there was a Progressive ticket in addition.

Though it is open to him to vote for some nominees of each party, solid voting is the almost unbroken rule, and since each man on the electoral panel chosen is pledged to cast his vote (in the following January) for the nominee of his party, it is known at once that a Democratic victory in Illinois means twenty-nine votes for the Democratic candidate for the White House. The election, therefore, is virtually by States. As an expression of the popular opinion it is gravely imperfect, in that the minority in any State is entirely unrepresented. Thus in New York on one occasion a majority of no more than eleven hundred out of a poll of over a million gave the whole of the State representation of thirty-six (as it then was) to the Democratic candidate, while the Republican minority, consisting of over 49 per cent. of the electors polling, commanded not one electoral vote. In the Southern States,

where the Democrats are supreme, it is a waste of time for the Republicans to go to the polls, since they can nowhere secure a State majority, and are consequently entirely unrepresented in the electoral college.

A further effect of the system is that the popular vote rarely bears any recognizable relation to the electoral vote, since the party gaining a series of small majorities in populous States like New York or Pennsylvania or Illinois secures not merely a proportionate majority, but the whole State vote, in the electoral college. In the light of these facts the remarkable result of the 1912 election becomes intelligible. In every State Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt split the Republican vote and the Democratic went to Mr. Wilson. As a result, in forty States out of the forty-eight the Democratic candidate headed the poll and secured the State vote in the electoral college, though the combined popular vote of his two opponents almost always exceeded his. The final result was declared as follows :—

	Electoral Vote	Popular Vote.
Wilson	... 435	6,286,987
Roosevelt	... 88	4,125,804
Taft	... 8	3,475,813

Though the three other candidates who ran were of little importance, their record may be given for the sake of completeness :—

	Electoral Vote.	Popular Vote.
Debs (Socialist)	... 0	895,892
Chafin (Prohibition) ...		200,772
Reimer (Soc.-Labour) ...		38,814

Only two States, Vermont and Utah, supported Mr. Taft, while Mr. Roosevelt carried Pennsylvania in the East, Michigan and Minnesota in the Middle West, and California, Washington, and South Dakota in the West. It was an astonishing triumph for Mr. Wilson.

CHAPTER V

THE NEW PRESIDENT'S PROSPECTS

The feelings with which we face this new age of right and opportunity sweep across our heartstrings like some air out of God's own presence, where justice and mercy are reconciled and the judge and the brother are one. We know our task to be no mere task of politics, but a task which shall search us through and through, whether we be able to understand our time and the need of our people, whether we be indeed their spokesmen and interpreters, whether we have the pure heart to comprehend and the rectified will to choose our high course of action. This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me.—*First Inaugural, March* 1913.

MR. WILSON'S position on his assumption of office in March 1913 was in one respect strong, in another equivocal. He was under the disadvantage, more apparent indeed than real, of being a minority President. Apart from the million odd votes divided between the Socialist and other minor candidates, he had polled a good million and a third less than the combined totals of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft. On the other hand, he found himself supported in the Sixty-third Congress, which succeeded to power simultaneously

with himself, by a Democratic majority in both Houses. The importance of that backing lay in the fact that all Bills must be passed by both Houses and approved by the President, and a difference in political colour between President and Congress, or between the two branches of the latter, makes inevitably for legislative delay and friction.

There was only one precedent since the Civil War for the complete enthronement of the Democrats. Cleveland, the one Democratic President since Buchanan, had a Republican majority against him in the Senate in both Congresses (the Forty-ninth and Fiftieth) of his first term. In the first Congress of his second term (the Fifty-third) both Houses were Democratic, but the concurrence between executive and legislature was short-lived, for the Fifty-fourth Congress, 1893-7, was Republican in both branches. It was reserved for Mr. Wilson's administration to revive the unremembered spectacle of Democracy dominant both at the White House and at the Capitol through the whole of a Presidential term.

The announcement of the composition of the new Cabinet tended to confirm the President's hold over his party, and so over Congress. The two chief posts were filled by Mr. Bryan and Mr. W. G. McAdoo, of New York, who in 1914 married the President's youngest daughter. Mr. Bryan's selection as Secretary of State was a foregone conclusion in view of the part he had played in securing Mr. Wilson's nomination in the Demo-

cratic Convention ; while Mr. McAdoo's claim to the Secretaryship of the Treasury was based largely on the impression he had created as a practical business man in carrying through the work of constructing the Hudson River tunnels. Mr. W. B. Wilson, the first Secretary of the newly constituted Department of Labour, was a miner and trade union leader of Scotch birth.[1]

In estimating the prospects of the incoming President at the beginning of 1913 three factors had to be taken into account : the personality of Mr. Wilson himself, the nature of the concrete issues that confronted him, and the trend of developing political thought in America. The importance of the first of these had been strikingly demonstrated during Mr. Roosevelt's tenure of office. The ex-President in his autobiography throws into contrast the two ideals of the Presidency represented respectively by the Jackson-Lincoln and the Buchanan-Taft schools. It need hardly be added that he neither disguises his contempt for administrators of the latter class nor conceals the assertion of his own claim to rank with the former. In the seven and a half years of his administration Mr. Roosevelt had con-

[1] The other places were filled as follows :—

Secretary of War		Lindley M. Garrison (New Jersey).
Attorney-General		J. C. McReynolds (Tennessee).
Postmaster-General		Albert S. Burleson (Texas).
Secretary of the Navy	...	Josephus Daniels (North Carolina)
Secretary of the Interior	...	Franklin K. Lane (California).
Secretary of Agriculture	...	W. F. Houston (Missouri).
Secretary of Commerce	...	W. C. Redfield (New York).

sistently lived up to his constitutional convictions. No President of recent times had initiated more formidable programmes of legislation, and no President had been more successful in bending Congress to his will. It is hardly too much to say that in the years 1901-9 the doctrine of personal rule in the United States took on a colour it had not assumed since the days of Lincoln—and the circumstances of the Civil War were too abnormal to provide any valid precedent for the conduct of government in an ordinary Presidential term.

With Mr. Taft's succession to office in 1909 the balance of power had shifted. Mr. Roosevelt had been swept forward by the impulse of an impetuous radicalism. Mr. Taft was cautious, constitutional, and conservative, and temperamentally incapable of the personal dominance that his predecessor had so effectually exerted. Under his régime Congress reasserted itself. In the Lower House insurgent Republicans made common cause with the Democrats in divesting the Speaker of his traditional power to determine the course of legislation by selecting from the intractable mass of Bills before the House the chosen few to which priority of discussion might give an opportunity of passage into law. That prerogative was transferred to the Committee on Rules, which was better qualified than any single official could be to reflect the desires of the rank and file of the House.

How was Mr. Wilson likely to stand with Congress? In both Houses he could command

a substantial Democratic majority, but the Democratic Party was by no means homogeneous, and the President's independence of the machine was calculated to modify rather than consolidate his influence. There was room for some initial doubt, therefore, as to his power, as well as his desire, for effective personal leadership. As to the latter quality, however, conjecture had solid ground to build on. No man can go through the ordeal of a Presidential election without exposing the whole of his past career to the critical scrutiny of the world; and in the four months preceding the November polling the electorate had learned enough of the President of Princeton and the Governor of New Jersey to justify the conviction that if the Democratic candidate reached the White House he would be content with the rôle neither of constitutional figurehead nor of automatic registrar of the decisions of Congress. His administration promised, in short, to be shaped on the Jackson-Lincoln-Roosevelt model, not the Buchanan-Taft.

Opinion both in the legislature and in the country was disposed to approve that interpretation of the Presidential function. In Congress Mr. Wilson was backed by a safe majority, and if many Democrats were inclined to be conservative, many of the opposition were inclined to be radical. The Taft-Roosevelt controversy, indeed, had left the Republicans temporarily impotent. The antagonism between the advanced and reactionary wings of the party had crystallized in 1911 in the formation of the National Progressive

Republican League, of which Senator La Follette, of Wisconsin, was the leading spirit. The success of the Progressives at the polls—Roosevelt totalled over seven hundred thousand more votes than Taft—indicated a revolt, of which Mr. Wilson was in a position to take full advantage, against the old party alignments and the traditions of the political machine. In one of his campaign speeches the Democratic candidate had suggested that "the burden that is upon the heart of every conscientious public man is the burden of the thought that perhaps he does not sufficiently comprehend the national life." [1] His election to the Presidency gave the speaker an opportunity such as few of his predecessors enjoyed of proving the quality of his own comprehension.

He had behind him a political following that years of unbroken opposition had made opportunist and uncertain of its principles and ideals. It lay with him to weld it into a self-conscious and purposive entity. He had around him and before him a commonwealth of citizens in swift but blind transition from old political allegiances to a new and still undiscerned concentration of forces. The impulse to revolt was stronger than the capacity to construct. Domination by party machines and exploitation at the hands of monopolies and trusts had stung a new and challenging individualism into activity. Men remembered afresh the ideals of those forerunners who had "brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the

[1] *The New Freedom*, chap v.

proposition that all men are created equal"; and recognizing how far economic slavery had replaced that liberty, and plutocracy and privilege destroyed that heritage of equality, they were ready for any leadership that could carry them on to the re-establishment of the old ideals.

Democracy demanded the right to reassert itself. The electorate claimed to choose its representatives, not merely to endorse the decisions of the caucus of machine-riggers that controlled the destinies of nine candidates out of ten. The institution of the direct primary in State and national politics, the movement for the indication of "Presidential preference" by the individual voter, and the growing approval of the principle of the initiative, referendum, and recall [1] in many States, were all evidences of the same universal resolve for the recovery of popular control over administration.

But the movement was no more than inchoate. The forces opposed to it—financial interests and party bosses—were powerful. Strong and decisive leadership was needed before all things. In many respects Mr. Roosevelt was well qualified for the rôle of leader. He had vision, energy, and a wholesome contempt for tradition. But he was handicapped by his egoism and by the almost insuperable difficulty of converting an established party, and a party in power, to a policy of inno-

[1] Initiative: Right of a small percentage of the electorate (usually 10 per cent.) to submit a Bill to the legislature and compel its consideration. Referendum: Right of the electorate to insist on the submission of new legislation to a popular vote. Recall: Right of petition for the removal of unsatisfactory public servants.

vation and radical reform. He made the attempt, and wrecked his party. For the Democrats the task was easier. They were in enjoyment of the freedom of opposition. The main permanent plank in their platform, tariff reduction, was in line with the new movement of thought. They were sufficiently disintegrated to welcome the emergence of a new constructive programme. Standing as a Democrat Mr. Wilson had a unique opportunity. If he could rise to the demands of a supreme occasion there lay before him, not a successful party candidature but true national leadership.

It was mainly in the field of domestic politics that leadership was called for. Abroad America had few commitments and only one anxiety. Some Democrats, it is true, were still exercised over the acquisition by a Federal State of a colonial empire, but the dominions were of small importance, and raised no serious administrative problems. The Filipinos were being gradually trained for self-government and ultimate independence; Porto Rico, another fruit of the Spanish-American war, was tranquil; the Panama differences with Colombia were regarded as closed. In another category Cuba, her independence restored four years earlier after a period of American occupation, was maintaining peace and achieving prosperity. San Domingo was under American administration, but occupation by a handful of marines was sufficient to guarantee the good conduct of that inconsiderable republic. In one quarter only did trouble threaten. Since the

resignation of Porfirio Diaz in 1911 Mexico had been subject to what might be termed indifferently a succession of revolutions or a perpetual anarchy. American lives had been lost and American property destroyed. Madero, the constitutional President, had announced that intervention by the United States would mean war. Mr. Taft had so far successfully averted that catastrophe, but with the situation growing steadily worse, he left an unenviable legacy to his successor.

But it was in its effect on domestic legislation and administration that the fruits of the election of 1912 were looked for first. Mr. Wilson had come in on a programme of radical Democracy. Almost every speech he delivered in the pre-election campaign had pledged him to a reassertion of the control of the people over legislation —expressed directly in the re-establishment of the freedom of election—to an attack on monopoly and privilege in industry and finance, to an abolition of the sectional burdens and sectional endowments created by a high tariff, and to the extension of ameliorative legislation and social reforms.

In entering on that crusade the new President had the mass of public sentiment with him. The Progressive platform had been even more radical than the Democratic. The newly constituted party had declared that it was "born of the nation's awakened sense of injustice," and that its supreme purpose was the maintenance of the ideal of government of the people by the people for the people. It was clear that Mr.

Wilson had little to fear from Progressive opposition either in Congress or in the country so long as he held to the course mapped out in his own campaign speeches.

His own party stood solid at his back. Since the Currency Act of 1900 the Democrats had abandoned the controversial issue of "free silver," and so removed a fertile source of dissension in their own ranks. More than that, in their insistence on the regulation of corporations and on industrial and administrative reforms in other directions they had committed themselves to the principle of a much more vigorous assertion of authority by the Central Government than the academic Democrat of the past could have approved. It is true that the Baltimore platform of 1912 had insisted, in its section on State Rights, that "Federal remedies for the regulation of inter-State commerce and for the prevention of private monopoly shall be added to, and not substituted for, State remedies," but that rather perfunctory act of homage to party tradition did not prevent the Convention from registering emphatic demands for the vigorous application and extension of existing Anti-Trust Laws; for the ratification of the proposed Constitutional Amendment providing for a Federal Income Tax; for more drastic regulation of railway, telegraph, telephone, and other corporations discharging public services; for Federal development of waterways; and, finally and more comprehensively, for a return to the unfettered rule of the people, whereby alone "can they [the people]

protect themselves from the misuse of delegated power and the usurpation of governmental instrumentalities by special interests."

It was clear, therefore, that a President committed to effective action along these lines would enter on his task free from the fear of opposition proceeding from that school of States Rights exponents that had in the past dominated the Democratic Party. The States Rights doctrine had not been jettisoned, but the party, largely through the educative influence of its candidate's campaign speeches, had by the time Mr. Wilson entered on his office in March 1913 swung itself completely into line with the President in its acceptance of such Federal action as the national situation demanded. President Wilson and his party were at one in the resolve to right certain wrongs. His vision went beyond theirs, and he foresaw that measures would be called for that the party as a whole had neither contemplated nor discussed. That raised no question of a mandate, for a President of the United States is at liberty to go where he will if his majority in Congress will follow him. But it meant that the success of the Administration must be dependent on Mr. Wilson's power to consolidate and reinvigorate his party and use it as a great instrument of national reform. It was twenty years since it had last been so used by a Democratic President, and in the interval dissension, disappointment, and the absence of responsibility had gone far towards rendering it a negligible influence in national (though not in State) affairs.

Mr. Wilson had not been forced to party supremacy by the machine. He had been called to leadership by rebels against machine rule, and he took with him into the party councils new ideals and an invigorating disregard for obsolescent political traditions. He had been chosen as candidate by delegates who realized what type of man they were nominating, and elected President by voters who realized what type of man they were calling to office. It was a new type but a welcome type, and by thus expressing their confidence in him the rank and file of the Democratic Party committed themselves to the loyal acceptance of his leadership. It was manifest already to the discerning that if he was to lead successfully he would necessarily remake the party in the process.

CHAPTER VI

THE ATTACK ON PRIVILEGE

The nation has awakened to a sense of neglected ideals and neglected duties; to a consciousness that the rank and file of the people find life very hard to sustain, that her young men find opportunity embarrassed, and that her older men find business difficult to renew and maintain because of circumstances of privilege and private advantage which have interlaced their subtle threads throughout almost every part of the framework of our present law. She has awakened to the knowledge that she has lost certain cherished liberties and wasted priceless resources which she had solemnly undertaken to hold in trust for posterity and for all mankind; and to the conviction that she stands confronted with an occasion for constructive statesmanship such as has not arisen since the great days in which her Government was set up.—*Speech of Acceptance, July* 1912.

PRESIDENT WILSON lost no time in putting his principles to the proof. He had pledged himself to an attack on privilege, and even before his actual inauguration preparations for that attack were in train. He was installed on March 4th. On April 7th Congress, which under normal circumstances would not have met till December, assembled in special session, summoned by the President to consider a new Tariff Revision Bill.

"Every business question," Mr. Wilson had declared a few weeks earlier, "comes back sooner or later to the tariff." Accordingly it was to tariff revision that his attention was first turned. The details and destiny of the Bill prepared

under his personal direction must be separately examined; but it is important to recognize that it was no isolated measure, but an integral part of a comprehensive and deliberately concerted programme for the emancipation of the people from the fetters imposed by great commercial and financial interests. In the execution of that programme measures for corporation control and currency reform stood out side by side with tariff revision among a number of minor Bills directed to the same general end.

There was no question of the urgency of the need for reform along all these lines. Republican administration, with the high Protection that formed a permanent plank in the party platform, had been the almost unbroken rule since the Civil War, and behind the shelter of a tariff wall there had grown up great industrial combinations that were rapidly achieving, and in some branches of trade had already achieved, a nation-wide monopoly. "The protective tariff"—to quote the President's own words—"has been taken advantage of by some men to destroy domestic competition, to combine all existing rivals within our free-trade area, and to make it impossible for new men to come into the field." The main object of a trust tended to be, not to serve the public but to throttle competition and use the resulting monopoly to force up prices and inflate profits.

That process involved two main stages, the first being the absorption or consolidation of existing concerns, the second the resolute exclu-

sion of every new competitor attempting to measure himself against the trust in the area—in some cases co-extensive with the Union itself—marked out for its operations. The mania for the consolidation of competing companies was at its height in the closing years of the nineteenth century. "In the single year 1899," writes Professor J. B. Moore, of Columbia,[1] "the nominal capital of newly formed combinations reached a total of $3,500,000,000, of which, however, more than three-quarters represented the capital of the reorganized companies. In the following year the United States Steel Company was organized with a capital of $1,100,000,000, besides a bonded indebtedness of $300,000,000. If a single corporation to control the vast iron and steel business of the country could be successfully established, there seemed, indeed, no limit to the process of consolidation."

These developments had a sinister political side. It was essential that the great combinations should retain a free hand for their operations by keeping Congress, and still more the State legislatures, under their control. "Control" is perhaps too strong a term to apply to the subterranean intrigues at Washington by which powerful trusts were able to secure that Bills adverse to their interests were never reported out of Committee, or that duties by which they were sheltered were never lowered a point in a tariff revision. But it is not at all too strong to apply to the handling of State Legislatures by corporations. For a great

[1] *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vii, chap. xxi.

railway to command the "machine" of the dominant party in a State served by its system was a commonplace of American politics. The Pennsylvania Railroad in New Jersey and the Southern Pacific in California were cases in point.

A corporation knows no politics, in the sense that it is indifferent which party it uses to secure its ends. If the Republicans are in the ascendant it will use the Republicans, if the Democrats the Democrats. It will retain counsel whose functions are exercised more largely in the lobby of the Legislature than in the law-courts; it will keep the party campaign chest well stocked; it will maintain permanent and effective understandings with the local bosses; its advertising gives it a hold over the more influential newspapers; and a generous but judicious allocation of free passes to editors, politicians, and State officials secures a freedom from interference with "legitimate and beneficial industry" advantageous to directors and shareholders if not to the general public. Some of these practices are now forbidden by State or Federal legislation, but it needs little ingenuity to circumvent the veto, and where it cannot be circumvented it can often be ignored without serious consequences. The result of such corporation rule is that the railroad can always count on the Legislature to refuse authorization for the construction of competitive lines, and on the executive to turn a blind eye to the varying of freight rates from the schedules set out in the railroad's charter, to the substitution of dangerous level crossings for

expensive bridges and embankments, or to the curtailment or inefficiency of stipulated services.

Commercial domination of this character has for a generation been vitiating the political life of the Union. It finds one manifestation in the lobbying of the great industrial interests when a Tariff Bill is before Congress, and another in the extensive interlocking of directorships. What that means is seen on a small scale when half the members of the board of an inter-State railway are at the same time directors of a local lumber company or steel foundry seeking special freight rates from the railroad. It is seen on a national scale when the directorates of the great combines —oil or steel or railroads—have sufficient hold over the financial houses, as they usually have through the interlocking of the directorships, to close the market to potential trade rivals in need of a loan. A Money Trust is as real and as serious a peril as an industrial trust. The extent of the identity of interests between the financiers and the leaders of industry may be gauged by the fact that in 1914, after the report of a Congressional Committee on money combines, the members of the great financial house of Morgan resigned thirty directorships of railroad and other companies, including the New York Central and other Vanderbilt lines, the Western Union Telegraph Company, the United States Steel Corporation, the Guaranty and other trust companies, and the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company.

The intimacy of the relationship between in-

dustry and transport was emphasized by Mr. Wilson himself. "When you reflect," he pointed out,[1] "that the twenty-four men who control the United States Steel Corporation are either presidents or vice-presidents or directors in 55 per cent. of the railways of the United States, you know just how close the whole thing is knitted together in our industrial system, and how great the temptation is."

These evils had not grown to maturity unchallenged. Almost every session of Congress had seen the passage of legislation directed towards the restriction of the power of the combines. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft had invoked the existing Anti-Trust Laws with effect, and many combines and rings had been broken up. But there were grave difficulties in the way. The United States lives under a double legal system, State and Federal, and the conflict of jurisdiction between the courts gave the combines, particularly where they were operating in several States with different laws, opportunities of immunity of which they were sufficiently astute to take full advantage. The Democratic platform of 1912 was basing its judgment on a sinister record of unsuccessful anti-trust litigation when it insisted, in language curiously picturesque for a political manifesto, that there must be "no twilight zone between the nation and the State in which exploiting interests can take refuge from both."

It is superfluous to enlarge on Mr. Wilson's

[1] *The New Freedom*, chap. viii.

antagonism to a system opposed to every article in his political philosophy. Declaration of war on privilege and vested interests, the emancipation of the consumer oppressed by high tariffs and uncompetitive prices, and of the small employer crushed out of existence by the organized undercutting of the trusts and restriction of access to credit, was the keynote of almost every speech he delivered in the campaign of 1912. It was therefore in full accordance with anticipation that the first domestic legislation announced for the opening session of the new Congress should be directed to the three kindred ends of lowering the tariff wall, curbing the power of the trusts, and stabilizing finance and opening up new paths of access to credit by a broad measure of currency reform.

True to his expressed conviction that the tariff lay at the root of every business question, Mr. Wilson specified tariff revision as the first task of the Congress which met in accordance with his special summons in April. That was no unfamiliar process. The McKinley Tariff of 1890, the Wilson Tariff of 1894, the Dingley Tariff of 1897, and the Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1909, all represented the successive efforts of particular interests to shift the burdens of Protection from their own shoulders or secure that its benefits should accrue to their own advantage. Of these the Wilson Bill alone (its author had no connection with the subject of this biography) was an attempt at a downward revision, and even that ended in a compromise that practically

stultified the measure. The session of 1913 was to see, for the first time since the Civil War, a determined and successful endeavour to approximate to the traditional Democratic ideal of tariff for revenue only.

From the outset Mr. Wilson threw into striking relief those Presidential prerogatives which conferred on him the power of initiative. When Congress assembled on April 7th the two Houses met in joint session to hear the customary Presidential message delivered by the President in person. Not for over a century had such a scene been witnessed. Washington had been accustomed to address Congress in person, and his successor, John Adams, followed his example. Jefferson had discontinued the practice, preferring to transmit a written message, and no subsequent President, not even Jackson or Lincoln or Roosevelt, had revived it. Mr. Wilson's reversion to the earliest precedent was an eloquent indication of his views as to the right relationship between President and Congress. The Constitution deliberately debarred the executive from close association with the legislature. Neither the President nor his Ministers can sit in either House, and their communication with the two Chambers is limited to such intercourse as can be squared with the clause enacting that the President "shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." [1]

[1] Constitution of the United States, Article II, section iii.

Mr. Wilson determined that at least such association as was permitted should be as close as possible. In his undergraduate article on "Cabinet Government in the United States" in the *International Review* for August 1879, he had dwelt on what he called in another place "leaderless government," and advocated the establishment of Cabinet responsibility to Congress. There is no reason to suppose that the lapse of years had changed his convictions, and it is clear that as President he felt himself fettered by the limitations imposed by the Constitution. The result of those restrictions was to bring the party caucus into prominence as the medium through which, if at all, the President must initiate and control legislation. Since no member of the Cabinet could introduce or explain a measure on the necessity of which it was agreed, the only method was to entrust the Bill to one of the party leaders in the Senate or the House. If the majority in either Chamber was adverse to the Administration, the difficulties of the situation were of necessity much accentuated.

From the first moment of its career to the last Mr. Wilson devoted himself by every means proper to his office to promoting the passage of the Tariff Bill. His initial message to Congress on its assembly in April confined itself to that question alone. The revision, in the President's words, was designed to forestall "a final hard crystallization of monopoly and a complete loss of the influences that quicken enterprise and keep independent energy alive." To secure that end

"we must abolish everything that bears even the semblance of privilege or of any kind of artificial advantage, and put our business men and producers under the stimulation of a constant necessity to be efficient, economical, and enterprising masters of competitive supremacy, better workers and merchants than any in the world."

The President could rely on a solid party majority, but even that did not mean plain sailing for his Bill. Democratic Congressmen were no more immune than Republican from the influences threatened interests could bring to bear. There were local considerations to weigh as well as financial. It was not an easy matter for the representative of a steel-producing or sheep-raising district to bring an entirely unbiassed mind to the discussion of the metal and wool schedules in the new Bill. Conscious of that, the President felt it the more necessary to exercise his personal influence at every point where his action or suggestion would have effect. The Bill was introduced into the House by Mr. Oscar Underwood, a Congressman (and subsequently Senator) from Alabama. The Committee on Ways and Means had begun to get it into shape even before the President had actually taken office, and he himself took an active part in their work.

The details of the measure are less important than its general trend, and it is sufficient to mention the main changes it effected. Broadly speaking, its policy was to tax luxuries and free necessities. Many food commodities, such as

wheat, flour, fish, potatoes, together with wool, coal, and leather, went on to the free list. Duties on clothing and textiles were reduced, and sugar was to be free after three years. At the same time the new Constitutional Amendment,[1] authorizing the levying of a Federal Income-Tax, was invoked for the first time, and a graduated tax, beginning with 1 per cent. on incomes over $4,000, was imposed. The yield of the reduced tariff and the income-tax was below expectations, and new taxation had to be levied in 1914.

Thanks largely to the President's assumption of leadership in the tariff revision movement, the Bill had an easier passage than might have been predicted for so contentious a measure. It went through the House in a month, but at once ran foul of the usual obstacles in the Senate. The familiar lobbying was soon in full swing, and amendment after amendment in endless succession was moved. Mr. Wilson let the process go unhindered for a time, and then intervened characteristically and with immediate effect. The Bill was a people's Bill, and the people's backing must be invoked to secure its passage. The President made a public statement on the measure. Declaring that he was ready to accept no compromise, he called the attention of the public to "the extraordinary exertions being made by the lobby in Washington to gain recognition for certain alterations of the Tariff Bill." "Washington," he asserted, "has seldom seen so numerous, so industrious, or so insidious a lobby. The news-

[1] Amendment XVI, declared in force February 1913.

papers are being filled with paid advertisements calculated to mislead, not only the judgment of the public men but also the public opinion of the country itself. There is every evidence that money without limit is being spent to maintain this lobby, and to create the appearance of a pressure of public opinion antagonistic to some of the chief items of the Tariff Bill." The appeal to the ultimate authority had its effect. The Senate passed the Bill at the end of September and President Wilson signed it, substantially in the form in which it was first introduced, on October 3rd. The first of his three measures of reform was safe in harbour.

In 1916 the Underwood Tariff Act was supplemented by a useful measure constituting a standing Tariff Commission. The President, who had not in the first instance favoured the appointment of such a Commission, came to recognize the value of the work it might perform, and in January 1916, in a letter to the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee of the House, he outlined the proper functions of the proposed Board whose creation he advocated.

"It should," he wrote, "investigate the administrative and fiscal effects of the customs laws now in force or hereafter enacted; the relations between the rates of duty on raw materials and those on finished or half-finished products; the effects of *ad valorem* and specific duties, and the classifications of the articles of the several schedules; the provisions of law and the rates and regulations of the Treasury Department re-

garding entry, appraisement, invoices, and collection; and in general the working of the customs tariff laws in economic effect and administrative method."

A Bill framed on these lines was in due course passed into law, and at the end of 1916 the President offered the chairmanship of the newly constituted Commission to Professor Taussig, the distinguished Harvard economist, an appointment that made an excellent impression.

The legislation to which the remainder of the special session of 1913 was devoted, the passage of a Currency Bill, was in one aspect an attack on privilege, in that it effectively mitigated the danger of the concentration of credit in the hands of a Money Trust. But its purpose was much broader than that. For fifty years the banking and currency system of the United States had been unequal to its financial needs. It dated back to the Civil War, when, in order to secure a market for Government bonds, Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, practically vetoed the issue of notes by all banks failing to invest a third of their capital in such bonds. Banks complying with this condition could issue notes up to 90 per cent. of the face value of the bonds. The effect of that restriction was to stereotype a note issue which was not merely incapable of expanding to meet commercial needs, but in recent years had been steadily contracting; for as the Government bonds increased in price (and notes could only be issued against the face value, not the current value, of the bonds) the banks preferred to sur-

render their right of issue, realize on their bonds, and employ their capital more profitably elsewhere. The artificial rigidity of the currency was a serious drag on commercial and industrial enterprise, and repeated attempts had been made to substitute a more efficient system. None had proved successful, and it was left to Mr. Wilson to introduce a comprehensive measure of reform that revolutionized the whole banking system of the United States.

The President's success in carrying the Currency Bill through Congress is the more striking in that, as he frankly admitted, he possessed no expert knowledge of finance. In his speech of acceptance to the delegates of the Democratic Convention that nominated him for the Presidency he had declined to commit himself to dogmatic proposals, but laid it down that at least the system established should be designed to meet the requirements of merchants and farmers as well as bankers, and to frustrate that "concentration of the control of credit which may at any time become infinitely dangerous to free enterprises."

But if Mr. Wilson had not the necessary qualifications for drafting a programme of currency reform, he knew where to find the men who had. In his faculty for drawing on the knowledge and experience of authorities of recognized eminence in fields where his own knowledge is limited the President has a good deal in common with Mr. Lloyd George. Each of them is always ready to call in the expert. Neither is prepared to be subservient to him. And each has a gift for

discussion and accommodation. In the case of the Currency Bill Mr. Wilson got the party leaders in the House early to work. As with the Tariff Bill, they were considering the form of the measure before the President was actually inaugurated. He himself took an active part in their conferences, and proposed to use the same personal influence in support of the Bill as he had exercised for the promotion of tariff revision.

The Tariff Bill had been transmitted from the House to the Senate early in May. On June 23rd the President, again addressing Congress in person, started the Currency Bill on its way. His message was, as always, terse and vigorous. He emphasized the relation of the second great measure of the session to the first. The Tariff Bill was designed to unfetter business, the Currency Bill to open up new paths of enterprise and offer practical incentives to industrial expansion. "It is absolutely imperative," he declared, "that we should give the business men of this country a banking and currency sytem by means of which they can make use of the freedom of enterprise and of individual initiative which we are about to bestow upon them." The character of the new proposals was broadly indicated by the assertion that "we must have a currency not rigid as now, but readily, elastically responsive to sound credit, the expanding and contracting credits of everyday transactions, the normal ebb and flow of personal and corporate dealings. Our banking laws must mobilize reserves, must not permit

the concentration anywhere in a few hands of the monetary resources of the country, or their use for speculative purposes in such volume as to hinder or impede or stand in the way of other more legitimate, more fruitful uses."

The Bill as finally passed by Congress differed in some details, none of them fundamental, from the form in which it was originally introduced by Mr. Carter Glass, of Virginia, in the House at the end of June. The system it instituted was singularly simple and symmetrical, its central purpose being to stimulate the fluidity of credit on a national scale. To that end every national bank (i.e. a bank incorporated under Federal as opposed to State laws) must, and every State bank might, link itself to a new Federal Reserve Bank, of which twelve were to be established in twelve defined areas into which the Union was for this purpose divided.[1] Every bank must become a stockholder in the Federal Reserve Bank of its district up to 6 per cent. of its paid-up capital, and deposit its reserves with the Federal Bank, which would always be under obligation to re-discount for a local bank, making payment in Federal Reserve notes. These, in their turn, were to be convertible into gold at any of the twelve regional Reserve Banks or at the United States Treasury.

At the centre, and in control of the whole

[1] The twelve banks are situated at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland (Ohio), Richmond (Virginia), Atlanta (Georgia), Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis (Minnesota), Kansas City, Dallas (Texas), and San Francisco.

system, a Federal Reserve Board was to be established at Washington, directed by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency, together with five members nominated by the President and approved by the Senate. Each regional Reserve Bank is controlled by nine directors, six chosen by its member banks and three by the Federal Reserve Board at Washington. The twelve regional banks are purely bankers' banks, doing no business direct with the public. Their main function is issuing notes against commercial paper for the benefit of their member banks, and they must maintain a minimum gold reserve of 40 per cent. against such issues. In addition they are expected to act as clearing-houses for their member banks.

The effect of the system is to prevent the accumulation of money power at any single centre or in the hands of any group of financiers ; and the network of conduit-pipes linking up every local bank with a regional Federal Reserve Bank, and through it with the Federal Reserve Board at Washington, gives every solvent banking house an absolute guarantee against stoppage of payment through inability to liquidate its assets ; for a panic resulting in a run so severe as to paralyze even the Reserve Board at the centre is hardly to be imagined. On the power conferred on the Reserve Board to do business in foreign markets it is not possible to dwell here, though it may in the course of time make a new place for America in the field of international finance. It was significant that certain national banks imme-

diately took advantage of the Act by opening branches at Buenos Aires and other South American centres.

No measure so revolutionary could look for an easy passage through Congress. It was opposed from the first by the bankers, who wanted a new Central Bank under their own control, and by conservatives like Senator Root and Senator Lodge, who feared an inflation of the currency, with resultant high prices. The Senate was almost evenly divided for and against the measure, but the President refused to countenance concession on any point of principle, and in the end the Bill, modified in certain unimportant particulars by agreement between the two Houses, was sent forward for his signature, which was affixed on December 23, 1913. The Federal Reserve Board, with its twelve regional banks, came into being in the following year. It has as yet undergone no very exacting test, but the soundness of the scheme has been definitely vindicated. A typical verdict was that of Dr. C. W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard, who wrote of it that "no American administration has ever before accomplished so great a contribution to the stability and efficiency of American credit and financial enterprise. Business men of all sorts—financial, manufacturing, and commercial—recognize the high value of this remarkable achievement." [1] The prospect of facing the problems raised by the European War with no better system of currency and reserve than the outworn legacy of

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1915.

Civil War days would have been impossible to contemplate.

With the Currency Act is to be associated a measure on which Mr. Wilson had laid much stress in his pre-election speeches, the Rural Credits Act, though the measure embodying his views did not actually become law till more than two years later. The purpose of the Bill, first mentioned in the President's message as part of the programme of 1914, was to facilitate advances to farmers. It was finally passed in July 1916.[1]

The anti-trust legislation on which Mr. Wilson had laid constant stress in his campaign speeches was commended to Congress in the Presidential message of January 20, 1914. To estimate its importance the nature of the restrictions already in force needs to be appreciated. The instrument on which the Administration relied in its perpetual conflict with the trusts was the Sherman Act of 1890. The operative passage of that measure consists of the enactment that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Important as the Sherman Act was, it had many defects, chief of them the vagueness of its language. The question of whether a particular corporation represented "a combination in restraint of trade" opened the door to endless forensic argument and conflicting legal decisions, while the Act was for a time emasculated through the verdict of the

[1] See p. 218.

Supreme Court in 1895 [1] that it applied only to commercial and not to manufacturing concerns. Later decisions modified the position by pronouncing favourably on the application of the Act to railway combinations, to "holding companies" (i.e. the merging of two or more competitive concerns in a corporation which acquires their stock and controls them), and to corners in staple products. It was also laid down that a labour boycott was a restraint of trade, and therefore illegal under the Act.

The real defect of the Sherman Act, however, was that it provided no sound basis for discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate competition. "Big Business," as both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Wilson recognized, is not necessarily an evil. It may result in large-scale production, enabling the manufacturer to supply the consumer with a better article at a lower price. The judges themselves appreciated that, and in the famous Standard Oil case in 1911 the Supreme Court laid it down that in each case the Court must decide "in the light of reason" whether the combination under discussion was or was not a deliberate attempt to restrain trade and competition. That was a common-sense ruling, but it threw a heavy responsibility on the Courts, and tended to divert to the judiciary a good deal of hostility that should have been directed against the legislature.

The great merit of Mr. Wilson's proposals for the reinforcement of the Sherman Act was his

[1] United States *v.* Knight Sugar Refining Company.

recognition of the fact that great combinations were not of necessity against the public interest, and his resolve to proceed by administrative as well as legislative methods. Mr. Roosevelt, who had worked the Sherman Act hard during his terms of office, had taken the view that "the true way of dealing with monopoly is to prevent it by administrative action before it grows so powerful that even when courts condemn it they shrink from destroying it." [1] Mr. Wilson was of the same opinion, and the central feature of the anti-trust legislation initiated by him in 1914 was the institution of a Federal Trade Commission, such as Mr. Roosevelt had advocated but been unable to create. The essential reform, the President had repeatedly insisted,[2] was to "let in the light" on the constitution and operations of great corporations, and the Federal Trade Commission was invested with powers of investigation and mandate that went far towards dispelling the secrecy that proved so effective a protection to numbers of combinations palpably detrimental to the public interest.

The Presidential message of January 1914 had

[1] Autobiography, chap. xii.

[2] E.g. "The processes of capital must be as open as the processes of politics. Those who make use of the great modern accumulations of wealth, gathered together by the dragnet process of the sale of stocks and bonds, must be treated as under a public obligation; they must be made responsible for their business methods to the great communities, which are, in fact, their working partners, so that the hand which makes correction shall easily reach them, and a new principle of responsibility be felt throughout their structure and operation" (*The New Freedom*, chap. vi).

been awaited with anxiety by the great commercial interests, but their apprehensions were largely allayed by its conciliatory tone. Mr. Wilson disclaimed all intention of "unsettling business or breaking its established course athwart," and let it be understood that there was to be no blind and undiscriminating attack on all forms of big business, good and bad. The specific proposals he outlined provided for—

1. The prohibition of "interlocking directorates." [1]

2. An increase of the power of the Inter-State Commerce Commission over new railway issues.

3. A clearer definition of the term "in restraint of trade and commerce."

4. The creation of a Federal Trade Commission.

5. The prohibition of "holding companies."

6. A simplification of legal processes in the interests of individuals suing a corporation on facts proved in a Government suit.


This programme was before Congress all the summer. The Bills encountered much opposition and underwent considerable emendation in the Senate, but before the session closed in October the President had secured the essence of his demands. He set his signature to two important measures, one the Federal Trade Commission Act, the other the Clayton Act, the main provisions of which (1) strengthened the hands of an injured party under the existing anti-trust laws; (2) defined certain abuses, discriminations, and re-

[1] See p. 94.

straints of trade, and empowered the Trade Commission to deal with them; and (3) legalized the boycott in labour disputes. There is a close analogy between this last provision and the right of combination guaranteed to Labour in Great Britain under the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.

The functions of the Federal Trade Commission have been outlined above.[1] The central feature of the law instituting it is the clause declaring that "unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." The Commission was furnished with extensive powers of investigation into the affairs of corporations, with authority to issue orders, against which appeals lie to the Federal Courts. Its creation meant a large and beneficial extension of administrative control over monopolies, corners, rings, and combinations. The President could with justice claim that closed doors had been thrown open, dark places explored, and the wholesome light of publicity turned on the conduct of enterprises that formed in a fundamental sense a subject of public concern.

[1] P. 110.


ARIZONA
N. MEXICO
Yuma
Tucson
Columbus
Ft. Paso
TEXAS
Juarez
Carrizal
Rio Grande
Austin
LOUISIANA
Mississippi
ALABAMA
New Orleans
Galveston
Hermosillo
SONORA
CHIHUAHUA
Chihuahua
Eagle Pass
LOWER CALIFORNIA
Gulf of California
Guaymas
Laredo
PACIFIC OCEAN
Parral
Brownsville
Monterey
Torreon
Matamoros
Culiacan
Saltillo
Gulf of Mexico
Durango
Mazatlan
Zacatecas
S. Luis Potos
Aguas Calientes
Tampico
San Blas
Leon
Tuxpan
Gulf of Campeche
YUCATAN
Guadalajara
Pachuca
Campeche
MEXICO CITY
Vera Cruz
Manzanillo
Colima
Puebla
Puerto Mexico
BRITISH
Columbus
El Paso
Paso del Norte
Ft. Bliss
Juarez
Candelaria
Rio Grande
Ft. Leaton
Carrizal
Moctezuma
Terrazas
Galena
Presidio del Norte
Gallego
CHIHUAHUA
R. Yaqui
Sauz
Los Catalos
Guerrero
Meoqui
Rosale
MEXICO
Tehuantepec
HONDURAS

CHAPTER VII

THE MEXICAN PROBLEM

What is it our duty to do? Clearly everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested deliberation. Impatience on our part would be childish, and would be fraught with every risk of wrong and folly. We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it. It was our duty to offer our active assistance. It is now our duty to show what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again and wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly counsels. The door is not closed against the resumption, either upon the initiative of Mexico or upon our own, of the effort to bring order out of the confusion by friendly co-operative action, should fortunate occasion offer.—*Address to Congress, August* 1913.

NO feature of President Wilson's administration, with the exception of his relation to the European conflict, has exposed him to more unsparing criticism than his policy with regard to Mexico. No President, it is just to add, could have had any hope of cutting such a course through the multitudinous complexities of the problem as would satisfy every conflicting section of his critics.

Mexico had for something like ninety years been a source of perpetual anxiety to the Government of the United States. The State had finally shaken off Spanish rule and constituted itself a federal republic in the year 1824. Within the

next fifty years it could boast of fifty-two presidents or dictators, one emperor, and one regent, most of whom met violent deaths at the hands of their successors. In 1845 the incorporation of the once Mexican province of Texas into the Union of the United States led to the war of 1845-8, aspects of which are familiar to every one who has read the "Biglow Papers." As a result of Zachary Taylor's and Winfield Scott's campaigns in those years Mexico lost to the United States (in addition to Texas) the vast territories to the west of the Rockies now represented by the States of California, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Though there was never serious talk, except among a limited section in the South, of further encroachment on Mexican territory, Mexico remained permanently distrustful of her northern neighbour. Her suspicions were, however, partially dispelled by the attitude of the United States after the Civil War, when the Washington Government insisted on the termination of the French occupation of Mexico (in accordance with the principles of the Monroe Doctrine), but took no step towards instituting an American suzerainty. The fortunes of the republic steadily improved after the advent to power in 1876 of General Porfirio Diaz, who, being re-elected for term after term, established what was not far removed from a dictatorship, on the whole salutary in its effects, lasting down to his abdication in May 1911.

The withdrawal of Diaz's strong hand was the

signal for the outbreak of anarchical movements, which are still (January 1917) disastrously active. His own resignation was due to the rebellion of a faction, headed by Francisco Madero, hostile to the President's prolonged usurpation of power. Five months after Diaz's retirement to Europe —in October 1911—Madero was elected constitutional President of the Mexican Republic. Revolts against his rule followed immediately; at least one of them, led by General Zapata, being generally supposed to depend on American interests (private interests, it heed hardly be added) for financial support. Madero, however, could count on the loyalty of the bulk of the Federal Army, and he maintained for a time a precarious tenure of power.

The interest of the United States in affairs in Mexico was direct and intimate. Apart from the danger of incursions across the Texas frontier, which was at this time slight, there were heavy investments both of European and American capital in Mexican coalfields and oil wells, and large foreign holdings of railway shares and Government bonds. The United States was trustee for the property both of her own and of foreign investors, for she could only discountenance European intervention, as a breach of the Monroe Doctrine, if she was prepared to give the same guarantee for the protection of British or French or German interests in Mexico as the respective Governments would have secured by diplomatic or military action. President Roosevelt had fully recognized that principle when

he went debt-collecting on behalf of foreign investors in San Domingo, and none of his successors could logically repudiate it.

None the less President Taft, who was in office during the earlier phases of the Mexican conflict, exerted every possible effort to avoid American intervention. He knew how much easier it would be to get into a war with Mexico, or with a Mexican faction, than to get out again, and there were cogent reasons against the assumption by the United States of anything like permanent responsibility for the internal government of the Latin republic. An extension of American influence south of the Rio Grande would have been received with suspicion and resentment in Mexico itself and in most of the South American States, and with undisguised disapproval in some European capitals. Fortunately for Mr. Taft, the problem had not in his time entered its acute phase. Madero was still in power as a constitutionally elected President, and though over a large part of the country his authority was openly flouted, America was able to avoid active intervention. In March 1912 the President had forbidden the exportation of arms to Mexico, but he felt able to return a reassuring answer to Madero's intimation that the first crossing of the border by an American trooper would mean war. And though American lives, as well as American property, were lost in Mexico in the course of the summer, President Taft maintained his attitude of neutrality without arousing serious criticism at home.

But the Republican administration left a disquieting legacy to its successor ; and the responsibility resting on Mr. Wilson when he assumed office, in March 1913, was greatly augmented by the fact that barely a fortnight earlier President Madero had been deposed and murdered, in favour of a rebel leader named Victoriano Huerta, who immediately proclaimed himself President.

From this point onward conflicting interpretations and estimates have been put on every article in the President's Mexican policy by rival schools of opinion in America. Each can make a respectable case for its contentions. But if that policy is to be understood at all, it is necessary to take into account at the outset certain of the factors by which the President's action was determined. In the first place, he is temperamentally a pacifist, standing somewhere—precisely where is immaterial—between the idealism of Mr. Bryan and the minatory self-restraint of Mr. Roosevelt. In the second, he was firmly resolved that no recognition should be extended to Huerta. In his eyes the *soi-disant* President was an assassin and a usurper. On Huerta's responsibility for the murder of Madero there was some conflict of opinion and no conclusive evidence, but the President must be assumed to have been in possession of information sufficiently definite to justify his decision.

But it is clear that the dominant idea in Mr. Wilson's mind from the first was the conviction that the remotest suspicion of American aggres-

sion in Mexico must be discouraged if the republics of Central and Southern America were to be satisfied as to the disinterestedness of any movement initiated by Washington for a closer association between them and the United States. The range of the President's views on a Pan-American alliance is more fully indicated in another chapter.[1] The ultimate judgment on them may be favourable or adverse, but it will at least be conceded that they fall under the head of true statesmanship, not of personal idiosyncrasy or visionary idealism. Whether it was necessary or wise to adjust Mexican policy to the requirements of the larger Pan-American purpose is a debatable question. But to realize that such an adjustment was in fact being attempted is to start with an adequate comprehension of the President's governing motive.

Whatever the principles on which he based his action, an administrator in President Wilson's position was almost inevitably fated to hold to them too rigidly or deviate from them too lightly. The task of picking the one path of perfect wisdom among the treacherous and shifting quicksands of Mexican rivalry and intrigue was beyond normal human capacity. It will be the business of the dispassionate historian of a later day to determine whether Mr. Wilson's mistakes were less or greater than any statesman of ability might be pardoned for committing in a like situation. The Mexican problem is still in process of solution, and no final judgment can as yet be

[1] P. 138, *seq.*

passed on the quality or the effect of American diplomacy in that sphere.

If Mr. Wilson was determined to discountenance Huerta, he had no lack of alternative choices at his command. Felix Diaz, nephew of the former President, and Generals Carranza, Zapata, and Villa, were all in the field, any one of them ready to usurp the supreme power if fortune should sufficiently establish his position. In point of fact, however, the President had no desire to support a particular Mexican claimant as such. He was resolved that Huerta must go, but apart from that stipulation his hope was that the Mexican people would settle their own affairs by holding a constitutional election and choosing a President who would command general support. Meanwhile a waiting policy was to be observed, Huerta being refused American arms and American loans. This policy met, at any rate at first, with general approval in the United States, though American citizens in Mexico pressed for Huerta's recognition on the ground that he alone was capable of reducing the country to order. These representations would have been better received if the average American had not shared the President's disinclination to interfere in the internal affairs of another sovereign State in the interests of exploiters and concessionaires. It has largely escaped notice in that connection that President Wilson has tacitly enunciated the doctrine that nationals of one State operating in another State for their own benefit do so at their own risk—a striking departure from estab-

lished international practice.[1] Some of the President's "preparedness" speeches, however, were by no means consistent with that principle.

It is impossible to trace in detail the bewildering changes that followed the murder of Madero in February 1913. The three outstanding events were the occupation of Vera Cruz by America in April 1914, the resignation and abdication of Huerta in July of the same year, and the formal recognition of Carranza at the end of 1915. Mr. Wilson, having resolved under no circumstances to recognize Huerta, settled down, from the moment of taking office, to his policy of watchful waiting—hoping, while taking no active steps to give effect to the hope, for the defeat of the self-appointed President by the forces of Carranza and Villa, who claimed to represent constitutional government in Mexico. Events, however, gave no sign of moving in that direction, and the situation was rendered the more embarrassing by the studied correctness of Huerta's diplomatic attitude and the truculence of Carranza.

In an address to Congress at the end of August Mr. Wilson stood by his policy, but admitted that

[1] "To President Wilson's administration the country owes its thorough committal to two policies which nearly concern its righteousness and its dignity. The first of these policies is—no war with Mexico. The second is—no intervention by force of arms to protect on foreign soil American commercial and manufacturing adventurers who of their own free will have invested their money or risked their lives in foreign parts under alien jurisdiction. . . . America has now turned her back on the familiar policy of Rome and Great Britain of protecting or avenging their wandering citizens by force of arms, and has set up quite a different policy of her own" (Dr. C. W. Eliot, *Atlantic Monthly*, October 1916).

so far it had had no satisfactory results. He had sent a personal intermediary, ex-Governor Lind, of Minnesota, to urge Huerta to abandon his usurped position and arrange for the holding of a constitutional election at which he himself would not be a candidate. The proposal was declined. The President reaffirmed the neutrality of the United States, spoke hopefully of the ultimate effect of moral force, and declared an embargo on the export of arms from Union territory to Mexico. The embargo was destined to be raised and reimposed for different reasons several times in the next two years.

Huerta himself forced the next declaration by the President, his seizure of over a hundred deputies and the proclamation of an election to be held practically under duress evoking an announcement that no election held under such conditions could be recognized by Washington as valid. Anarchy continued, the undisciplined forces of Huerta, Carranza, Villa, and Zapata holding different parts of the country in subjection. In February 1914 the arms embargo was withdrawn, since it seemed to be injuring the Carranzists rather than Huerta. In April an unexpected incident precipitated a crisis. Early in that month a party of United States sailors who had landed at Tampico, the port of the Mexican oilfields, to obtain petrol, were put under arrest by a Huertist colonel. They were subsequently released with an apology, but Huerta, faced with a demand that the Mexican authorities should salute the American flag as an apology, pre-

varicated and offered an unacceptable compromise. An ultimatum was dispatched by Mr. Bryan, as Secretary of State, and the President appealed to Congress to invest him with power to take such armed action as the situation might demand.

The House at once complied, but before the Senate could pass the necessary resolution orders were sent to the Admiral in command of the squadron off Mexico to seize the custom-house at Vera Cruz. Vigorous protests against the President's cavalier treatment of the Senate were entered by Senator Root, Senator Lodge, and others, but the explanation that immediate action was necessary in order to prevent the expected landing of a cargo of arms for Huerta was generally accepted as satisfactory. Incidentally a nice constitutional point had been raised, for while the President of the United States has unlimited authority over the armed forces of the Union, it is not he but Congress that declares war. If the landing at Vera Cruz was an act of war, the President had gone beyond his powers. Americans, however, were too anxious to know whether they were committed to a Mexican war to split hairs over the Constitution, and Mr. Wilson could count on the full support of the nation in any action he might find it necessary to take.

So far, however, all that was involved was a local and limited measure of intervention—intervention both uncontemplated and undesired by the interveners. To make matters worse, the Vera

Cruz landing was resented by Carranza, equally with Huerta, as an invasion of the sovereign rights of Mexico. But the possible dangers of the situation were averted, and though the American landing-party came in for some sharp fighting, though not merely the custom-house but the whole port was seized, and though the occupation was maintained for nearly eight months, the feared breach between the United States and Mexico as a whole did not take place. President Wilson attended the funeral of seventeen American sailors killed at Vera Cruz, and declared that they had died in "a war of service." [1]

Meanwhile events had taken a new turn with the proposal of the so-called A. B. C. Powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, to mediate in the Mexican quarrel. This association of the South American Powers with the United States opened up large questions, on which something more must be said in another chapter.[2] Their action was warmly welcomed by Mr. Wilson, and a

[1] "We have gone down to Mexico to serve mankind if we can find a way. We do not want to fight the Mexicans; we want to serve them if we can. A war of aggression is not a war in which it is a proud thing to die, but a war of service is one in which it is a grand thing to die.

"I never was under fire, but I fancy there are some things just as hard to do as to go under fire. I fancy it is just as hard to do your duty when men are sneering at you as when they are shooting at you. When they shoot at you they can only take your natural life. When they sneer at you they can wound your heart. The cheers of the moment are not what a man ought to think about, but the verdict of his conscience and the conscience of mankind." (*Speech at funeral at Brooklyn Navy Yard.*)

[2] P. 138, infra.

Mediation Conference, attended by representatives of all four Powers, met on Canadian soil at Niagara Falls in May 1914. Huertist delegates were present. Carranza, after temporizing and refusing, finally sent representatives, who were, however, excluded from the Conference because the leader for whom they professed to speak declined to assent to an armistice while deliberations were in progress.

The Niagara Falls Conference had no direct result, and fierce fighting continued in Mexico. The complications of the situation were increased by a quarrel between Carranza and Villa; but in the meantime Huerta's position was becoming more and more untenable, and his determination to resign was rumoured. In the middle of July he left Mexico City, and within a week he had set sail for Europe, having first nominated his Foreign Secretary, Francisco Carbajal, as Provisional President.

Huerta's elimination closed one chapter in the diplomatic contest with Mexico. Mr. Wilson had never consented to recognize him, though most of the European Powers had done so within a month of his usurpation, taking the view that he was at least the *de facto* ruler of Mexico and that to sustain his authority was the most effective way to secure the pacification of the country and the protection of foreign interests. The President was justified in claiming that his policy of watchful abstention had had its reward; but the question remained whether the result achieved had involved an undue sacrifice of American in-

terests, and whether a settlement in Mexico would be any more practicable after Huerta's departure than it was before. To that both affirmative and negative answers were confidently returned by differing schools of political opinion in the United States.

It could not be claimed that the position showed any immediate improvement. The Huertist nominee, Señor Carbajal, held office for just a month, and then began a further prolonged period of anarchy, in which the three predominant figures were Carranza, Villa, and Zapata. Each of them held a portion of the country under military control, each of them gained temporary possession of the capital, and there was generally under negotiation some short-lived combination of any two of the factional leaders against the third. In October (1914) an abortive conference between the three was held at Aguas Calientes. In November the American forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz. In December the self-declared President Zapata was at Mexico City, the self-declared President Villa with his forces a little farther to the north, and the self-declared President Carranza at Vera Cruz. Villa for a time appeared to be in the ascendant, but the balance of power was perpetually shifting as the lieutenants and nominees of the different generals betrayed their respective leaders.

After another six months of continued anarchy Mr. Wilson made a further move. In January (1915) he had delivered a brief but much-dis-

cussed speech at Indianapolis, in which he declared that it was not the business of the United States to interfere in Mexican internal affairs, even to reduce anarchy to order.

"Have not the European nations," he asked, "taken as long as they wanted and spilled as much blood as they pleased in settling their affairs, and shall we deny that to Mexico because she is weak? No, I say. I am proud to belong to a great nation that says, 'This country which we could crush shall have as much freedom in her own affairs as we have.'"

Events, however, compelled a change of attitude, and at the beginning of June 1915 (when Washington, and the whole nation, was deeply preoccupied with the *Lusitania* controversy), the President issued a statement to the American people through the Press declaring that the United States could not permit the conditions then existing in Mexico to continue. Failing the immediate establishment of a constitutional Government by the Mexican leaders, the United States Government would be constrained to decide what means it should employ "to help Mexico to save herself and serve her people."

The warning had no immediate result, and early in August a conference of delegates of Latin-American States met at Washington on the invitation of the United States Government. In addition to the three A. B. C. Powers, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Uruguay were represented on this occasion. The conference issued a memorandum giving Mexico three months to put her affairs in

order, in default of which joint Pan-American intervention would be undertaken. By this time, however, the Carranzistas were gradually establishing a mastery over their rivals, and by the end of October they were in effective possession of more than two-thirds of Mexico. At this point Mr. Wilson decided to recognize Carranza and his Government, and early in December Great Britain and the rest of the Entente Powers simultaneously extended similar recognition. The close of the year 1915 appeared to bring a new dawn of hope for Mexico. Once again Mr. Wilson might claim, with at least a colourable show of justice, that his policy of abstention had had its reward.

But there would appear to be no finality in a Mexican settlement. The year 1916, which it was hoped would see the progressive and complete pacification of the distracted country, was to bring the Washington Government far closer to open war with Mexico than it had been even at the height of the Vera Cruz crisis. The fact that Carranza had been recognized did not mean that Villa was done with. In January his bandit forces gave evidence of their activity by murdering a party of fifteen Americans near Chihuahua, and two months later a Villista raiding party four hundred strong crossed the American frontier, descended on the border town of Columbus, New Mexico, was engaged by United States cavalry, and finally retired with considerable loss, against which was to be set the death of four American cavalrymen and eleven civilians.

The whole Mexican problem was reopened in the most acute form. A punitive detachment was ordered to pursue the bandits across the Mexican frontier, and preparations were made for substantial reinforcements to follow on its heels. On March 15th five thousand American troops under General Pershing crossed the border in pursuit of Villa. The difficulties and possible consequences of the enterprise were fully understood at Washington. The prospects of rounding up the bandit were small, for he was a skilful guerilla leader, and the ground, broken everywhere by valleys and mountains, suited his purpose admirably. At the same time the effect on Mexico of an American invasion, even under the guise of a punitive expedition, was problematic. Carranza at once showed signs of resentment, and though he was pacified for the moment by a reciprocal agreement authorizing him to pursue Villistas across the American border in case of need, both his good faith and his authority over his followers remained doubtful.

The Pershing expedition made rapid progress, penetrating so far into Mexico as to excite grave apprehension as to its fate in the event of a sudden coalition between Villistas and Carranzistas against the invader. The troops, however, fought a successful engagement, in which Villa was for a time believed to have been killed, and then, in the middle of April, Washington learned simultaneously of the issue by Carranza of a truculent note demanding the withdrawal of the troops, and of a treacherous attack by a town mob on an

American detachment passing through Parral in the State of Chihuahua. Early in May a conference between the United States Generals Scott and Funston and the Mexican General Obregon resulted in a temporary and unsatisfactory compromise, and a week later Mr. Wilson called out the militia of the border States of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico for patrol work.

Carranza's attitude grew more threatening, and at the end of May he again demanded with menaces the withdrawal of the American force. On June 18th Mr. Wilson called out the militia of all the American States for service on the Mexican border, but most of them mobilized in a state of deplorable inefficiency. A firm Note was at the same time dispatched to Carranza and warships were ordered to Mexican ports. Meanwhile news arrived of a serious collision between American troops and a body of official Carranzistas (not the outlaw Villistas) at Carrizal, ninety miles south of El Paso. Seventeen Americans were captured and forty killed.

War—for which America had no adequate military provision—now appeared inevitable, but at the end of June the situation suddenly eased, Carranza releasing the seventeen American prisoners, and a little later proposing the submission of outstanding questions to a Joint Commission of representatives of the two countries. President Wilson accepted the suggestion, and the Commission was appointed and began its deliberations at New London (Connecticut) early in September, transferring later to Atlantic City

(New Jersey). The tension diminished while a *modus vivendi* was under discussion, and though General Pershing's force still remained in Chihuahua, a considerable proportion of the militiamen were sent back to their own States. The position at the end of 1916 was that the Commission had worked out a scheme for a joint patrol of the border calculated to remove the danger of future raids. Carranza declined the proposal. Villa had not been caught, and there was little prospect that he would be. Under those circumstances the early withdrawal of General Pershing's force was regarded as certain, and at the end of January 1917 the War Department at Washington definitely announced its recall. Mexico was once more to be left to work out its own salvation.

A comparatively detailed examination of the Mexican problem has been needed to demonstrate the nature and magnitude of President Wilson's difficulties. His critics—and they are many—maintain that he has shown himself a pure opportunist in his attitude towards Mexico; that he has never evolved a settled policy; and that such action as he has taken from time to time has been bad for the United States and bad for Mexico. Mr. Roosevelt has characteristically declared that more American lives have been sacrificed while peace was raging in Mexico than were lost in the whole of the Spanish-American War. It is contended that in declining to recognize Huerta the President actually defeated his own object, by enabling the usurper to appeal effectively to

national resentment against foreign interference; that in attempting to influence the succession to Diaz, Mr. Wilson went beyond his constitutional powers; that he has throughout failed to uphold American prestige and defend American material interests; that his advice to American citizens to leave Mexico was a confession of weakness; and his impositions and withdrawals of the embargo on the export of arms an indication of vacillation and indecision.

That on the one hand. On the other, it is certain that even in the crisis of 1916 the bulk of the American nation desired above all things to be kept out of war, partly on account of the inadequacy of the military establishment, partly because it was generally held that the result of war must be annexation, a course which would have aroused bitter hostility and suspicion throughout the whole of Latin America. As it is, the supporters of Mr. Wilson's Mexican policy maintain, signal proof has been given of the absolute disinterestedness of the United States, and the fruits of the President's adhesion to that high principle will be reaped in the establishment of a new relationship of trust and confidence with the numerous republics of Central and South America.

Full justice will be done to the case for Mr. Wilson under this head if it is finally summarized in some striking declarations made to a New York paper [1] in July 1916 by one of the ablest members of the Cabinet, Mr. Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of the Interior.

[1] *New York World*, July 16, 1916.

"President Wilson's Mexican policy," Mr. Lane asserted, "is one of the things of which, as a member of his Administration, I am most proud. It shows so well his abounding faith in humanity, his profound philosophy of democracy, and his unshakable belief in the ultimate triumph of Liberty, Justice, and Right. He has never sought the easy solution of any of the difficult questions that have arisen in the last three years. He has always sought the right solution.

"Mr. Wilson's Mexican policy has not been weak and vacillating. It has been definite and consistent, firm and constructive. The policy of the United States toward Mexico is a policy of hope and of helpfulness; it is a policy of Mexico for the Mexicans.

"President Wilson has clearly seen the end that he desired from the first, and he has worked toward it against an opposition that was cunning and intensive, persistent and powerful. If he succeeds in giving a new birth of freedom to Mexico, he most surely will receive the verdict of mankind."

Between these conflicting estimates every student of the facts is qualified to make his choice.

CHAPTER VIII

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

One of the chief objects of my Administration will be to cultivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of our sister republics of Central and South America. The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interest of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents, which shall redound to the profit and advantage of both, and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither. From these principles may be read so much of the future policy of this Government as it is necessary now to forecast.—*Presidential Statement of March* 11, 1913.

FOR ninety years the Monroe Doctrine has been the charter of American foreign policy. It has never had, and has not now, any legal sanction. It is not embodied in the American Constitution. It has never been adopted as a permanent policy by a joint vote of the two Houses of Congress. Its *prima facie* authority is such as pertains to an enunciation of policy by a President of no particular distinction at a time when little more than a generation had elapsed from the final establishment of American independence.

The true importance of the Monroe Doctrine is derived, not from the immediate circumstances which evoked its formulation, but from the fidelity with which it voices the consensus of political thought on the foreign relations of America from

Washington's day to Wilson's. The history of the Doctrine may be briefly recalled. Throughout the second decade of last century the Spanish colonies in Latin America had been in revolt against the mother country. In 1822 the Holy Alliance (Russia, Austria, and Prussia) took in hand the chaotic affairs of Spain, and it became apparent that the immediate sequel to the settlement of Spain in Europe would be an expedition for the subjugation of the revolted Spain in America.

That prospect was equally distasteful to Great Britain and to the United States ; to Great Britain by reason of her distrust of the growing power of the Holy Alliance ; to the United States on account of her sympathy with what were now the South American republics, and her fear of the consequences of a bitter and prolonged war close to her borders. Accordingly Canning took counsel with the then American Minister in London, Richard Rush, and out of their conversations emerged the declaration in respect of which Canning three years later claimed that he had "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."

That declaration was addressed by President Monroe to Congress in his (written) message of December 2, 1823. It fell under three heads, the following being the salient clauses :—

1. "We should consider any attempt on their [the members of the Holy Alliance] part to extend their system [1] to any part of this hemisphere as

[1] i.e. monarchy.

dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we shall not interfere."

2. "Our policy in regard to Europe . . . is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers."

3. "The American continents . . . are not henceforth to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power."

The Doctrine embodied the policy succinctly defined by the aged Jefferson six weeks earlier in a letter to Monroe, laying it down that "our first and fundamental doctrine should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe, our second never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." It was invoked by Andrew Johnson when he insisted on the evacuation of Mexico by French forces in 1867, and by Cleveland when he claimed a voice for the United States in the boundary dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain in 1895; while President Roosevelt carried it a step further in taking over the financial administration of San Domingo in 1907 in order to satisfy claims that might otherwise have justified intervention by foreign creditors.

When Mr. Wilson took office in 1913 he found himself committed to a foreign policy, and an application of the Monroe Doctrine, of which not more than three of his predecessors had had experience. The exclusion of European Powers from colonization of American soil had been sufficient to safeguard the continent in the days

when Monroe's Doctrine was formulated. It was not sufficient when the Russo-Japanese War had suddenly revealed the presence, ten days' steaming across the Pacific, of a nation equal in military achievement to any European Power, and destined inevitably to seek early opportunities of expansion. The need for broadening the formula became very clear during the presidencies of Mr. Wilson's immediate predecessors, and an unofficial corollary was added to it by a declaration of the Senate in 1912, when Japanese were reported to be negotiating for interests in a harbour on the western coast of Mexico, that such a development could not be viewed by the United States without grave concern.

The new importance attaching to foreign policy generally arose from the fact that down to the Spanish War of 1898 America had had no overseas possessions and never contemplated acquiring any. No provision was made in the Constitution for the administration of dependencies that were neither States of the Union nor self-governing territories, and there was a strong feeling that for a democracy, certainly for a federal democracy, dependencies were an anomaly. When at the end of the war with Spain the Union found itself unexpectedly and through force of circumstances in possession of a number of islands in the Atlantic and Pacific, the first thought was how to get rid of them again. Cuba was never fully acquired. It was given its independence, with certain reservations in the matter of its foreign relations, and it now conducts its own affairs under a very loose

American suzerainty. The Philippines were a more serious problem, as they were clearly not ready for immediate self-government, and these islands, like Porto Rico, were put under an executive appointed by the President of the United States, with a Chamber elected on a popular franchise. The Democratic platform of 1912 demanded that the United States should "recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable Government can be established." Mr. Wilson took an early opportunity of indicating his approval of that policy, and it was clear that the matter would come before Congress before the new Administration had run its course.

But more important than any single issue in this field was the attitude of the President to the policy declared in the Monroe Doctrine and all the implications arising from it. The Doctrine was popularly regarded, and with much justice, as being mainly negative and precautionary in character. Europe was warned off America; America was pledged against interference in Europe. To Mr. Wilson Monroe's principle involved much more than that. Apart from the European War, which, as the President early realized, may entail a radical restatement or an almost entire abandonment of the Doctrine, he recognized that it must have positive applications hardly less important than the negative. If it conferred rights it equally imposed duties. America could not prohibit European interference i countries where large European interests were stake unless she was prepared to assume some

trusteeship for those interests herself. That doctrine had been severely strained in Mexico, and had European Powers been less ready to repose confidence in Mr. Wilson a serious position might have arisen. In the island divided into the republics of San Domingo and Hayti the United States was compelled, out of regard to its own and foreign interests, to enter and administer, the responsibility being assumed in the case of San Domingo by Mr. Roosevelt and in the case of Hayti by Mr. Wilson.

But President Wilson carried the Monroe Doctrine farther still. Influenced at once by a sincere altruism and by a necessary regard for the interests of the United States, he visualized a relationship between the twenty-one republics of the American Continent that would, so far as there is any faith in bonds and treaties, guarantee the whole continent against the perils of external attack and internal dissension. The danger of such attack was no mere bogy of apprehensive statesmen. Mention has already been made of American distrust of the intentions of Japan, and the European War had inspired equal anxiety as to Germany's future attitude towards South America. In this country there seems to be no popular recognition of the almost limitless potentialities of South America, or of the culture and prosperity to which many parts of Argentina, Brazil, and other States have already attained. There is no such lack of knowledge or of enterprise in Germany. German capitalists and traders have of late years been concentrating their efforts

on South America, and characteristically applying themselves to their task with far more thoroughness than their rivals of other nations ever exhibited.

"The number of North Americans in Buenos Aires," wrote a well-known American author in 1911, "is very small. While we have been slowly waking up to the fact that South America is something more than 'a land of revolutions and fevers,' our German cousins have entered the field on all sides. The Germans in South Brazil are a negligible factor in international affairs, but the well-educated young German who is being sent out to capture South America commercially is a force to be reckoned with. He is going to damage England more than Dreadnoughts or gigantic airships." [1]

The German trader in South America is as great a menace to the United States as to Great Britain, for it is south of Panama that the American manufacturer should find the chief market for his growing output. The urgency of Germany's need for commercial expansion after the war is palpable, and unless she secures such peace terms as only victory can give her, it will be to South America first that she will look for her market. The gravity of that prospect in President Wilson's eyes lies not in the possibility of acute competition with American traders, but in the danger of the financial penetration of some weak Latin State, with the almost inevitable sequel of diplomatic or even military intervention by the lending

[1] Hiram Bingham, *Across South America.*

Power in the case of friction or default. In that event Washington would have the choice between washing its hands of the Monroe Doctrine and embarking on a war with Germany.

There was only one sure way in which that danger could be averted. The European Power that could look with contempt on Guatemala or Costa Rica or Nicaragua would find it a perilous adventure to come into collision with a Pan-American alliance backed by the naval and financial resources of the United States and Argentina and Brazil—so perilous, indeed, that the mere existence of the alliance would be an almost certain guarantee against aggression. That, at least, was President Wilson's belief, and its influence can be traced through the whole of his foreign policy. He was fully conscious that there could be no question of tutelage by the United States. The mere suspicion of such tutelage was the greatest obstacle to the project he had set before him. A strong tendency towards jealousy and distrust marked the attitude of every Latin-American State towards the Union, fostered by such specific influences as the memory of the seizures of territory from Mexico in 1846 and the more recent acquisition of the Panama zone during Mr. Roosevelt's Presidency. There was a general belief that the fixed aim of the United States was the extension of her political influence southward, and if that suspicion had been encouraged by armed intervention in Mexico all hope of carrying through a Pan-American agreement would have been finally dissipated.

As it was Mr. Wilson was able, not merely to avoid creating suspicion, but actually to use the Mexican trouble as an instrument for the furtherance of his larger purpose, by meeting on equal terms in 1914, and again in 1915, delegates from several of the Latin-American States in conferences on a Mexican settlement.

Those guarantees of the good faith of the United States assured a favourable reception for the proposals publicly outlined by the President at the Pan-American Scientific Congress at Washington early in 1916. The conference was ostensibly devoted to scientific deliberations. Actually it was the occasion for the discussion of a pronouncement of the most vital and far-reaching importance to every American State. That pronouncement was embodied in the speech delivered by President Wilson on January 6th, when he laid before the Congress proposals for the conclusion of an understanding between all the American Republics on the following basis :—

1. Mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity.

2. Settlement of all disputes not touching independence by arbitration or friendly discussion.

3. Maintenance in every State of the republican form of government.

4. No equipment of a revolutionary force in, or exportation of arms from, one State to the detriment of the Government of another.

In view of the frequency of filibustering expeditions across the boundaries of certain Central

and South American States the importance of the last provision needs no emphasis.

Mr. Wilson's proposals were endorsed at the same Congress by Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, who dwelt on the value to every American republic of an understanding that would give expression to their common ideals for their common benefit. The proposals were received with general approval, and negotiations for the conclusion of a series of treaties to carry them into effect have since been in progress, though none of the treaties have as yet (February 1917) been ratified.

The full significance of President Wilson's Pan-American alliance cannot yet be gauged, for it opens up possibilities on which it is too early to pronounce. In one direction extension inevitably suggests itself. The Pan-American proposals as at present outlined embrace the whole of the American continent from Cape Horn to the Great Lakes. Is it impossible that the northern limit should be, not the Great Lakes but the Arctic Ocean? That is manifestly part of a much larger problem. British colonies, even self-governing colonies, do not enter into diplomatic agreements independently of the Mother Country, and the question of Great Britain's alliances will have to be considered as part of, or as sequel to, the war settlement. It need only be remarked that an alliance between the British Empire and a league of Pan-American Republics would provide a new and durable element of stability in international politics. The possibility of such a

development has not been overlooked in America, where it was pointed out by responsible critics immediately on the publication of Mr. Wilson's speech that it was absurd to talk of Pan-Americanism and ignore the fact that one of the greatest of the American Powers was not included in it; and that only a combination of the Latin Republics, the United States, and Great Britain could make Pan-Americanism a safe and useful principle of foreign policy.

The Pan-American proposals are essentially an extension of, not a derogation from, the Monroe Doctrine, for they provide effective safeguards for the Doctrine's central principle, the prohibition of European interference in American affairs. Incidentally they are calculated to dispel all Latin suspicion of the United States, for they will, if ratified, effectively prevent the Washington Government from acquiring by conquest or annexation a single square foot of territory south of the Rio Grande. What effect they might have on European commercial penetration in Latin America is problematic, but the tendency would no doubt be towards the policy publicly advocated by Mr. Wilson, of inviting the financier from the Eastern hemisphere to come rather as an investor than a concessionaire.

Mr. Wilson's Pan-American aims have been discussed thus early in this chapter on account of the light they throw on the character of his foreign policy as a whole. He has always looked beyond the immediate interests of the United States, and it is not surprising that a section of

his compatriots should accuse him from time to time of idealistic altruism. The grounds for that charge were provided by a number of decisions taken by the President in the first two years of his administration. The first of these, important only as a revelation of Mr. Wilson's point of view, was his advice to American financiers to withdraw from the Six Power Group in China, on the ground that America ought to have no part in arrangements that promised to infringe China's diplomatic and territorial integrity. Far more important was the President's action in regard to the Panama Canal Tolls in 1914. That question was a legacy from the previous Administration. When Great Britain had agreed to leave the United States a free hand in the construction of the proposed Panama Canal it was stipulated, by the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, that the tolls levied should apply to the shipping of all nations equally and without discrimination. In spite of that an Act had been passed by Mr. Taft's Administration in 1912 exempting all coastwise shipping from tolls. The ground taken by the defenders of this measure—including Mr. Taft, himself a jurist of some distinction—was that as coastwise trade was confined to American vessels decisions taken with regard to it were no concern of any external Power, a position vigorously contested by the British and other European Governments. No agreement had been reached when Mr. Wilson took office, and the expiring Congress had not responded to Sir Edward Grey's proposal to submit the whole matter to arbitration. There

was a considerable body of opinion in America which held that the Act of 1912 had contravened existing treaty obligations, but against that was to be set the strong national feeling of some millions of patriotic citizens quite unqualified to pronounce on the legal merits of the case.

President Wilson early decided that the Act must be repealed, though the Democratic platform of 1912 had pronounced in its favour. There was no opportunity of dealing with the question in the crowded session of 1913, but in March 1914 the President went down to Congress to urge the cancellation of the exemption provisions. In a brief but impressive address he gave it as his judgment that "exemption is in plain contravention of the Treaty with Great Britain concerning the Canal concluded on November 19, 1901"; and in the light of that conclusion he proceeded (in language that is not without a bearing on the much-discussed "too proud to fight" passage in a later speech) to contend that "we are too big and powerful and too self-respecting a nation to interpret with too strained or refined a reading of words our own promises just because we have power enough to give us leave to read them as we please," and that as a consequence "the large thing to do is the only thing we can do—voluntary withdrawal from a position everywhere questioned and misunderstood." The message ended with an enigmatic sentence generally interpreted as referring to the Mexican difficulty, in which the President declared that if repeal was not granted

"I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence."

It is a striking tribute to the force of the President's personality that his appeal for action running counter to the judgment of a substantial section, and to the sentiment of a much more substantial section, of the American people should have proved immediately effective. The divisions in the two Houses produced a good deal of cross-voting, Mr. Underwood and a number of Democrats opposing the measure, while Senator Lodge and several other Republicans supported it. The Bill was passed by the House by 247 votes to 162, and by the Senate by 50 to 35. It was signed by the President in June 1914.

Two other minor measures concerning Panama revealed in the President the same desire for straight dealing that he had evinced in the matter of the tolls. The original owner of the Panama Canal zone was Colombia, and it was while President Roosevelt was actually negotiating with Colombia for its acquisition that a fortuitous revolution in the Panama area enabled him to abandon the deal with the larger republic and purchase the Canal rights from the insurgent population then organizing itself as the State of Panama. The revolution proved of the highest benefit to the United States, but Mr. Roosevelt's attitude towards Colombia was emphatically condemned by a section of his own countrymen—and as emphatically defended by the President himself and his partisans. Colombia presented

various demands to the United States, the most tangible a claim for the payment of $10,000,000, which had not been met when Mr. Wilson came into office. Consistently with his views on Pan-American union, he held that the United States could and should afford to be generous rather than rigidly just in its relations with a small Latin republic, and he proposed the payment to Colombia of $25,000,000 in settlement of all claims. A treaty on that basis was approved by the Senate in 1916, but is not yet [1] ratified.

A somewhat similar arrangement was effected with Nicaragua, which possessed a rival canal route. By an incomprehensible departure from the President's consistent principles a Bill was presented by Mr. Bryan in 1913 which would have practically established a United States protectorate over Nicaragua. It failed to pass the Senate, and in 1916 a treaty on much more reasonable lines, securing to the United States a naval base on the Nicaraguan coast and an option on the Canal route in consideration of a payment of $3,000,000 to Nicaragua, was signed and ratified. The initial object of both these transactions was to provide against the acquisition of rival canal routes by any extra-American Power; but the spirit in which they were negotiated made effectively for the restoration of goodwill between the United States and two weak but suspicious Latin republics. A similar anxiety for the prosperity of the Panama Canal led in 1916 to the acquisition on purely strategic

[1] January 1917.

grounds of the Danish West Indies, which lay within striking distance of the Canal in the Caribbean Sea. Their purchase had been under negotiation on various occasions from the time of the Civil War onwards.

Two other particular problems, immigration restrictions and Philippine independence, and one general, the negotiation of peace treaties with all Powers prepared to accept them, occupied the attention of the State Department during Mr. Wilson's first Administration. The immigration question caused him much personal anxiety. Asiatic immigration on the Pacific slope was always a fruitful source of friction, and in 1913 matters were brought to a head by the introduction into the Californian legislature of a Bill prohibiting aliens ineligible for citizenship of the United States from holding land in the State. This provision was manifestly aimed at the Japanese fruit-planters settled in California, and it provoked forcible protests on the part of the Japanese Ambassador. The Bill passed the Californian Lower House by a large majority, and despite a personal appeal from Mr. Wilson, and a conference between the State Government and Mr. Bryan, whom the President sent West to try and stop the Bill, it was passed by the Senate and signed by the Governor. During its discussion an amendment was inserted which saved the measure from actually infringing existing treaties with Japan (in which case the Supreme Court might have invalidated it), but left the Act provocative and offensive to the

fruit-growers themselves, their Ambassador, and their Government.

The immigration problem confronted the President at Washington as well as in California. In 1914 two measures were introduced into Congress, one a general Immigration Bill, the other a Japanese Exclusion Bill. The latter was shelved through Mr. Wilson's influence, but the former was proceeded with and eventually passed by both Houses. Apart from codifying clauses, the measure provided for the exclusion of African negroes and imposed a literacy test which the President considered would involve harsh and unjust discrimination against a large class of immigrants, including political refugees, whom America had readily admitted in the past and whom she should be prepared to welcome still. Accordingly he made this one of the rare occasions for exercising his Presidential veto, and the Bill in consequence lapsed. It was, however, reintroduced in the following session in a form even more antagonistic to the President's views, and passed the Senate by an overwhelming majority (64 votes to 7). In January 1917 it once again came before the President for his assent, and once again that assent was refused.

Japan was indirectly involved in another question which has caused and will cause some embarrassment to succeeding administrations at Washington. The Philippine Islands, like Cuba and Porto Rico, passed from Spanish control to American after the war of 1898, but conditions in the two cases were entirely different, in that

the Philippines lay some four thousand miles from the shores of America. Therein lay the crux of the Philippine problem. The islands could not be defended if the United States should ever find itself involved in a war with a naval Power. Interest, therefore, confirmed the conclusion which sentiment dictated, that they should be relinquished at the earliest possible moment. That, however, was no simple matter. Spanish administration had been such as to rule out any idea of a restoration of the Philippines to Spain. At the same time, civil war in the islands had been with difficulty suppressed by American troops, and a further outbreak was certain if the United States forces were withdrawn. There was equally strong objection to leaving the Philippines defenceless within the orbit of the expanding empire of Japan.

The Democratic platform had demanded, and President Wilson identified himself with the demand, that the Philippine Islands should be given their independence as soon as they were deemed capable of managing their own affairs, and that the neutralization of the group should if possible be secured by international agreement. Though Mr. Taft, who had been the first Governor-General of the Philippines, asserted that the islands would not be ready for self-government for fifty years, Mr. Wilson, in his message to Congress in December 1914, urged the passage of a measure granting a fuller degree of autonomy and pointing towards early independence. A Bill embodying this principle became law in August

1916. It substituted for the nominated "Philippine Commission" an elected Senate of twenty-four; and for the existing Assembly a House of Representatives of ninety. It generally enlarged the powers of the Insular Government, and put on record the purpose of the United States "to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein."

Throughout his administration Mr. Wilson had given unmistakable proof of his desire that the nation should so far as might be live at peace with all men. He was resolutely opposed to all aggressive action, and in his speech at Mobile in October 1913 he had specifically pledged the United States against any annexation of alien territory. In all controversies that had arisen with foreign Powers it had been his fixed principle, maintained in the face of heated criticism, to subordinate the interests of his own country to what he considered to be the dictates of justice, or the needs of some larger policy looking beyond the immediate issue. The Panama Tolls Bill, the proposal for compensation to Colombia, and in some degree the Mexican policy, are cases in point.

But apart from negotiations on specific questions Mr. Wilson worked assiduously at measures designed to consolidate and perpetuate the pacific relations of the United States with the rest of the world. He had inherited from the preceding administration the principle of the so-called "cooling-off" treaties, under which the signa-

tory nations undertake to submit to an international commission all disputes not covered by existing arbitration treaties, and to refrain from hostile action for a year, or such shorter time as may suffice for the commission to reach a decision. It was, however, during Mr. Wilson's Presidency that the treaties were actually carried through. During 1914, 1915, and 1916 treaties were actually ratified with Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Spain, the three Scandinavian Powers, China, and most of the Latin-American Republics.

The terms of the treaties are not beyond criticism, for the interval of a year, valuable as its "cooling-off" effects may be, might give scope for the unhindered continuance of the very offences of commission or default that were the subject of dispute. None the less, the contraction of treaties with so many foreign Governments evidenced a growing faith in the principle of arbitration and discussion, and in the case of Latin America in particular the ratification of the treaties was well calculated to open the way to the adoption of the larger policy outlined in the early part of this chapter.

CHAPTER IX

THE EUROPEAN WAR

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility—responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its Government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honour and affection to think first of her and of her interests, may be divided into camps of hostile opinions hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action. Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind, and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan but as a friend.—*Address to the American People, August*, 1914.

THE unlooked-for outbreak of the European War in August 1914 added immeasurably to Mr. Wilson's burdens. He was weighed down at the time by a great personal anxiety, his wife being in the first week of August laid on her death-bed at the White House. Mexican affairs were at a critical stage, for though Huerta had just taken ship for Europe the effects of his abdication were not yet revealed, and American troops were still in possession at Vera Cruz. The Presi-

dent well knew, moreover, that though America might avoid actual participation in the war she could not fail to be directly and gravely affected by its reactions, and time and energies that should have been concentrated on programmes of domestic reform must of necessity be largely devoted to the negotiation of delicate problems of foreign policy.

There was at the outset no serious question of American intervention in the war. When England took the fateful decision on August 4th the meaning of the sudden breaking of the storm of conflict had hardly been grasped in the Western hemisphere. The documents published later in the official Blue Books and White Books and Red Books were not available; only Belgium's neutrality, and not her women, had as yet been violated; and though the direction of American sympathies might be clear, American judgment was at first held for the most part in suspense.

A tremendous responsibility was laid on President Wilson. Political tradition and the letter of the Constitution make the President of the United States both a leader and an interpreter of the people, and it rests with the individual to lay predominant emphasis on whichever he will of the two heads of his Presidential duty. Woodrow Wilson had for seventeen months played the rôle of leader, and the nation accordingly looked to him with the greater expectancy in the crisis of August 1914. In shaping his course at such a juncture he was bound to take cognizance of certain indisputable facts. Tem-

peramentally and by tradition the American people was essentially pacific. Its first President had warned it against foreign entanglements, and the Monroe Doctrine had served as a permanent proclamation of benevolent isolation. Apart from the tearless war with Spain in 1898, America had not for over a century fought an external campaign, and she had virtually no dependencies to draw her into controversy with any European Power. And while she had a serviceable Navy, her Army was organized on a scale which forbade all thought of early participation in a serious land campaign.

But there were more cogent reasons than these why America should in 1914 cling instinctively to her traditional policy of isolation. Though Washington had fought to make America independent and Lincoln had fought to keep her united, Mr. Wilson, fifty years after Lincoln's battles and a hundred and thirty after Washington's, found himself President of what was not yet a cohesive nation. The census of 1910 showed that the United States contained over four million Germans and Austro-Hungarians who were actually foreign-born, while there were close on nine millions of Germans alone returned as of foreign parentage. The danger that war against Germany would mean civil war needed no demonstration.

Of war with the Entente Powers there was no serious prospect. There was not, it is true, in America that enthusiasm for Great Britain that some exponents of the unity of the Anglo-Saxon

race too confidently assume. The large Irish section of the population was ill-disposed towards England, and throughout the war the strongest bond of transatlantic sympathy has been between America and France. Between Americans and Englishmen there had grown up that curious relationship sometimes established between two men who, knowing they will never go as far as a serious quarrel, can afford to be perpetually irritating one another. So far had that tendency been carried that it was possible recently for one of the most thoughtful of American reviews, in its anxiety for an Anglo-American understanding, to solicit help from "the two peoples who will find their security in such understanding, the two peoples most able to mediate, the people of Canada and the people of France." [1] Another fact to be remembered is that prior to the war there was in America no feeling against Germany and considerable feeling against Russia.

Even now we are prone in this country, and in the later months of 1914 we were much more prone, to judge America by the Eastern States. For that our Press is largely to blame. Nine quotations out of ten cabled across from American journals are taken from New York papers, with an occasional reference to the *Philadelphia Ledger*, or the *Boston Transcript*, or the *Springfield Republican*. From west of the Alleghanies not a voice reaches us, unless it be a rare citation from the *Chicago Daily News*, or *Herald*, and the very names of powerful organs like the

[1] The *New Republic*, December 9, 1916.

Kansas City Star, or the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, or the *Detroit Free Press* are unknown outside Fleet Street. It is not surprising therefore, though it is on many grounds unfortunate, that Englishmen have failed throughout to realize that in the West and Middle West the European War has never yet become, as it has in New England, the first preoccupation in the public mind.[1] The West is still an undeveloped country, and all it asks is to be left to its business of working out its own great destiny. That view is short-sighted and limited, no doubt. It takes no account, for example, of the function of the British Fleet as a shield of the Monroe Doctrine. But it is not wholly selfish. The West is not concerned merely with the accumulation of dollars. Mr. Henry Ford, the so-called pacifist fanatic, has built up at Detroit a business in which commercial prosperity is combined with some of the best industrial conditions in America. As a Chicago correspondent of *The Times* recently pointed out in an instructive article,[2] the West has ideals, social, industrial, municipal, to the realization of which both the principle and the fact of war are essentially antagonistic. It fears and hates war for reasons that demand respect. These are considerations that must be reckoned with. If many of them were lost—and pardonably lost—on the average Englishman, none of them was lost on Mr. Wilson, who never allowed himself to forget that he was President of the West as well as of the East.

[1] Written in 1916. [2] *The Times*, December 14, 1916.

From the first the President interpreted the neutrality of the United States as requiring an attitude of the most scrupulous—as it has sometimes appeared on this side of the Atlantic, the most excessive—detachment on the part of its constitutional head. On August 4th he issued a formal proclamation of the neutrality of the United States ; on August 5th, twenty-four hours before the death of his wife, he circulated to all the belligerents a Note expressing his readiness to act as mediator at any future time when opportunity might offer ; and on August 14th he emphasized the necessity for true neutrality in an address the salient passages of which stand at the head of this chapter. He foresaw from the first day of war that America was facing a crisis. Millions of her polyglot population would be torn by conflicting loyalties. British and Germans, Belgians and Hungarians, Poles and Finns—would they in the moment of testing prove false or true to the country of their new allegiance? If his appeal to every American to put America first were effective, out of the ordeal new and potent bonds of union would be forged. If it failed, the peril of disintegration was imminent.

None the less, the call to Americans to show themselves "impartial in thought as well as in action," and the warning against indicating "a preference of one party to the struggle before another," were too much for a large section of opinion in the United States, though the more moderate of the President's critics recognized that

whatever might be thought of his words his address was dictated by nobler motives than a mere negative desire to avoid entanglement in the war. Rightly or wrongly, he looked forward to the part that America as the greatest neutral Power might at some time be called to play as mediator, and he believed that the one hope of discharging that high function with success was to preserve in the meantime what was bound to be characterized in many quarters as an attitude of exaggerated and unworthy detachment.

President Wilson can have been under no illusions as to what the policy he had chosen would involve. For him personally it would in many respects have been the easiest course to commit his country to intervention forthwith. That decision would at least have saved him from entanglement in the endless series of perilous complications arising out of the German submarine campaign, the British blockade, the machinations of German agents in America, and the abuse by belligerents of the laws of war and of humanity.

It was soon made impossible for America to remain neutral in spirit, whatever she might be in act. The outrages in Belgium, verified as they were by the Bryce Commission, whose Chairman was known and honoured above all other living Englishmen in America, threw a new light on the meaning of the war. The United States was not a guarantor of Belgian neutrality, but she was a signatory to the Hague Conventions of 1907, whose provisions Germany had ruthlessly

and cynically flung to the winds under the impulse of a military necessity that knew no law. The world turned instinctively to the great neutral Republic for the word of judicial protest and condemnation that her part in the violated Convention gave her a legal title as well as an unassailable moral right to utter.

That word was not spoken. America has earned the undying gratitude of Belgium for the unstinted generosity with which her citizens have provided and her agents administered the relief that has kept millions of Belgians from starvation. But it was not till more than two years of war had passed—when Germany was crowning her crimes by deporting the civil population of Belgium to work in German factories and mines—that an official protest against the martyrdom of that unhappy nation was for the first time voiced by the spokesman and leader of the American people.

Mr. Wilson's silence was no doubt dictated by his fear of being driven, so early in the war, into a position of apparent partisanship, and it is fair to him to add that the most embittered opponent of his policy, Mr. Roosevelt, at this point shared his views. "Sympathy" [with Belgium], wrote the ex-President, "is compatible with full acknowledgment of the unwisdom of our uttering a single word of official protest unless we are prepared to make that protest effective; and only the clearest and most urgent national duty would ever justify us in deviating from our rule of neutrality and non-inter-

ference." [1] Great Britain and France—which, it may be objected, are not entirely unbiased judges—have found full comprehension of that attitude beyond them.

In view of the gravity of the protracted controversies between America and Germany on the conduct of naval warfare, it is of some importance to recall that the first Note of protest drafted at Washington was addressed, not to the Wilhelmstrasse but to Downing Street. It was distinctly friendly in character, but expressed America's perplexity and concern at the new rules of war at sea formulated by the Allied Governments. Full justice has hardly been done to the difficulty of Mr. Wilson's position in his negotiations with this country over the interference with American overseas trade. Soon after the beginning of the war the Declaration of London began to be jettisoned bit by bit, and faced with the fact that a port like Rotterdam or Flushing constituted for commercial purposes practically the mouth of Germany, the Allies undeniably worked the recognized doctrine of continuous voyage and ultimate destination very hard.

Early in 1915, moreover, a series of moves took place that laid American commerce under grave disabilities. Germany established Government control of practically all food supplies; Great Britain thereupon declared all food contraband; Germany replied by announcing a blockade of Britain as from March 18th; and Britain retaliated by Orders in Council proclaim-

[1] In the *Outlook*, September 23, 1914.

ing a blockade of Germany, under which the right was reserved to the British Navy to detain and take into port "ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin." The result of these successive declarations was to supersede the old laws of the sea as commonly understood in favour of a new code, which, as America contended, had the validity only of a municipal law of an individual belligerent and could not be substituted for the recognized canons of international law.

The real difficulty was not that a departure had been made from established custom,—America, like every other nation, realized that the advent of the submarine had introduced a factor subversive of all accepted rules,—but that by the middle of 1915 or earlier a neutral had come to feel that the arbitrary proclamations of the different belligerents had left him with no solid ground beneath his feet. In the case of Great Britain American irritation at the delays attendant on the examination of cargoes in port instead of on the high seas was accentuated by the censors' interference with mails—to which merchants more than once attributed (apparently without much justice) the loss of important orders. On our side there was some disposition to ride off too lightly on the plea that while we were merely delaying American cargoes Germany was murdering American sailors. That was true, and America recognized that it was true; but President Wilson had always insisted on the sound principle that he was discussing business only

with the particular Power concerned, and, as he twice reminded Germany in forcible words, there could be no question of playing off one belligerent against the other. It would have smoothed some rough places if more regard had been paid in this country to a judgment of that shrewd and able diplomatist Lord Lyons, who wrote from the Embassy at Washington fifty years ago: "The Americans, both Government and People, are I think much pleased by attentions and civilities, and very prone to think themselves slighted. This quality may be sometimes turned to good account, and should certainly be borne in mind when it is necessary to keep them in good humour." [1]

As it was, speakers and writers were, with individual exceptions, at no particular pains to consider American susceptibilities, and there was considerable surprise when in November 1915 a Note couched in language of marked acerbity was handed by the American Ambassador to Sir Edward Grey. The phraseology, there is reason for believing, was the work of Mr. Lansing, not of President Wilson, and it was strongly deprecated in some sections of the American Press. Here it was generally assumed to be in some measure a studied counterweight to the grave communications the President was finding it necessary to address to Germany, and a detailed reply by Sir Edward Grey, offering explanations, and conceding some modifications, of the procedure to which objection was taken, averted any

[1] *Lord Lyons*, by Lord Newton, chap. ii.

danger of increased friction between the two countries. Some fresh resentment was occasioned in the summer of 1916 by the action of the British Foreign Office in forbidding British traders to do business with certain specified American firms, set out in a "black list," which were in the ordinary way of commerce giving assistance to the enemy; but here, again, a reasoned explanation by Sir Edward Grey greatly reduced the tension, and no serious or permanent strain was laid on Anglo-American relations.

President Wilson's attitude in all these controversies has been scrupulously correct. While not prepared to disregard what he held to be undue invasions of the rights of American shippers, he has throughout the negotiations with this country preserved a just sense of proportion, and firmly refused to allow his differences of opinion with Great Britain to be exploited by friends of Germany in America.

But the President had more anxious negotiations than these upon his hands. While he was suing Great Britain for trespass he was called on to prosecute Germany for murder. The original announcement of Berlin (in February 1915) that the waters round the British Isles were to be considered as a "war zone," into which neutrals would venture at their peril, had been received in America with resentment and concern, and a Note was immediately dispatched warning the German Government that if American vessels, or the lives of American citizens, should

be lost "the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities." The spring of 1915 was a time of acute anxiety for the President. While he was being daily assailed with protests from American traders at British interference with their commerce, he feared to learn at any moment of a German outrage which would bring the "strict accountability" clause of his recent Note into play.

His apprehensions were soon realized. It is impossible to follow in detail the procession of shelled or torpedoed ships—the *Falaba*, the *Cushing*, the *Gulflight*, and the rest—across the diplomatic stage. It will be sufficient here to recall briefly the leading cases, the *Lusitania*, the *Arabic*, the *Hesperian*, and the *Sussex*, to which, in the unfolding of events, it may become necessary to add the *Marina*. On May 8, 1915, the civilized world was struck with horror by the news that on the previous day the great Cunarder *Lusitania* had been torpedoed by a German submarine off the south of Ireland. Over eleven hundred lives were lost, more than a hundred being those of American citizens. Anger at the unexampled atrocity was even more intense in America than in Great Britain, already bitterly inured to the brutalities of war, and it burned the fiercer by reason of a warning that had been issued from the German Embassy at Washington some ten days earlier advising Americans not to travel by the *Lusitania*.

A section of public opinion, particularly in New

England, demanded a declaration of war on Germany. The President took no immediate action, and in a speech three days later, in which no specific reference was made to the *Lusitania,* he used words which have been remembered against him from that day onward. Since his critics have done him some injustice by isolating the four words "too proud to fight" for contemptuous reiteration, it will be well to quote the offending passage as a whole.

"The example of America," said Mr. Wilson, "must be a special example, and must be an example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but because peace is a healing and elevating influence of the world, and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight; there is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right."

However academically defensible those words may be—and they are academically defensible—it is difficult to acquit the President of a culpable indifference to the interpretation that would throughout two continents be put on such language at such a crisis. It is a defect to which there are several parallels, notable among them the declaration in the League to Enforce Peace speech of May 1916, that "with the causes and objects of the war we have no concern," and the passage in the Peace Note of December 1916 implying at first glance that the writer regarded the purposes and ideals of the two belligerent groups as identical. In none of these

cases was the underlying sentiment at fault; in none of them was the language used incapable of bearing the meaning it was meant to bear; but in all of them the phraseology was such as to invite the ordinary man rather to misunderstand than to understand. The President was capable of foreseeing, and ought to have foreseen, what would inevitably happen. It was a serious misfortune that he should have encouraged a misreading of his sentiments and character on the part both of the nation on whose loyal support his position depended and of the nation with which he had now to deal as a potential antagonist.

There was, however, no lack of dignity or firmness in the Note dispatched to Germany three days later. It recapitulated the previous German outrages at sea; it vigorously reasserted the right of American citizens to "take their ships and travel wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas"; and it called on the German Government for disavowal, reparation—so far as reparation was possible—and guarantees against the recurrence of any similar violation of the law of nations.

The German reply to these demands was unsatisfactory in the extreme, and the President found it necessary in continuing the controversy to make use of language with which his pacifist Secretary of State felt unable to identify himself. Accordingly Mr. Bryan resigned and was succeeded by Mr. Robert Lansing, an international lawyer of considerable repute. The second *Lusitania* Note reviewed the facts of the tragedy;

declared that the American Government was "contending for something much greater than mere rights of property or privileges of commerce, for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity"; proceeded to define those rights; laid down the principle that "the lives of non-combatants cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unresisting merchantman"; and called for an undertaking that the German Government would forthwith take the necessary measures to ensure that these rights and principles should be duly respected.

This communication evoked a conciliatory, if not wholly reassuring, response, the good effect of which was modified by what Germany termed the "unfortunate accident" of the torpedoing of the American vessel *Nebraskan*. The destruction of the *Nebraskan*, however, was soon overshadowed by greater events. On August 19th the White Star liner *Arabic* was torpedoed off the south coast of Ireland in broad daylight, with the loss of American lives.

The situation now created was so menacing that the German Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, went hot-foot to the White House to beg the President to suspend judgment till the full facts and explanations were received. A week later he assured Mr. Lansing, the Secretary of State, that the "Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act," and would pay an indemnity for the American lives lost on the *Arabic*. On September 1st a general undertaking was given that "liners will

not be sunk by submarines without warning, and without ensuring the safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." In transmitting the undertaking Count Bernstorff added that it embodied decisions arrived at before the *Arabic* was sunk. That assertion assumed unexpected importance when news was received of the torpedoing, no more than three days later, of the Allan liner *Hesperian* 130 miles west of Queenstown.

This was the culmination, and for a moment it seemed as if the *Hesperian* might stand to a German war of 1915 as the *Maine* stood to the Spanish War of 1898. Moreover the count against Germany embraced a far more comprehensive series of crimes than the outrages at sea. From the earliest days of the war the activities of German agents on American soil had been ceaseless and notorious. Bridges had been blown up, bombs placed on outward-bound liners, armament factories fired, and strikes engineered in order to impede the export of munitions to the Allies. In August 1915, while the *Lusitania* controversy was in full activity and the *Arabic* outrage in contemplation, the New York *World* published a series of revelations of the machinations of German diplomatic agents. Among them Herr Dernburg, an ex-Colonial Secretary, had so far exceeded all bounds in his propagandist enthusiasm that President Wilson had indicated, soon after the *Lusitania* disaster, that the further presence of the over-zealous diplomatist on American soil was undesirable.

In the course of September evidence came to hand definitely convicting the Austrian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, and the German Naval and Military Attachés, Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen, of various gross abuses of their diplomatic position. President Wilson wasted no time in deliberation. Diplomatists were accredited to him, not to Congress, and he took action forthwith. Austria was requested to recall her Ambassador. She made some attempt to argue the question, whereupon Dr. Dumba, who had privately boasted of his power to "disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West," was handed his passports and dispatched without further dallying to the nearest neutral European port. Boy-Ed and von Papen followed him in December.

The President's decisive action in the case of the diplomatists was a characteristic expression of his earnest and intense anxiety for the preservation of the unity of America in what he spoke of as "these days that try men's souls." Such machinations he viewed, not as an offence against diplomatic decencies or against American dignity, but as a wedge driven into the fissure that the war must inevitably open in the fabric of national unity and cohesion. The peril to a composite nation like the United States was of the gravest, and no man was more sensible of its gravity than the President. In his review of the events of 1915 he spoke, in language whose emphasis caused no surprise, of "citizens of the United

States, born under other flags, but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to full freedom of opportunity in America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life, and who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries, wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purpose to strike at them, and to debase our policies to the uses of foreign intrigue." That indictment culminated in a request for legislation to strengthen the hands of the Administration in dealing with "such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy."

Meanwhile the *Arabic* controversy, seriously aggravated by the *Hesperian* crime, had been pursuing its course. The assurances given by Count Bernstorff at the beginning of September by no means met the requirements of the case. They referred only to liners, not merchant vessels, and they did not touch the question of the safety of passengers turned into open boats in mid-ocean. Early in October, however, the matter was carried a step farther. Acting on advices from Berlin, the German Ambassador officially informed Mr. Lansing that the attack on the *Arabic* had been undertaken in disregard of the instructions issued to the commander, and that the Imperial Government regretted and disavowed the act, and was prepared to pay an indemnity for the American lives lost. For a time it appeared that the President's policy of patient negotiation—a policy by no means easy to recon-

cile with his original promise to hold Germany to strict accountability if her threats of piracy were carried out—had at last had effect. Certain assurances had been given and submarine activity did, in fact, appear to slacken, though the destruction of the Italian *Ancona*, the French *Ville de Ciotat*, and the British *Persia*, crimes ascribed, it is true, not to German but to Austrian submarines, showed how easily the pledges of Berlin could be evaded.

Meanwhile the controversy had taken another turn, by which America's prestige was recognized to be directly involved. Early in 1916 the question of the status of armed merchantmen came under discussion. Here, again, the advent of the submarine had necessitated a re-examination of existing precedent—though in claiming the right to arm merchantmen for defence the Allies had international law definitely on their side, and America early in the war had refused to exclude such vessels from her ports. In view, however, of Germany's contention that what was defensive armament against a cruiser was offensive armament against a submarine, Mr. Lansing sounded the belligerents on the abandonment of the practice of arming merchantmen. Before a reply had been received from the Allies Germany destroyed any case she might have had by announcing that she would attack all such vessels without warning, as having the character of auxiliary cruisers. Simultaneously a Teutonic agitation broke out in America in favour of warning Americans officially against travelling on

such vessels, and resolutions in that sense were introduced in both Houses of Congress.

President Wilson did not hesitate. His own position was immediately defined in a public declaration. "To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them," he wrote to Senator Stone, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, "would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere, and of whatever nation or allegiance." The gravity of the situation was accentuated by the evident prevalence in Germany of the belief that America was not behind the President in his refusal to warn American citizens off armed liners. At all costs that illusion must be dispelled, and the President immediately took a characteristic decision.

The resolutions in Congress (urging that Americans should be forbidden passages on armed liners) might have come to a vote in due time, but it was more likely that they would never get past the Committee on Rules, with whom it lay to select the business that should come before the Chamber. President Wilson determined that the issue should be faced. He wrote personally to Mr. Pou, the Chairman of the Committee on Rules in the House, urging an early vote on the resolutions. That and nothing less (such as the suggested alternative of a vote of confidence) would satisfy him. Congress acceded to his demand. Early in March the resolutions

were put to the vote. In the Senate they were "tabled"—i.e. allowed to lapse—by 64 votes to 14, and in the House by 276 to 142. The President's authority to represent America was vindicated.

The votes of Congress were taken early in March 1916. Within three weeks the most flagrant of all Germany's violations of her pledges was perpetrated. On the 24th a German submarine torpedoed the cross-Channel passenger steamer *Sussex*, with many Americans on board. The eyes of belligerents and neutrals alike were turned on President Wilson. There was a brief investigation of the facts, which left no room for the erection of even the flimsiest fabric of defence, and on April 19th Mr. Wilson went in person before Congress to deliver an address that unequivocally condemned the whole principle of submarine warfare as illegal and inhuman, and embodied the declaration that "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight vessels, the Government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire altogether." A Note to that effect had already been dispatched to Berlin.

The reply to what was, if words had any meaning, an ultimatum, was anxiously awaited. Germany had the choice between compliance and a breach of relations, and a breach of relations would almost inevitably mean war. She chose

compliance. At the beginning of May a Note was received in Washington which contained, embedded in a mass of justificatory explanations, an undertaking that merchant vessels should be subjected to visit, search, and destruction only in accordance with the recognized principles of international law, and that "such vessels, both within and without the area declared as a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning, and without saving human lives, unless the ship attempt to escape and offer resistance." Mr. Wilson acknowledged the undertaking in a Note which observed frigidly that the United States would "rely upon the scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government," and sternly rejected the suggestion that the President ought now, as a *quid pro quo*, to turn his attention to the Allies' misdemeanours —a proposal which he declared that the United States "cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss."

At last, after more than twenty months of warfare and outrage, Mr. Wilson had forced Germany into a repudiation of her settled policy and a pledge of its abandonment. What share the anti-submarine activity of the British Navy had had in bringing the German Government to that decision cannot be determined. Everything now depended on whether Germany would respect her latest pledge. As to that the facts are not in dispute. She has not respected it. The successive violations of the undertaking of May 1916 need not be recapitulated here.

Among them the sinking of the American-owned *Marina*, destroyed at the end of October 1916 by a German submarine, seems likely to be taken as the test case. The negotiations on that vessel's fate had not, when this chapter was being written, reached a conclusive stage.

This is not the place to attempt a general criticism of Mr. Wilson's handling of the submarine controversy. The salient facts have been stated, and they provide ample material for judgment. That the President has fulfilled either the spirit or the letter of the passage in which in February 1915 he had undertaken to hold Germany to strict accountability for the destruction of American vessels or the loss of American lives it is hardly possible to maintain. It is easy to charge him, as plenty of his political opponents in America have charged him, with vacillation and irresolution and incompetent stewardship of his country's interests. It is less easy to assess at their true value the unquestionably weighty considerations that restrained him from the decisive step that would have meant open war. His own natural pacifism and the danger that a war with Germany would mean widespread civil disturbance in America have already been touched on. There was the further fact that in a military sense America's intervention would, except in the field of finance, have counted for relatively little. Her Army was negligible and the Allies were already so superior at sea as to discount the value of the accession of the American Navy.

In addition, the fact that a Presidential election was imminent cannot be altogether ignored. No reputable critic has suggested that Mr. Wilson was capable of putting political strategy before national duty, but it is a grave step for an expiring administration to plunge a nation into war, and the President's hesitation to take that step was intelligible and just. And, beyond all these considerations, it is certain that Mr. Wilson never abandoned his belief that by maintaining her neutrality to the end America would best qualify herself for the function he earnestly desired to see her exercise, of offering mediation at the appropriate moment and exerting her influence in the framing of safeguards against the recurrence of any such conflict as the present.

There is an interesting resemblance between Mr. Wilson's attitude on the submarine issue and Mr. Asquith's attitude on conscription in Great Britain. Each was instinctively and by conviction opposed to a step to which he was being strongly urged. Each was resolved to avoid it so long as it could be safely avoided. Each was prepared to face it in the last resort. And each knew well that if his country was to be led into acceptance of a course repugnant to great masses of its citizens it could only be by the avoidance of all precipitate action and at the behest of a leader known to have held back so long as holding back was possible. Mr. Asquith took what appeared the inevitable step and carried the country with him. Mr. Wilson has

not yet [1] taken the corresponding step, but it must be recognized that so far he has as faithfully reflected American feeling over relations with Germany as Mr. Asquith did English feeling over conscription. Whether a President of the United States should be less content to reflect and more resolved to lead is a question for constitutional authorities to debate.

It remains to add the beginning of what is still an unfinished chapter in Mr. Wilson's relations with the belligerents. For over two years the President resisted both his own impulses and the pressure of a large section of American opinion and refrained from any offer of early mediation or proposals for peace. Towards the end of 1916, however, an almost insensible change came over the international situation. Germany's economic position was known to be bad and Austria's worse, but her armies, though gradually yielding to the growing pressure of their opponents, were still in possession of large tracts of Allied territory. The Allies, on the other hand, while their general strength was far superior to Germany's, had obtained no such decisive advantages in the summer campaign as pointed to an early conclusion of the war. There was a strong temptation to neutrals, themselves suffering severely from the war (this was true even of America, despite the unexampled prosperity of some of her industries), to advance any proposal that might bring peace nearer.

In the autumn of 1916 Mr. Wilson felt the

[1] January 1917.

time had come to make a definite, if tentative, advance. His decision was taken about the middle of November, but some time was spent on the preparation of the Note he proposed to address to all the belligerents. It was couched in the most restrained and guarded language, and marked throughout by a dispassionate and detached impartiality, which was felt in most of the Allied countries to be excessive even for a neutral engaged in so delicate a mission as Mr. Wilson's. That impression was encouraged by the wording of a single passage, on which far too much attention and criticism was concentrated. "The objects," wrote the President, "which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world." It is obvious that that sentence was entirely non-committal and suggested only—what was substantially true—that the *professed* objects of both sides were virtually the same. Unfortunately, it was possible for critics so disposed—and many critics were so disposed—to contend that Mr. Wilson was asserting that the two groups of belligerents stood actually on the same moral level. The author of the Note could be charged with no offence more heinous than an inadvertent ambiguity, but it was regrettable that in a diplomatic document of such delicacy and importance room should have been left for any ambiguity at all.

President Wilson's actual proposals could not have been more moderate and tentative, amount-

ing to no more than a suggestion that something would be gained if each group of belligerents would do what had never been done throughout more than two years of war—state explicitly the objects for which they were fighting and the terms on which they would be prepared to abandon the struggle. Such a comparison of terms might prove that the obstacles to a settlement were not as insuperable as had been feared. Mr. Wilson put forward no peace proposals. He did not offer mediation. And he did not suggest the opening of direct negotiations. His action marked a stage precedent to any such steps as those.

The American Note was to have been sent to all the belligerents a little before Christmas, but just before it was ready for dispatch a new element was introduced into the situation in the shape of an unexpected and melodramatic peace offer by Germany. Her announcement of her readiness to consider terms of settlement was everywhere received with profound suspicion, and small hope was entertained that it would lead to any promising development. The President was placed in a serious dilemma. Should he issue or hold back the Note he was on the point of forwarding to Europe? If he issued it, he would be charged, as he was in fact freely charged by his critics in America, with lending support to "the German peace intrigue." On the other hand, the intervention of a neutral might enable the Allies to move much farther towards a beginning of negotiations than they would be

disposed to do in response to German proposals. In this belief the Note was issued. It was received by the belligerents on December 20th, published in America on the 21st and in England on the 22nd.

In America the President's action had a mixed reception. He had taken it entirely on his own responsibility, and the Senate, which later had before it a resolution on the subject, declined to do more than associate itself with the general purpose of his Note. The public was at first more perplexed than critical. There was much speculation as to the President's motives, on which some doubtful light was thrown by an indirect but none the less pregnant remark let fall by Mr. Lansing, to the effect that action was necessary because America was drawing near to the verge of war. Considered comment was divided. There was probably some basis for all the three hypotheses most in favour: that Mr. Wilson was animated by purely humanitarian and pacific motives; that he had private knowledge of Germany's economic condition which led him to believe in the possibility of an early peace; and that, having reason to fear a fresh outbreak of German submarine activity that must draw America into the conflict, the President was making an eleventh-hour endeavour to avert that catastrophe by bringing the whole war to an end.

The American Note was very differently treated by the two groups of belligerents. Germany replied with great brevity and almost precipitate haste, stating no terms, but proposing

an immediate round-table conference at which conditions of peace might be considered. That went far beyond anything Mr. Wilson had suggested, and the proposal, coupled with the omission of any semblance of a statement of terms, was generally regarded in America as a deliberate evasion of the issue.

The Allies' Note was three weeks in preparation and took the form of a detailed and explicit reply to Mr. Wilson's suggestions. It cordially accepted in principle his proposal for a League of Nations to safeguard the peace of the world on a basis to be laid by the settlement of the present war; it set out the aims and purposes of the Allies, and in response to the President's invitation specified the actual territorial readjustments which, subject to negotiation on individual points, they were resolved to effect. They set the price high, but they stated it clearly. The general effect of their Note in America was to dispel any misgivings as to the President's action and incidentally to strengthen his hands in negotiating with Germany on the submarine question and in opposing the latent movement for an embargo on supplies for the Allies.

Speculation as to whether Mr. Wilson had a further move in contemplation was rife. Doubt on that head was soon resolved, the President unexpectedly appearing in the Senate on January 21st and delivering an address that covered the whole field of the post-war settlement. The occasion of the speech was chosen with much discretion. Mr. Wilson's advocacy

of the proposed League to Enforce Peace had been freely criticized in America on the ground that he was not competent either to bind the country by the treaties on which the stability of the new order must rest, or to use the armed forces of the United States in the interests of the League. In addressing the Senate the President was dealing with the body whose concurrence he would need if the necessary treaties were to be ratified. He was able, therefore, at once to answer his critics at home, and in so doing to enunciate principles which it was important to lay before the belligerents but undesirable to lay before them in a further direct communication.

The speech concerned itself primarily with the nature of the peace America would be ready to endorse. In discussing that the President was not, as might at first appear, travelling beyond his province, for if after the war the United States was to join a League to preserve the *status quo* the nature of that *status quo* was clearly a matter of legitimate concern to her. Mr. Wilson was eager to take his part in the work of preserving peace, but not in the work of preserving a bad peace. He was prepared to join in guaranteeing a settlement, but it must be a settlement containing the essential elements of stability. Most of the conditions laid down by the President had been frequently approved in public declarations by the Allied Powers. They included "peace without victory"; equality of rights for all nations, great and small; the right of nationalities to decide their own allegiance and form of

government; the right of access to the sea for every great people struggling for development; the freedom of the seas; and subsequent disarmament.

The term "freedom of the seas" has never yet been adequately explained, and President Wilson left its significance still indefinite. His reference to "peace without victory" he explained to be merely a warning against "a peace forced upon the loser," a peace that "would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently but only as upon quicksand." The Allies had already repudiated the idea of forcing such a peace as that. The phrase "peace without victory" none the less provoked much criticism and some hostility, and it must be ranked with the curiously unhappy or ambiguous expressions of which isolated examples are to be found in almost all Mr. Wilson's more important pronouncements on the war.

In the main the President's address was well received. It was both defended and criticized in the Senate itself—the frank abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine being the main object of attack—and in Europe responsible opinion in the Allied countries generally approved the speech. At any rate, it had kept the subject of peace to the fore, and at the end of January the era of actual negotiations seemed sensibly less remote than at any earlier period of the war.

ADDENDUM.[1]

Within a fortnight of the day the President addressed the Senate the situation took a dramatic turn. On January 31st the German Government presented to the American Ambassador at Berlin a Note giving warning of an unrestricted submarine campaign. Germany declared what was virtually a blockade of Europe, and informed the United States Ambassador that one American vessel would be permitted to cross to England each week, following a specified course and arriving and leaving on specified days. All other vessels entering the war zone would do so at their peril.

The challenge was met by immediate action at Washington. The German Note reached America late on the evening of Thursday, January 31st. All day on Friday the President was in conference with his Ministers and the political leaders. At 1.57 on Saturday afternoon Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, was handed his passports by Mr. T. M. Woolsey, the Assistant-Solicitor of the State Department. Mr. Gerard had already been recalled from Berlin and the American Consuls throughout Germany instructed to relinquish their posts forthwith. Diplomatic relations between the two Governments were completely severed.

At two o'clock the same day the President appeared before Congress. In a brief, impressive, and severely practical message, that took no more

[1] See Note, p. 9.

than sixteen minutes in delivery, he recalled what had been popularly known as "the *Sussex* pledge" of April 1916; quoted textually Germany's new threat to sink indiscriminately all vessels entering the so-called "war zone"; and added, amid an outburst of applause on the part of the assembled Senators, Representatives, and Supreme Court Judges: "I, therefore, directed the Secretary of State to announce to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed and that the American Ambassador in Berlin will immediately be withdrawn, and in accordance with this decision to hand to his Excellency his passports."

"If," the President concluded, "American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by German naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before Congress to ask that authority be given to me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral Governments will take the same course."

America stood at the brink of war, confident in the knowledge that the reins of power would for four years more be held by the man who by the establishment of the Federal Reserve

Board had set American financial stability on a new basis, who by his personal campaign had roused the country to a sense of the needs of the Army and Navy, who had riveted South America to North by his Pan-American foreign policy, and who by his restraint and forbearance had welded a nation of divided sympathies into a solid whole in resistance to the threatened invasion of its rights.

CHAPTER X

PREPAREDNESS AND PERMANENT PEACE

Our principles are well known. It is not necessary to avow them again. We believe in political liberty and founded our great Government to obtain it, the liberty of men and of peoples—of men to choose their own lives, and of peoples to choose their own allegiance.

Our ambition also all the world has knowledge of. It is not only to be free and prosperous ourselves, but also to be the friend and thoughtful partisan of those who are free or who desire freedom the world over. If we have had aggressive purposes and covetous ambitions, they were the fruit of our thoughtless youth as a nation, and we have put them aside. We shall, I confidently believe, never again take another foot of territory by conquest. We shall never in any circumstances seek to make an independent people subject to our dominion; because we believe, we passionately believe, in the right of every people to choose their own allegiance and be free of masters altogether.

For ourselves we wish nothing but the full liberty of self-development; and with ourselves in this great matter we associate all the peoples of our own hemisphere.—*Address to Manhattan Club, New York, November* 1915.

THERE is no more than a superficial inconsistency, if there is even that, between President Wilson's advocacy of a programme of "preparedness," naval, military, and commercial, unprecedented in the history of the United States, and his unqualified support of proposals directed towards so preserving the peace of the world as to render the projected fleets and armies mere wasteful superfluities. Mr. Wilson is an idealist,

but he is not a visionary. The Mexican campaign and the European War had awakened America with a sudden shock to the peril of her own defencelessness. That peril, moreover, lay not ten years ahead, or five, or two. It stood already at the very door. Mr. Wilson himself had spoken in language of the utmost gravity of not knowing what the morrow, literally the morrow, might bring forth. Even the certainty —if there had been any certainty, and there was none—that after the war the projected League of Peace would fulfil all the hopes centred on it would not have relieved the President of the necessity of safeguarding his country's interests during that undetermined period, the duration of the war.

But the idea of preparedness and the idea of a League of Peace were not merely not irreconcilable, they were intimately associated. The basis of the League to Enforce Peace, whose principles Mr. Wilson accepted and endorsed, was not the elimination of force, but the application of force to the defence of justice and right. The official proposals of the League included a clause enacting that "the signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising has been submitted" [to the judicial tribunal or council of conciliation]. If the United States was prepared to commit herself to such proposals as that, she must be prepared to back her word with such military contribution as her popu-

lation, area, and importance in the family of nations required.

There was, in the view of most Americans, another and a stronger reason why the United States should arm herself in the interests of peace. No man could foresee the result of the European War or the nature of the settlement, but it was reasonable to assume that for some years at least Europe would be left divided into two hostile and embittered groups, one, indeed, definitely predominant, but the other still sufficiently powerful to perpetuate anxiety and uncertainty as to the future. There would, moreover, in the event of the Allies' victory, be a number of small nationalities whose security would demand international guarantees more effective than the agreements that had failed to save Belgium from destruction in 1914. If the United States entertained any thought of securing the triumph of justice at an international council by throwing her weight on the side of one or other of two opposing groups, if her backing was to give any assurance to a reconstituted Belgium or an independent Poland or a new Jugoslavia, she must, so her politicians contended, take with her into the council of the nations arguments more potent than fair words and high ideals.

Such intervention in European affairs would, of course, mean complete abandonment of America's traditional policy of isolation; but the President and most other practical observers of political development realized that the days of isolation were already at an end. Mr. Wilson

declared publicly in 1916, in language that startled and alarmed many of his fellow-citizens, that this was the last world-war America could ever keep out of; and if she believed herself doomed in the future to submit her cause to the bitter arbitrament of war there was overwhelming reason why she should take a part, and a leading part, in the endeavour to substitute for that the higher arbitrament of peaceful settlement. The belief that a period of armed and guarded peace must precede any future era of disarmament was a complete justification of President Wilson's simultaneous advocacy of a larger Army and Navy and of a League to secure the peace of the world.

But the first purpose of preparedness was national security. From the day of the destruction of the *Lusitania* war with Germany was always a real and perilous possibility; and the necessity of sending a punitive expedition into Mexico had revealed the comparative worthlessness of the State militias even for the defence of the one land frontier where military operations might be necessary. A hardly less convincing revelation of America's ability to depend on her own resources had been provided in another sphere by the sudden toll levied at the outbreak of war on the mercantile marine of the world. German merchant ships had been swept from the sea before the first month of war had ended, and thousands of vessels on the register of Great Britain and other Allied Powers were withdrawn from their regular vocation to serve as

fleet-auxiliaries, mine-sweepers, transports, supply-ships, and patrols. The available carrying capacity of the world had suddenly become hopelessly unequal to the needs of the world, and as American exporters found freight rates soaring to unknown heights, and goods accumulating on the quays for lack of ships to carry them away, they realized for the first time what America's poverty in merchant tonnage involved.

Some 8 per cent. of American foreign trade had hitherto been carried in American vessels, and even those vessels became steadily fewer through submarine losses as the war wore on. The day had been when America was a seafaring nation. The New England colonies bred a race of enterprising and courageous seamen. In the first decade of the nineteenth century over 90 per cent. of American produce was carried in American bottoms and less than 10 per cent. in foreign. By the first decade of the twentieth those proportions had been almost precisely reversed. Any preparedness policy that did not include immediate and comprehensive measures for the acquisition or construction of a mercantile marine would fall far short of meeting the national need.

Accordingly the Administration, as soon as the lessons of Mexico and the European War had been assimilated, decided on proposals falling under three heads : a larger Navy, a larger Army, and an adequate mercantile marine. Of these the naval programme took first place. America has

little reason to maintain a large standing Army. She has few overseas possessions to garrison and only one land frontier to protect, for the boundary line that for over three thousand miles separates the United States from Canada has, since the Treaty of Ghent more than a century ago, been secured by the pledged word of both the contiguous Powers and by the armed forces of neither. To the south the Mexican frontier was under patrol, and the demand for a Federal Army in that region might, as the troubles that succeeded Diaz's abdication had shown, at any moment become urgent. The danger of conflict with any Latin-American State had been greatly diminished by Mr. Wilson's Pan-American policy, but that policy itself made it necessary that the United States should be ready in case of need to bring to the defence of South American integrity a much greater force than she had been accustomed to keep under arms. It was therefore the view of the President that the Army reform demanded by the situation was a measure that would provide for a comparatively small increase of the standing Army, and at the same time secure a much larger and more efficient body of reserves as a second line.

The case for an enlarged Navy was much stronger. The whole of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of the United States were vulnerable to hostile attack, and if more intimate relations were to be developed with the South American States it was clear that the United States Navy would have to bear a large share of responsibility for

their defence. Even apart from that, naval operations in the European War had thrown a new light on the requirements of a modern fleet, and merely to bring America's existing forces up to the necessary level of efficiency would involve an extensive programme of expenditure and construction.

Though the naval programme was far more formidable than the military it provoked less opposition, partly because its necessity was generally recognized, partly because it touched the daily life of the people less closely than proposals for the enrolment of a large force of citizen-soldiers. The Naval Appropriation Bill of 1914-15 was of normal character, providing for the construction of two Dreadnoughts, six destroyers, seventeen submarines, an oil-ship, a transport, and a hospital ship. In February 1915—after six months of the European War—the House passed the Bill with amendments reducing the number of submarines from seventeen to twelve and cutting out the transport and hospital ship altogether. There was as yet no appreciation of the urgency of the need for preparedness. Mr. Wilson, who had approved a programme based on ordinary requirements, had in his December message strongly deprecated the demand already articulate in some quarters for panic legislation in the interests of naval and military defence. There was, he had assured Congress, no reason to fear that America would be drawn into the war, and there was everything to gain by postponing new programmes of preparedness till the operations then in pro-

gress in Europe should have thrown decisive light on the new requirements of modern warfare. The Army, he agreed, should be strengthened by developing the efficiency of the National Guard. In the case of the Navy they were dependent for guidance on the experts, and the experts were altogether at variance as to what the needs of the future would be. "But," added the President, "we [the Administration] are not unmindful of the great responsibility resting upon us. We shall learn and profit by the lesson of every experience and every new circumstance; and what is needed will be adequately done."

Looking back to that address more than a year later—in January 1916—Mr. Wilson made a frank confession of change of view. "Perhaps," he told a New York audience, "when you learned that I was expecting to address you on the subject of preparedness, you recalled the address which I made to Congress something more than a year ago, in which I said that this question of preparedness was not a pressing question. But more than a year has gone by since then, and I would be ashamed if I had not learned something in fourteen months." Who had been the President's mentors in that fourteen months' interval? Two of them were the captains of the submarines that had sunk the *Lusitania* and the *Arabic*. A third was Dr. Dumba, the now expelled Austrian Ambassador; a fourth and fifth were Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed. And to them was to be added the army of German spies and agents diligently employed on the destruction of

American factories and the instigation of American citizens to disloyalty to America.

The lesson that the President had learned had been learned by his fellow-citizens of every State in the Union. In spite of the opposition of the considerable pacifist school, the conviction that new measures of preparedness were essential spread rapidly during the summer and autumn of 1915. And while the people were preparing themselves for acceptance of the principle, the President and his advisers were busy on the detailed programme to be laid before Congress in December. Mr. Wilson's first action was to appoint (through the Secretary of the Navy) a strong Naval Advisory Board to formulate a comprehensive scheme of naval development. Mr. Thomas Edison, the great inventor, was made chairman of the Board, and it began its work in October. A scheme of Army reform was being worked out simultaneously.

When the Sixty-fourth Congress met in December the President was ready with specific proposals. The naval programme covered a period of five years. In that time there were to be added to the existing resources of the United States—

10 battleships,
6 battle-cruisers,
10 light cruisers,
50 destroyers,
100 submarines,
4 gunboats,
6 hospital, oil-fuel, repair, and ammunition ships.

It was the most formidable programme ever submitted to any Parliament. The battleships were to be of 32,500 tons, 5,000 tons heavier than the *Queen Elizabeth*, and armed with 16-inch guns as against the *Queen Elizabeth's* 15-inch. Their estimated cost was just under £4,000,000 apiece. The battle-cruisers were to be 850 feet long (190 feet longer than the *Lion*), with a speed of 32-35 knots and a tonnage of 35,000. The guns were to be 14-inch, and the estimated cost of each ship £4,257,000. The programme was to involve an expenditure approaching $250,000,000 in the first year, and increasing later, and included a demand for an immediate addition to the personnel of 7,500 sailors, 2,500 apprentices, and 1,500 marines.

The Army proposals were on a less extensive scale. For a country of the area of the United States the standing Army was astonishingly small. It numbered on paper well under 100,000, and of these over 60,000 were employed in various non-combatant posts or on garrison duty in the Philippines, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and elsewhere, leaving little more than 30,000 available for immediate combatant service. Behind this first line stood the State militias, amounting in all to some 120,000 men, which the President was empowered to call up for Federal service in case of emergency. But their efficiency stood generally at a low level, and they were totally unprepared, as the summons to them for the protection of the Mexican border showed, to respond to a sudden call. The General Staff had laid before

the President proposals for the increase of the regular Army to 250,000, with a reserve of the same number, and 500,000 second-line troops, but Mr. Wilson declined to put forward demands on that scale. The scheme he actually laid before Congress provided for an additional 40,000 regulars (bringing the nominal strength of the Army to 141,843 officers and men), and a force of 400,000 "citizen soldiers," to be raised in the ensuing three years at the rate of 133,000 a year. They would serve three years with the colours and three in reserve, their service in the former period consisting of some weeks of intensive training each year in association with the regular Army.

A joint naval and military programme of this magnitude was sufficiently staggering to a nation with the traditions of the United States, and it was not surprising that the endeavour to get his proposals through Congress constituted the first call on the President's energies in the year 1916. On the broad question of preparedness the country was in the main at one with Mr. Wilson, though men like Mr. Henry Ford strenuously opposed his concessions to militarism, and Mr. Bryan accused him of having gone "joy-riding with the Jingoes." At the other end of the scale was Mr. Roosevelt and those who supported his demand for much more extensive schemes than were proposed, and between the two lay a mass of opinion in the West and Middle West naturally apathetic on any military question, but not incapable of being convinced of the wisdom of the President's proposals.

Preparedness became immediately what Mr. Wilson was determined it should be, a national and not a party issue. He had no desire to see Congress carry his measures over the heads of an antagonistic or indifferent electorate. When the defence of the country was in question he was resolved to have the country behind him. Accordingly he set out in January (1916) on a tour of the Union, in the course of which he was to impress the necessity for a predominant Navy on millions who had never seen the sea, and rouse to a sense of national duty the hundreds of thousands of young men on whose voluntary co-operation, together with their employers' concurrence, the creation of his citizen army depended.

The tour admirably fulfilled its purpose. In New York the President warned his hearers, "I cannot tell you what the international relations of this country will be to-morrow—and I use the word literally." At Pittsburg he declared that no man in the United States knew what a single week, a single day, a single hour, might bring forth. At Milwaukee, speaking to a German-American population, he appealed for support for the preparedness proposals to fortify him in his double task of maintaining America's honour and keeping her out of war. At Kansas he emphasized the need for safeguarding shipments of "the wheat of the Kansas fields and of the other great flowering acres of the United States."

At St. Louis he was betrayed—for the remark

can only be regarded as an unpremeditated hyperbole—into the unexplained and inexplicable declaration that the American Navy, having regard to the extent of the area it must defend, "ought in my judgment to be incomparably the greatest navy in the world." Some of his political opponents condemned the President's preparedness tour as undignified and sensational; but that was not the general verdict, and it was soon apparent that Mr. Wilson's application of his uniform rule of carrying the people with him in great matters was fully justified by the support accorded to his proposals.

But while the country as a whole approved the preparedness proposals in principle, there was, as regards Army reform, a serious division of opinion on detail. Apart from the extremists who were demanding provision for compulsory service, there was a radical cleavage between those who proposed to make the existing State militias the basis of the new Continental Army of 400,000, and those who would place the whole enterprise under exclusively Federal authority. The Bill as drafted by the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, favoured the latter principle, the Committee on Military Affairs in the House the former. It was the old fight between the States and the Union, and the Democratic tradition was of course support of States rights. Mr. Wilson stood aloof from the controversy. He was resolved to raise the 400,000 men, but the question of how they should be raised was not in his view of fundamental importance. He

was content to leave the decision to Congress, and declined to accede to the War Secretary's appeal that he should throw his personal weight on the side of the centralizing party.

After a brief correspondence with the President Mr. Garrison tendered his resignation. It was accepted, and Mr. Newton D. Baker, of Cleveland, Ohio, was appointed Secretary of War in his place. With the Army and Navy Bills before Congress, both the general preparedness campaign and the controversy on Army reform methods were vigorously sustained. A monster preparedness parade in New York in May, headed by Mr. Edison, was followed by similar demonstrations at Chicago, Boston, and Washington. President Wilson, carrying a United States flag, marched at the head of the Washington procession.

Under such stimulus the Army Bill became law in June. In its final form it provided for a larger force than had at first been proposed. The regular Army was raised from a nominal strength of 100,000 to 175,000, with reserves that will amount when the Act is in full operation to some 230,000, or a total of rather more than 400,000. Behind these will stand a second-line army of another 400,000, the President's Continental Army of citizen-soldiers, based on the reorganization (under Federal control) of the militia, or National Guard, of the several States. One of the most important clauses of the Act provides that "if for any reason there shall not be enough voluntary enlistments to keep the [militia] reserve battalions at the prescribed

strength, a sufficient number of the unorganized militia (which comprises every citizen between 18 and 45) shall be drafted into the service of the United States to maintain each of such battalions at the proper strength." This, of course, is conscription. No military measure comparable in importance had been enacted in the United States since Lincoln carried through his proposals for compulsory drafts in 1863.

It is nevertheless clear already that the 1916 Army Act cannot stand in its present form. Since it became law the fiasco of the mobilization on the Mexican border has spelt the fate of the "federalized militia" provisions of the Act. Three months after being called up the contingents on the border were without the equipment necessary for action in the field, and 63 per cent. of the force consisted of virtually untrained men. In the light of that experience the demand for compulsion has made distinct headway, and if it is to be successfully countered by the majority who unquestionably oppose it a further reorganization, providing for a larger first-line Army and adequately paid and adequately equipped reserves, will be necessary at an early date.

The fortunes of the Navy Bill were not dissimilar. The main difference between the two measures was that while the decisions of Congress slightly increased the provision for the Army they slightly diminished the provision for the Navy. By the time the Navy Bill was sent to the President for signature in September the hundred submarines had been reduced to sixty-

seven, but the number of the larger units remained unchanged. Congress had authorized a programme unexampled in the history of any country, which would raise the United States Navy to a position of paper supremacy over every rival fleet except Great Britain's.

While two of the great preparedness measures had reached the Statute Book after what must be regarded, considering the magnitude of the issues involved, as a relatively smooth passage, the third, the Merchant Shipping Bill, was still the centre of violent controversies. The necessity for some measure that would rescue American manufacturers and merchants from their perilous dependence on foreign shipping was not disputed. What was in question was the method to be followed. In the past Republicans had frequently proposed, and Democrats regularly opposed, subsidies for American ships. The alternative plan, Government ownership, involved a controversial extension of the principle of strengthening the Federal Government.

Mr. Wilson had been alive to the importance of the merchant shipping question from the first. In his speech of acceptance in 1912, two years before war broke out, he had dwelt on the handicap imposed on American merchants through their dependence on the shipping of countries that were America's mercantile competitors, and he urged then that "we must build and buy ships in competition with the world." The war confirmed the President's resolve to press for legislative action, and in December 1914 he appealed for

favourable consideration for a Bill presented in the previous session, providing for the creation of a corporation, 51 per cent. of whose stock should be Government-owned, for the purchase and operation of merchant ships. He spoke strongly in the country on behalf of the Bill, but Congress was not well disposed towards it. With the end of the session near at hand the Senate divided 48 to 48 on an important clause, and a few days later voted 48 to 48 again. When Congress adjourned the measure had not passed.

The discussions in the country ran on through 1915, the prospect of naval expansion supplying another argument for the acquisition of merchant ships that would be needed as fleet auxiliaries in time of war. In December 1915 President Wilson laid the matter before Congress again. He repeated his earlier arguments; he dwelt on the function of trading vessels as links of friendship between nations, "the only shuttles that can weave the delicate fabric of sympathy, comprehension, confidence, and mutual dependence in which we wish to clothe our policy of America for Americans"; and he adjured Congress once more to consider a measure providing for Government purchase or construction in default of better proposals, which he was still ready to consider if a case could be made for them.

For the third time Congress settled down to the consideration of a Shipping Bill, the President giving much time in the early weeks of the year (1916) to conferences with supporters and oppo-

nents of the measure in both Houses. The new measure differed from the old in that it included a proviso against the permanent institution of Government control. A Shipping Board was to be established, which could create a corporation with a capital not exceeding $50,000,000 for the purchase, construction, and operation of merchant ships as might be deemed advisable. The Government was, in the first instance, to hold not less than 51 per cent. of the stock, but its ownership of the vessels built or purchased was limited to a term not exceeding five years from the end of the European War. In that form the Bill was passed by the House of Representatives in June, and after a few weeks in the Senate went to the President for signature at the end of August. The first members of the new Shipping Board were actually appointed in December.

The final enactment of the fourth of the great preparedness measures—for the creation of the Federal Reserve Board with its district banks must be regarded as the first—marked the culmination of a notable constructive achievement. Within three years credit throughout the Union had been placed on a new basis; an efficient home defence Army had been organized; the provision of American ships for the transport of American goods had been assured; and the protection of a Navy second to only one in the world guaranteed. And it was to a President elected pre-eminently on a programme of domestic reform that Americans owed their new sense of the

stability of their country in the commonwealth of nations.

The sincerity of President Wilson's repeated declaration that the new strength with which his policy had invested the United States would never be used for purposes of aggression was questioned in neither hemisphere. But his purpose involved much more than mere abstention from aggression. Armaments, he was satisfied, were an essential safeguard through an indeterminate period of transition to more stable international relations, but he worked consistently and unremittingly for the creation of agreements, sanctions, and guarantees that should make the prospect of war progressively more remote. Towards that goal he moved along three lines. His endeavours for the elimination of the danger of war on the American continent have already been discussed.[1] They were supplemented on a larger scale by the treaties concluded with a number of European and American Powers, agreeing that all disputes of every nature whatsoever not covered by existing arbitration treaties should be referred, in the event of other methods of settlement failing, to an international commission.[2] These agreements went far towards averting the danger of war so far as the United States itself was concerned, but President Wilson was not satisfied that their formulation constituted the maximum contribution of his country to the preservation of the peace of the world. The studies of his early life had been concerned with the constitu-

[1] Chap. viii p. 138.

[2] Chap. viii. p. 15.

tions and relationships of nations, and he believed firmly in the possibility of an international court that should hold the scales—and if need be the sword—of justice between the nations, just as they were held by judicial systems between citizens of an individual State.

That belief was not peculiar to Mr. Wilson. Thought both in America and in Great Britain was moving steadily in the same direction, and actual schemes were being worked out by men of weight and discernment in either country. In America constructive thinkers had evolved the conception of a League to Enforce Peace, its advocates including jurists of the experience and distinction of ex-President Taft and Mr. Elihu Root, Secretary of State in Mr. Roosevelt's second Administration. The proposals of the League included four main articles, providing—

1. That all justiciable questions on which no agreement was reached should be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment.

2. That all other questions should be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

3. That the signatory Powers should jointly take economic and military action against any of their number committing hostile acts against a co-signatory before the question in dispute had been submitted as provided above.

4. That conferences should be held between the signatory Powers to formulate and codify rules of international law.

Any critical student of such a statement can

find some point where he would desire amendments of detail,[1] and in giving his general assent to the scheme advanced by the League to Enforce Peace Mr. Wilson has never suggested that he commits himself to approval of every line of every clause. But he does find in the League's proposals a reasonable and practical basis for constructive work for the preservation of peace, and he associated himself publicly with those proposals in a notable speech delivered at a dinner of the League at Washington in May 1916.

In the course of a declaration that attracted world-wide attention, the President pointed the diplomatic and political moral of the war then at its height, and laid down the doctrine that in the future the principle of public right must take precedence over the individual interests of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right should prevail as against any sort of selfish aggression. "I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America," added Mr. Wilson, "when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation." His hopes were more clearly defined in a later passage of the same speech, in which he pictured "a universal association of all nations to maintain the inviolate security of the seas for

[1] The principle of the League to Enforce Peace is fully and ably discussed in Mr. H. N. Brailsford's recent book, *A League of Nations* (Headley Bros., 5s. net).

the commerce and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world—a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence."

Those words were not spoken to America alone. Confirmed as they were four months later in the President's speech of acceptance on his nomination as Democratic candidate, they challenged, or at the least invited, response from the great nations of the world. The response was not lacking. In the course of the next few months the two recognized spokesmen of the opposing groups of belligerents, Viscount Grey and Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg, both made direct and public references to the American proposals. Viscount Grey, at a luncheon to representatives of the Foreign Press in London in October 1916, spoke of the activities of the League to Enforce Peace as "a work in neutral countries to which we should all look with favour and with hope." On one of the League's proposals in particular the Foreign Secretary laid special stress, associating himself with the school of Mr. Wilson, rather than with that of Mr. Bryan, by his warning that "if the nations in the world after the war are to do something more effective than they have been able to do before to bind themselves together for the common object of peace, they must be prepared not to undertake more than they are prepared to uphold by force, and to see when the time of crisis comes that it is upheld by

force." Lord Grey's response to Mr. Wilson had a sequel less than three weeks later in the announcement by the German Imperial Chancellor that Germany was ready not merely to join, but to head, a union of peoples designed to restrain a disturber of the peace.

Encouraged, it can hardly be questioned, by these endorsements of the principles of the League to Enforce Peace, the President dwelt in his so-called Peace Note to the belligerents in December 1916 on "the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world," a matter in which, he declared, the people and Government of the United States were vitally and directly interested, and in which they were ready, and even eager, to co-operate when the war was over with every influence and resource at their command. That declaration, being incidental rather than essential to the main purpose of Mr. Wilson's Note, might well have been passed over without specific reference in the replies of the belligerents. It was therefore the more notable that both groups directly responded to the suggestion thus tentatively advanced, Germany professing herself prepared to collaborate fully after the end of the conflict then in progress in the exalted task the President had outlined, while the Allies declared that "they associate themselves whole-heartedly with the plan of creating a League of the Nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world." What fruit those seeds of agreement will bear only the future can show.

Mr. Wilson was not the originator of the

League to Enforce Peace, but his advocacy of its programme both in his Washington speech in May and in his Note to the belligerents in December 1916 had the effect of commending the League's proposals to political thinkers the world over. The difficulties such a scheme would inevitably have to meet cannot be considered here, except in one aspect that particularly concerns America. Critics of President Wilson and of the League to Enforce Peace have pointed out, and with undeniable force, that the participation of the United States in such a League of Nations would be fundamentally inconsistent both with the Monroe Doctrine and with the American Constitution.

The Monroe Doctrine is certainly no fatal obstacle. That article of political faith is being progressively modified under the influence of changing circumstances, and it is destined to be modified further still. The Constitutional objection is more serious. Under the provisions of the Constitution the President has a free hand in all ordinary diplomatic negotiations, but he needs the concurrence of the Senate for the ratification of a treaty, while the declaration of war rests with Congress alone. How, then, could he pledge himself in advance to enter into the treaty relations on which the League's very existence would depend? And how could he guarantee the co-operation of the armed forces of the United States in the exercise of military pressure on a recalcitrant member of the League?

These are questions that must be seriously

faced, for America does not lightly relax her constitutional safeguards. They are not likely to form permanent or insuperable obstacles to the participation of the United States in a League of Nations. Americans have too strong a sense of their rôle as international mediators for that. But they may well provide American opponents of the League with the means of seriously delaying and obstructing the realization of its ideals.

CHAPTER XI

LABOUR AND SOCIAL REFORM

It is time that property, as compared with humanity, should take second place, not first place. We must see to it that there is no overcrowding, that there is no bad sanitation, that there is no unnecessary spread of avoidable diseases, that the purity of food is safeguarded, that there is every precaution against accident, that women are not driven to impossible tasks, nor children permitted to spend their energy before it is fit to be spent. The hope and elasticity of the race must be preserved; men must be preserved according to their individual needs, and not according to the programmes of industry merely. What is the use of having industry, if we perish in producing it? If we die in trying to feed ourselves, why should we eat? If we die trying to get a foothold in the crowd, why not let the crowd trample us sooner and be done with it?—*The New Freedom*, chap. xi.

EVERY quality in Mr. Wilson's character made him a social reformer. He was a social reformer as Governor of New Jersey, and he was elected President of the United States in 1912 on a social reform programme. With organized labour he had temperamentally great sympathy, but down to his entry into New Jersey politics he had come into little actual contact with Labour as a political and social force.

His attitude on Labour questions had been defined as far back as 1910, when he was still President of Princeton, in a letter affirming that "it is not only perfectly legitimate, but absolutely necessary, that labour should organize if

it is to secure justice from organized capital, and everything that it does to improve the condition of working-men, to obtain legislation that will impose full legal responsibility upon the employer for his treatment of his employees and for their protection against accident, to secure just and adequate wages, and to put reasonable limits upon the working day and upon the exactions of those who employ labour, ought to have the hearty support of all fair-minded and public-spirited men."

Mr. Wilson has not varied from that attitude during the years that have intervened; but it is a much less simple matter to handle labour problems from the White House than from the State House at Trenton. All questions of factory laws, industrial disputes, wage rates, compensation for accidents, and the like fall within the sphere of the State legislatures, not of the Federal Government. The only legislative power to be assumed by Congress is such as can be squared with clause 3 of section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, giving it authority "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."

The words "among the several States" are driven hard. They at once bring every considerable railway under Federal regulation; and while Congress can do nothing to influence conditions of employment in a factory doing business exclusively within its own State,[1] it gets some

[1] This principle was definitely confirmed by the leading case U.S. *v.* E. C. Knight, heard before the Supreme Court in 1895.

hold by prohibiting the transport of its goods in interstate commerce unless the conditions of their manufacture have conformed to prescribed standards. Much of the work of the Supreme Court has consisted of deciding on the constitutionality of Federal laws challenged by the States as an encroachment on their rights.

To that standing difficulty was added the fact that in America, as elsewhere, problems arising out of the European War absorbed time and attention which both Cabinet and Congress would have desired to devote to domestic legislation. In spite of that the Wilson Administration has carried through a striking list of measures bearing on social and industrial questions. And in almost every case the President's share in their initiation or successful passage has been large. His relations with Labour have not been uniformly smooth. As is usual in times of industrial prosperity, there has been much industrial unrest, and one or two serious deadlocks, since Mr. Wilson's advent to power in 1913. The great textile strike, organized at Lawrence, in Massachusetts, by the Industrial Workers of the World (the unskilled labourers' federation), fell in his predecessor's term of office; but soon after his election there was a serious difficulty among the weavers at Paterson, in the President's own State of New Jersey, and in 1914 a grave outbreak took place at the Standard Oil Company's mines in Colorado. The issue was the recognition of union officials and the employment of non-union labour, and after a serious affray between the

strikers and the State militia, Mr. Wilson was compelled to draft Federal troops into the State. The dispute was finally settled by a Commission of Investigation, appointed by the President, when all other attempts at a settlement had failed.

There was fortunately no other disturbance of the magnitude of the Colorado outbreak, though the railway troubles of 1916 threatened to put that and every other industrial conflict of recent times in the shade. Meanwhile President Wilson had been proving the sincerity of his promises of social legislation. Of the three great measures passed during his first year of office all had an indirect bearing on the welfare of Labour. The Federal Reserve Act by distributing credit stabilized trade, and therefore employment; the Underwood Tariff Act lowered the price of staple commodities, like sugar, to the poor; and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act in certain important particulars constituted a charter for Labour comparable to the Trade Disputes Act in Great Britain.

The Clayton Act, which owed its passage into law to the pressure exerted personally by the President at a critical stage, expressly exempted labour unions from the veto on "combinations in restraint of trade." The unions had suffered much from the rulings of the courts. The Sherman Anti-Trust Law, of 1890, had not been aimed at Labour; but decisions of the Supreme Court in 1908 and 1911 had brought trade unions definitely under it. The clauses in the Clayton Act, legalizing peaceful strikes and boy-

cotts, were the response to urgent demands of Labour for relief from the impossible position in which the Sherman Act had placed it. The same measure severely limited the power of the courts to restrict the action of unions by injunctions prohibiting the continuance of practices forming the subject of an impending action. It was not without reason that Mr. Wilson sent the pen with which he signed the Act as a memento to Mr. Samuel Gompers, the President of the American Federation of Labour.

Labour legislation rarely enjoys a smooth passage. It almost invariably produces a clash of interests, and long after the law has been enacted and put in force opinion will still remain sharply divided as to its value. That was particularly true of two measures passed by the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth Congresses, the Seamen's Act and the Adamson Railway Act. The Adamson Act must be considered later. The Seamen's Act, introduced by Senator La Follette, one of the founders of the Progressive Party, was dictated partly by alarm at the *Titanic* disaster, and partly by the demand of the seamen's unions for better conditions of service. The effect of the Act was to establish the sailor's right to at least half wages within forty-eight hours of making an American port, and to abolish arrests for desertion; while it was laid down at the same time that after a specified interval 65 per cent. of the deck hands of any vessel calling at an American port must be able seamen, and 75 per cent. of the crew must be able to under-

stand any order in the language in which it is given. The Bill, which involved the denunciation of treaties with more than twenty nations, was strongly opposed by the Republicans, and it was fully expected that the President would veto it, in view of the opposition at home and the irritation abroad. He decided, however, that the case was not one for opposing the decision of Congress. The passage of the Act was loudly applauded by the Seamen's Union. The hostility of foreign Governments to the measure would no doubt have been more vigorously expressed if the war had not intervened to thrust lesser concerns into the background.

Two much less contentious measures, which owed their passage directly to the President's interest in their fortunes, were the Rural Credits Act and the Federal Child Labour Act. The Rural Credits Act, the purpose of which is sufficiently explained by its title, was the fulfilment of an old debt to the farmers. It had had a place in the Democratic platform of 1912, and Mr. Wilson had given it his strong personal support. The measure, more often known as the Federal Farm Loan Act, created a Federal Farm Loan Board and provided for the establishment of Federal Land Banks in twelve centres throughout the Union. The machinery bears a close resemblance to that of the Federal Reserve Board, which had already done something to facilitate agricultural development. The Act, as President Wilson reminded the farmers in whose presence he set his signature to it, made the credit of the

United States available to them and gave them the same facilities for raising loans as were always open to any city manufacturer and merchant with genuine assets to pledge.

The Child Labour Act was the first measure of the kind passed by Congress. Social reforms such as it embodied had in the past been left to the individual States, and the power of the Federal Government to legislate for the whole Union on such a question was a matter of controversy. As it is, the constitutionality of the Child Labour Act is certain to be challenged before the Supreme Court. The provisions of the Act are simple. It prohibits the shipment in inter-state commerce of goods emanating from factories employing children under fourteen, or under sixteen if employed at night or for more than eight hours a day. The measure had no easy passage. The first time it was introduced it was allowed to lapse. Brought in again in the following session, it would have met with no better fate but for Mr. Wilson's determination that it should be saved. At the critical stage, when the approaching end of the session threatened a general disaster to all outstanding Bills, the President sent for the party leaders and urged them to insist on the passage of the Child Labour Act. His appeal was successful. The Senate passed the measure by 52 votes to 12, and it was signed on September 1, 1916. It was to come into operation twelve months later.

It was left to the threatened railway strike of 1916 to involve Mr. Wilson in the most decisive

action he ever took with regard to a Labour problem. This was not the President's first experience of railway trouble. Within a few months after his election in 1913 a strike seemed impending, the then existing arbitration machinery —a Commission of three created by the Erdman Act of 1898—satisfying neither side in the dispute, since each party feared that a single vote might deprive them of an award involving some millions of dollars. In this case prompt legislative action was taken. A Bill, acceptable to both employers and employed, providing for the increase of the Arbitration Board to six, was rushed through Congress and signed by the President. On the basis thus provided the dispute was settled without open hostilities.

The 1916 trouble was much more formidable. It involved the skilled men of every railway system in the United States. The men were represented by four railway brotherhoods [1] (trade unions), their actual number being less than 400,000, distributed over some 230 railways, from Philadelphia to San Francisco and from Detroit to New Orleans. Moderate as these numbers were, the threatened strike would have paralysed the railway service of the whole of the Union, for the prospective strikers were the skilled men—engineers, firemen, conductors, brakemen—on whom the actual train-running depended, and they were backed by the promised support of the American Federation of Labour. Stripped of certain technicalities, their demand

[1] Locomotive engineers, locomotive firemen, conductors, trainmen.

was for an eight-hour day (instead of the usual nine or ten), without reduction of wages and with payment at time and a half for overtime. In the words of a poster issued broadcast throughout the country, they asked for "a square deal—eight hours' work, eight hours' sleep, eight hours' relaxation." The case for the companies was that the men's demands were unreasonable, and that to concede them would mean so heavy an addition to working costs as to necessitate the raising of rates, a step which the railroads were not empowered to take without the sanction of the Inter-State Commerce Commission.

The men refused arbitration and definitely called a strike, to take effect on the first Monday in September if their demands had not been met by that date. The Monday in question was the fourth of the month. A week earlier there was no sign of a settlement. The railroads were refusing all goods for future transport, and preparations were being made to have the mail trains worked by the military. A heavy responsibility rested on the President as Chief Executive. The deadlock was complete. Every possible opening for intervention had disappeared. Unless the men got what they asked for the train services would stop dead in seven days' time. Mr. Wilson was not predisposed to condemn the brotherhoods as unreasonable. He was a believer in the limitation of hours, and a Bill fixing an eight-hour day for Federal employees had recently been passed with his approval. But to rush through

legislation conferring on the men by statute satisfaction of demands they had refused to submit to arbitration was a serious step, which could not fail to expose its author to violent attack.

But it was a choice between that and a national strike. The President was faced with an extraordinarily difficult decision, and he decided for legislation. On Tuesday, August 29th, he went down to Congress and appealed for the immediate passage of a Bill whose provisions he outlined. It consisted of six clauses, enacting—

1. That the Inter-State Commerce Commission (which regulates railways) should be reconstituted and strengthened.

2. That the eight-hour day should be established as the legal basis of work and wages.

3. That a Commission of three should be appointed to watch the working of the Act and report.

4. That the companies should be permitted to raise rates if the Inter-State Commerce Commission decided that the increased costs imposed by the new Act justified it.

5. That a strike or lock-out should be illegal until a public investigation had been made into the dispute.

6. That in case of military necessity the President should have power to seize and work the railways, putting the railwaymen under military discipline.

The lengthy address by which these proposals were prefaced provoked much criticism; for the President contrived to put the masters, rather than

the men, in the wrong, on the ground that they had definitely rejected his plan of settlement, which involved just compensation in return for the concession of the eight-hour day. But the urgency of the situation demanded action rather than criticism. Congress, warned that starvation was among the possibilities, applied itself forthwith to its task. There was some argument as to the precise form and extent of the Bills to be passed; but on Thursday, August 31st, it was announced that the President and the leaders in the two Houses had accepted as a compromise the measure standing in the name of Mr. Adamson, of Georgia, for introduction in the House. The Bill established the eight-hour day, with overtime *pro rata* (not at time and a half), appointed the Commission of three to observe and report, and provided for the military operation of the roads in case of need. The new provisions were to have force as from January 1, 1917. The Bill was introduced on Thursday, passed by the House on Friday and by the Senate on Saturday, and was signed by the President on Sunday. On Monday, the day fixed for the great strike, work everywhere went on as usual. The rest of the President's programme was held over till the following session.

The settlement gratified the railwaymen and satisfied the President, and while Mr. Wilson was bitterly assailed for yielding to industrial menace, relief at the escape from the strike was clearly the predominant feeling in the mind of the

average citizen. No one, however, supposed that the companies would accept the decision without a fight. Their obvious strategy was to challenge the Act as unconstitutional, and a number of railroads at once filed injunction suits to suspend its operation. On November 22nd the Federal District Court at Kansas City decided, on the application of the Missouri, Oklahoma, Gulf Railroad, that the Law was unconstitutional. An injunction was issued pending a final judgment on the issue by the Supreme Court. At the time this chapter was being written (February 1917) that decision had not been given and the Law was not in operation.

Public opinion on the President's action has not yet finally crystallized, nor is it likely to until the decision of the Inter-State Commerce Commission on the raising of freight rates is made known. If the Law should be declared constitutional and should indirectly mean a levy on the pocket of the private citizen, it will not be viewed with quite the detachment that was possible while the dispute was pending. The men, on their side, are strongly opposed to the measure of what is virtually compulsory arbitration associated by the President with his proposal to make the eight-hour day statutory. The railway future therefore remains uncertain, the more so as the Newlands Commission, appointed to investigate and report on the working of railway systems the world over, must obviously bring the question of nationalization into the field of practical discussion. America is hardly pre-

pared yet for a change involving a centralization of power that would affect the whole relationship of the States to the Union, but merely to have nationalization discussed as a serious proposition will be a portent of interest.

Presenting himself for re-election within nine weeks of his settlement of the railroad dispute, Mr. Wilson commanded a substantial section of the Labour vote that would otherwise have gone to the Socialist candidate. In his speech of acceptance at the beginning of September he had given evidence of his solicitude for Labour in a passage recalling the legislation he had initiated or furthered.

"The working-men of America," he claimed, "have been given a veritable emancipation by the legal recognition of a man's labour as part of his life, and not a mere marketable commodity; by exempting labour organizations from processes of the Courts which treated their members like fractional mobs and not like accessible and responsible individuals; by releasing our seamen from involuntary servitude; by making adequate provision for compensation for industrial accidents; by providing suitable machinery for mediation and conciliation in industrial disputes; and by putting the Federal Department of Labour at the disposal of the working-man when in search of work." To this list of services would, of course, have been added the eight-hour day victory, but for the fact that on the day the President's speech was being delivered the measure conferring that benefit

was still in course of passage through the Senate.

On the whole, Labour recognized the justice of President Wilson's claims. The union clauses in the Clayton Act they regarded as a vindication of the principle that "the labour of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce" —and may therefore be legitimately withheld through the action of a combination when a commodity or article of commerce may not. Mr. Gompers, the President of the A.F.L., no doubt carried most of his membership with him when he wrote on the eve of the 1916 election: "President Woodrow Wilson has advocated, urged, and signed legislation protecting human rights and promoting the welfare of the workers and all of the masses of the people. It lies with the working people—the masses—on Election Day to determine by their votes whether the policy of progress, justice, freedom, and humanity shall prevail in the re-election of Mr. Wilson to the Presidency of the United States, or whether the pendulum shall swing backward, and the policy of reaction shall be enthroned." [1]

It does not appear that the Labour vote was in most areas cast solid for the President, but it may well have been responsible for giving him the victory in more than one doubtful State.

[1] *American Federationist*, November 1916.

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CHAPTER XII

RE-ELECTION

Four years is too long a term for a President who is not a true spokesman of the people, who is imposed upon and does not lead. It is too short a term for a President who is doing or attempting a great work of reform and who has not had time to finish it.—*Letter to Congressman A. M. Palmer, February* 1913.

FROM the end of 1915, when political thought began seriously to concern itself with the Presidential Election of the following November, down to the actual day of assembly of the Progressive and Republican Conventions at Chicago in June, a curious and baffling situation prevailed. On the Democratic side, indeed, there was neither division nor doubt. Only one candidate was possible, Woodrow Wilson, and the 1912 pronouncement in favour of a single Presidential term was by tacit agreement thrown to the winds. But with the opposition the case was very different. They did not know whether they were one party or two, and even if they should decide to be one they were completely at a loss for a candidate.

Half a dozen names were under discussion, the mention of any one of them calculated to provoke more criticism than approval. Mr. Roosevelt was an obvious nomination, but public

opinion was altogether against election for a third term, and in any case the Progressive leader's rampant radicalism would render his hold on the "old guard" of the Republican Party precarious. Senator Elihu Root commanded universal respect, but he was too conservative for many of the Progressives, and it was doubtful in the extreme whether he was ready to accept nomination at seventy-one. On the whole, the omens pointed to the adoption of a compromise candidate in Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, one of the nine judges of the Supreme Court, and a former Governor of New York State; but here again it was questionable whether Mr. Hughes was prepared to relinquish the dignity and distinction of his high judicial office, and whether, if he did, he would make an effective fighting candidate. In addition attention was spasmodically concentrated on the claims of such "favourite son" candidates as Senator Cummins of Iowa, Senator Borah of Idaho, and ex-Senator Fairbanks of Indiana, Vice-President in Mr. Roosevelt's second administration.

The importance of the Republican dilemma lay in the certainty that the presence of both a Progressive and a Republican candidate in the field would, in 1916 as in 1912, mean the gift of the election to Mr. Wilson. On the other hand, in the event of a Progressive-Republican coalition the President would have to do much more than maintain his position. In 1912 his total was 1,300,000 behind the combined polls of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Taft, and if in 1916 he should

be facing one opponent instead of two he would need to make up the leeway of a million and a third either by securing that majority among the new voters, largely women, added to the electorate in the preceding four years, or by detaching sufficient votes from the Opposition to reduce their total and increase his own to the necessary level. It is not surprising that the President's chances of re-election were generally assumed to turn on whether the cleavage in the Republican Party was to disappear or be perpetuated. In a straight fight the odds were against Mr. Wilson.

The first five months of 1916 passed with the Republican riddle still unsolved. When the Progressive and Republican Conventions, opening at Chicago on June 7th, were no more than a week distant the more sagacious prophets were predicting that Roosevelt would be nominated by the former and Hughes by the latter, though whether Hughes would consent to stand was altogether problematic. The first day of the Conventions brought no developments. On the second an important step was taken, five Progressives meeting with five Republicans to probe the possibilities of an accommodation. On the fourth Judge Hughes was nominated by the Republicans, and his acceptance was at once cabled from Washington. He resigned his seat in the Supreme Court on the same day. Mr. Roosevelt, nominated simultaneously by the Progressives, indicated that his acceptance would depend on the opinion he formed of Mr. Hughes's declarations. The Republican candidate having stated his posi-

tion, the ex-President decided that rather than make Mr. Wilson's re-election certain he would stand aside himself and throw his weight on the side of Judge Hughes.

The interest of the Democratic Convention at St. Louis a fortnight later lay not in the choice of a candidate, for that was a foregone conclusion, but in the formulation of a platform. The documents representing the views of the Republicans and the Progressives had been unimpressive, both demanding high Protection, both insisting on the vindication of American honour and interests, and both calling for extensive preparedness programmes, the Progressives committing themselves to the advocacy of universal military service. The Democratic platform, in the drafting of which Mr. Wilson had taken a prominent part, consisted largely of a record of the notable achievements of the Administration in power. It reaffirmed the belief of the party in a revenue tariff; made an outspoken appeal to American citizens of whatever origin to recognize the paramount claims of their American nationality; pledged the support of the party to the preparedness and Pan-American policies of the Administration; approved the Shipping Bill then before Congress; advocated the introduction of woman suffrage by the individual States; and recommended various measures of social reform.

The platform opened with the declaration that "we endorse the administration of Woodrow Wilson," and ended with the affirmation that "Woodrow Wilson stands to-day the greatest

American of his generation." That was the real plank on which the Democratic Party fought the election. Throughout the Union they placarded the legend, "Let us keep this proven man." No better war-cry could have been devised. An outgoing President presenting himself for re-election must stand primarily on his record, and in 1916 Mr. Wilson's personality, as revealed by his legislative and administrative achievement, was the supreme—it might almost be said the single—campaign asset of the party that had nominated him for a second term. The times forbade the introduction of new and ambitious domestic programmes. Moreover, most of the standing demands of the Democrats had already been realized, at least in part, during the quadrennium then drawing to a close. All they asked was that Woodrow Wilson should continue to lead. They were prepared, not in blind but in assured confidence, to follow.

In the four and a half months of organizing and oratory that intervened between the nominations in June and the elections in November the attitude of America towards the European War was inevitably the main subject of contention. It did not overshadow all other issues as completely as was sometimes supposed in this country, but it provided the Republicans with their main weapon of attack, and for that reason it was given a greater prominence in the campaign speeches than it assumed in the mind of the average voter in any except the Eastern States. New England, always Republican, was strongly opposed to what it

regarded as the President's nerveless handling of the controversies with both groups of belligerents —particularly with Germany. But throughout the West and South and a great part of the Middle West there was a general endorsement of the appreciation accorded in the Democratic platform to "the splendid diplomatic victories of our great President, who has preserved the vital interests of our Government and its citizens, and kept us out of war." The nature of the pacific idealism of the West has already been briefly touched on,[1] and it is sufficient to say here that the watchword Peace and Prosperity, with its variant Peace, Preparedness, and Prosperity, was calculated to secure the Democratic candidate many thousands of votes throughout wide areas west of the Mississippi.

The campaign was devoid of conspicuous incidents. From the first moment to the last the issue completely baffled the prophets. Much turned on whether the German vote would be cast solid, and if so which candidate would get it. At first Mr. Hughes was distinctly in favour with the hyphenates, partly from their natural disposition to oppose the man whom they regarded as backing the Allies against Germany, partly as a result of the President's unsparing flagellation of so-called American citizens of divided allegiance, who put the interests of the country of their origin before the interests of the country to which their loyalty had been pledged. For a while Mr. Hughes, notably in a speech at the German centre of Milwaukee, appeared to be cultivating such sup-

[1] Chap. ix, p. 157.

port, but it soon became an embarrassment to him, and he took an early opportunity of defining his position by some uncompromising strictures on qualified and divided loyalty.

As the campaign progressed the old party alignments, obliterated by the Progressive split in 1912, took clearer shape. Mr. Roosevelt, after a rather spectacular reconciliation with his former opponent Mr. Taft, took the field in active support of Mr. Hughes. On the other side Mr. Bryan, whose influence with the radical and pacifist wing of the Democratic Party was great, had at the outset pledged his unreserved support to the President, and the Democratic candidate's prospects were further improved towards the close of the campaign by the unexpected backing of Mr. Henry Ford, the pacifist and Republican motor-manufacturer of Detroit, Mr. Thomas Edison, and the influential, but so far non-committal, *New York Evening Post*. The main line of Republican attack was a fierce condemnation of the alleged failure of the President to protect American honour and interests; but Mr. Hughes showed himself singularly destitute of any practical alternative policy, a defect that unquestionably lost him the support of thousands of electors disposed to vote Republican but unprepared for a leap in the dark in a crisis so menacing.

The quality of Mr. Wilson's patriotism, moreover, was above challenge. He refused from the first to truckle to the pro-German element, and his position was considerably strengthened by an incident that occurred just a month before the

election. A body, of pro-German proclivities, known as the American Truth Society, sent him through its president, Mr. Jeremiah O'Leary, a telegram worded as follows :—

Again we greet you with popular disapproval of your pro-British policies. Your failure to secure compliance with all American rights, your leniency towards the British Empire, your approval of war loans and ammunition traffic, are the issues of this campaign.

The President immediately telegraphed back from his home at Long Branch [1] :—

Your telegram received. Would feel deeply mortified to have you, or anybody like you, voting for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans, and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them.—WOODROW WILSON.

The interchange was received with general satisfaction throughout America.

The beginning of November found the political pundits completely at sea. Never in the history of the Union had the issue seemed so incalculable. Certain early omens, it is true, had been unfavourable to Mr. Wilson. Maine, which holds its State elections apart from, and in advance of, the Presidential contest, had in September shown itself true to its traditional Republicanism. In the New York primaries in the same month the Progressives, for whose support the Democrats had been angling, went back to the Republican fold ; while in the President's own State of New Jersey there was a Democratic split, and an anti-Wilson candidate secured nomination at the primary for

[1] See map opposite p. 43.

the United States Senatorship. Nevertheless, Wall Street betting, which early in the campaign had been 2 to 1 on Hughes, had backed down by the last week in October to 10 to 9, and on the eve of the poll varied between 10 to 7 and 10 to 8 on the Republican candidate.

The President's chances of success rested on too many unknown factors for confident prediction. How far would he detach Progressive votes from Hughes? Or Socialist votes from Benson (the official Socialist)? Would he carry the Middle West? How would the four million women vote—for the Democratic candidate who advocated extension of the franchise to them by State ordinance, or for the Republican who boldly recommended an amendment of the Federal Constitution conferring the vote on women at a stroke throughout the forty-eight States?

With those, and many other similar questions unanswered and unanswerable, the electors went to the poll on November 7th. The quarters where the earliest foreshadowings of the result were to be sought were well known. Pennsylvania, with its 38 electoral votes, was a certainty for Hughes. Its great steel industry lived on high Protection, and the State had never gone Democratic since the Civil War. If to Pennsylvania's 38 should be added New York's 45, Mr. Wilson's handicap would be heavy, even with the certainty that the South and the probability that much of the West would be with him. Illinois with its 29 votes was regarded as the pivotal State. If the Democrats could carry that they

would have some set-off against their certain defeat in the East. If, on the other hand, Wilson lost Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois the election was as good as over. No candidate in the history of the Union had ever won against the combination of those three predominant States.

By the early evening unofficial reports from the different States were reaching New York. It was soon clear that Pennsylvania was Republican. By seven o'clock the Democratic *New York Times* had conceded New York to Mr. Hughes. By 7.30 the *Herald* had prematurely announced Mr. Hughes's election. An hour later the *American* did the same. The Illinois returns were still lacking, but a Republican majority was rumoured. By nine o'clock the Democratic *World* and the Republican *Tribune* had taken Mr. Hughes's victory for granted. By 9.30 the *Times* had hoisted the red light that was the prearranged signal of a Republican victory. It kept it burning till midnight, and announced the next morning in giant headlines across its front page—

HUGHES ELECTED WITH 290 VOTES,
PERHAPS 312, 7 STATES IN DOUBT;
HOUSE REPUBLICAN.

In this country there was, of course, no overnight excitement, for New York time is five hours behind Greenwich, and the earliest definite news could not reach London till after midnight. For the same reason the ordinary editions of the morning papers on the following day could report

no conclusive result, but *The Times* ran a special late edition bearing on its principal page the following inset :—

STOP PRESS

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, E.C.
Nov. 8, 5.30 a.m.

Mr. Hughes has been elected President of the United States.

The rest of the late morning papers made the same announcement.

The first editions of the evening papers published biographies of the successful Republican candidate, but before the afternoon was far advanced they were issuing posters bearing such legends as "American Election : Remarkable Development" ; or "Is Hughes Elected? Issue in Doubt." By the following morning, November 9th, it was clear that it was anybody's election. So close had been the voting in a number of States that so far from the result being certain, as it regularly was, within three or four hours of the close of the polls, no finality had been reached after more than a night and a day had elapsed. So far as could be ascertained Mr. Wilson was to be credited with 251 electoral votes and Mr. Hughes with 242. Since the total vote was 531 a candidate must secure at least 266 to be elected.

Another day passed and the figures were put at 269 and 247, Mr. Wilson, on this showing, being elected with at least three votes to spare. This computation, however, was quite unofficial, and all that could be said with any assurance was that the final result would turn on California and Minnesota, where the voting was so close that a recount might be necessary in either State. California had 13 electoral votes, Minnesota 12. If Mr. Wilson could carry either of the two he was safe. Mr. Hughes would need them both to secure election. In the end they went different roads, California returning a Democratic majority of 3,700 on a poll of over 900,000, and Minnesota a Republican majority of less than 500 on a poll of close on 360,000. It was not till November 23rd, sixteen days after the actual polling, that the Republicans finally abandoned hope, and Mr. Hughes telegraphed to congratulate the President on having won an election unprecedented in the history of the United States.

The official totals of electoral votes were :—

Wilson	276
Hughes	255

The President therefore had secured ten votes above a bare majority. He was the first Democratic President since Andrew Jackson (1829-37) to be elected for a second consecutive term, for Cleveland, though he was twice President (1885-9 and 1893-7) did not hold office for eight years continuously. On the popular vote Mr. Wilson held a lead of over half a million,

the totals of each of the five candidates being as follows :—

Wilson (Dem.)	9,116,296
Hughes (Rep.)	8,547,474
Benson (Soc.)	750,000[1]
Hanly (Prohib.)	225,101
Reimer (Soc.-Lab.)	10,105

Mr. Wilson's vote was the highest ever recorded by a Democratic candidate, being 2,800,000 above his own total in 1912, and Mr. Hughes's the highest ever recorded by a Republican. That is to be accounted for by the growth of the population and the admission of women to the franchise in several States that excluded them in 1912. In all there were over $3\frac{1}{2}$ million more votes cast in 1916 than at the previous election.

The result of the polling was hardly easier to explain than it had been to predict, but a study of the map (opposite p. 227) makes it clear where, if not why, Mr. Wilson won. New England, with the exception of New Hampshire (which went Democrat by a majority of 56 out of 87,000), was solid for Hughes. The South sent its usual unbroken phalanx of Democratic voters to the electoral college. The Middle West States of Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin all returned Republican majorities. Nothing but a practically solid Democratic vote in the West could have set off that heavy preponderance. The West turned the election. Its returns exceeded the Democrats' highest expectations. Except for

[1] Figures for certain States estimated.

Oregon and South Dakota (five votes each), every State from the Pacific Ocean to the Missouri had lined up behind Mr. Wilson. The West had combined with the South to send him back to the White House in the face of the East. And incidentally the President had achieved the unexampled feat of winning against the adverse verdict of New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, which contribute between them no fewer than 112 votes.

While no one State was actually more "pivotal" than any other, it was a curious irony that thrust on California the appearance of having turned the election. For California was the scene of a Republican *faux pas* that may justly be said to have cost Mr. Hughes the Presidency. The State was Republican by tradition. It had four times split its vote, but it had never since the Civil War gone solid for the Democrats. In 1912 it was Progressive, with a small split. In 1916 it should have been secure for the Republicans. But California was not prepared to discard its radicalism. It had cast up a political leader, Hiram Johnson, a strong Progressive, of whom more will be heard at Washington—certainly at the Capitol, it may even be at the White House—in no remote future. He had accepted nomination to the Governorship unwillingly, fought and beaten the party machine, broken the power of the railroad that dominated State politics, and then proceeded to purge California as Woodrow Wilson in his time had purged New Jersey.

In 1916 Governor Johnson, who was himself standing for the United States Senate, was prepared, on the smallest encouragement, to follow the example of his leader Mr. Roosevelt and support the Republican candidate. Unfortunately for the Republican candidate that encouragement was never given. When Mr. Hughes visited California he accepted the ill-conceived advice of a political agent, ignored Mr. Johnson, and took inordinate pains to make it clear that he was standing as a true-blue Republican, with no compromising strain of Progressivism in his political faith. That declaration lost him the thirteen California votes that would have made him President of the United States. Hiram Johnson and his friends were radicals and Republicans. They had a choice between supporting a radical and Democrat on the one hand and a conservative and Republican on the other. They preferred the radical and Democrat. Governor Johnson himself beat his Democratic opponent out of the field for the Senatorship, but the State's Presidential vote went to Wilson.

Few conclusive inferences can be drawn from an election so closely contested. It is clear that all the speculations on the effect of the women's vote and the hyphenated vote were superfluous. The women voted one way in one State and the opposite way in another. The hyphenated electors did the same. The Progressives evidently voted Republican in the Eastern States, but in the West they must have given considerable support to Mr. Wilson. There is

some evidence of a transference of votes, as compared with 1912, from the Socialist to the Democratic candidate.

The one broad moral to be drawn is that while America would have been quite content to see Mr. Hughes at the White House, she preferred on the whole that Mr. Wilson should remain in possession. His conduct of affairs might be open to criticism at different points, but at any rate he had steered the country through perilous seas without the shipwreck of either its honour or its prosperity. Was it certain that Mr. Hughes could do as much? The West, at least, was disinclined to take risks on that. The crisis, moreover, was still at its height, and the old 1864 dictum about swapping horses in the middle of a stream was peculiarly applicable to 1916. And to that was added the reflection, probably much more widespread than appeared on the surface, that if war had to come it was well that America should go into it under a leader who hated war and could be relied on to take up arms only under irresistible compulsion. If the secrets of individual votes could be revealed, it is not unlikely that Mr. Wilson would be found to owe his election to Republicans who shrank at the eleventh hour from the responsibility of committing the destinies of America at so critical a moment to untried hands.

It should be added that the elections reduced the Democratic majority in the Senate from 16 to 12, and left the balance in the House in the hands of half a dozen Progressives, Independents,

and Prohibitionists. Votes were cast in several States on the prohibition question, with the result that Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, and South Dakota "went dry." Their accession raised the number of dry States to 25 out of 48.

CHAPTER XIII

THE FUTURE

The destiny of America lies written in the lines of poets, in the characters of self-sacrificing soldiers, in the conceptions of ambitions of her greater statesmen, lies written in the teachings of her school-rooms, in all those ideals of service of humanity and of liberty for the individual, which are to be found written in the very school-books of the boys and girls whom we send to be taught to be Americans. The destiny of America is an ideal destiny. America has no reason for being, unless her destiny and duty be ideal. It is her incumbent privilege to declare and stand for the rights of men. Nothing else is worth fighting for. Nothing else is worth sacrificing for.—*At Chicago, January* 31, 1916.

To make a chapter under this heading anything but brief and tentative would be to court disaster. The prophet's is at all times a thankless rôle, and at a moment like the present, when external events over which America can have no control may suddenly involve her in war, or betray her President into some fundamental error of judgment that would shatter in a week the high reputation he has built up through four laborious years, any attempt at confident prediction would be a double folly. Nevertheless there are discernible in American political life certain drifts and tendencies of which it is well to take account, even though there can be no certainty that expectations legitimately founded on them will ever be realized.

First, as to Mr. Wilson himself. It is not to be supposed that the deep-rooted sentiment against a third Presidential term will be relaxed in his favour when his second quadrennium has been served. March 1921, therefore, will find him at the age of sixty-four, and, if present indications are any guide, with many years of vigour and activity still before him, an ex-President of the United States. Americans admit frankly that their ex-Presidents are an embarrassment. A man who has exercised more autocratic powers than a constitutional monarch ever wields over a population now approaching a hundred millions cannot quietly disappear when he leaves the White House. It is not consistent with his dignity to fight a contested election for the Senate. As a member of the Cabinet he would tend to limit the President's freedom of action. He may be prepared and qualified to assume the rôle of Elder Statesman, like Jefferson in his retirement at Monticello ; but there is always an equal prospect that he will become, like Mr. Roosevelt, a permanent thorn in the side of successors of whichever party.

Mr. Wilson is not likely to emulate the Progressive leader's achievements as critic and pamphleteer. It is more likely that he will follow Mr. Taft's sensible and honourable example and go back to the academic work to which he worthily devoted his abilities down to 1910. But there is one alternative on which an English writer may be permitted to dwell with an emphasis dictated by hope. There is no living

American who could fill with greater distinction or success the office of Ambassador to Great Britain, and none whose appointment would be read as a greater honour to the country to which he was accredited. Nor would it be beneath the dignity even of an ex-President of the United States to come to London, not as a mere diplomatic plenipotentiary, but as Ambassador to a people as well as to a chancellery, as the architect of a spiritual entente, charged with interpreting America to England and England to America as they have been interpreted in the past by James Russell Lowell on the one side and James Bryce on the other. The world may be a different place in four years' time, and it may well appear that the highest task to which a statesman can bend his energies in the third decade of the twentieth century will be the promotion and consolidation of Anglo-American friendship.

But before that question need be seriously considered Mr. Wilson has four years of power in prospect. His personal position has been materially strengthened by his re-election. He is still technically a minority President, for when all five candidates' votes in 1916 are taken into account Mr. Wilson polled a few hundred thousand less than the combined totals of his opponents. But for practical purposes all that need be considered are the Democratic, Republican, and Progressive candidates in 1912 and the Democratic and Republican in 1916. And in relation to the Republican-Progressives President Wilson, after four years of unprecedented

industry and unexampled anxiety, during which his domestic and internal policies challenged criticism at every point and from every quarter, converted a minority of 1,300,000 votes into a majority of 560,000. That vindication of his administration, coupled with the fact that he is no longer living under the shadow of an impending election, has sensibly increased the President's freedom of action. On the other hand, his hold on Congress is less secure, for while in the Sixty-fifth Congress the Senate still has a Democratic majority of 12 (as against 16 in the Sixty-fourth) the parties in the House are so evenly divided that a handful of Independents is likely to hold the balance.

Even if America continues to avoid entanglement in the war it is probable that there will be some slackening of the legislative pace. Almost all the more important measures foreshadowed in the Democratic programme of 1912 have been converted into laws, and concentration on administration is now more needed than a high legislative output. A number of new administrative instruments—a Federal Reserve Board, a Federal Trade Board, a Federal Farm Loan Board, a Tariff Commission, a Shipping Commission—have been set to work, and existing agencies, like the Inter-State Commerce Commission, are having new powers conferred upon them. Acts have already been passed providing for naval construction and Army development for some years ahead. What is needed now is that the working of these agencies and schemes should

be closely observed and where requisite directed and readjusted. That process may entail legislation, but no such concentration on lawmaking as marked the four years 1913-17 appears to be in prospect.

In the sphere of party politics the position is interesting and uncertain. Mr. Gladstone, in a moment of aberration, once declared that Jefferson Davis had succeeded in making a nation. With far greater truth it may be affirmed that President Wilson has succeeded in making—or, at the least, remaking—a party. The Democrats, through the personal force of a leader who owed nothing to the favour of bosses or command of party machinery, have in the last four years become once more a living force in Federal politics in America. But while it is certain that Mr. Wilson has remade his party, it is by no means clear what he has remade it into. If Democrats have stood for anything in the past, they have stood for the rights of the States against the Federal Government. Yet there has never been an administration at Washington that can compare with President Wilson's in its record of legislation calculated to strengthen the Federal Government at the expense of the States. The legislation has been uniformly beneficial, and the Democrats have given its initiator their loyal support throughout. But it remains a fact that the party whose main plank in the past has been local autonomy has for four effective years been devoting its energies to translating into action the principle of centralization.

What effect will such a tendency have on the alignment of parties? That depends in part on the future of the Progressives. At present it is still uncertain whether they will preserve their separate identity or merge themselves once more with the Republicans from whom they sprang. And they need not necessarily do either. An effort is being made to maintain the individuality of the party. Whether it succeeds or fails, the Progressives will have to decide whether they have more in common with the conservatism of the Republicans or with the radicalism of the Democrats. In the East they will almost certainly adhere to the Republicans, but in the West that is by no means so inevitable. In 1916 Mr. Wilson's majority clearly included a considerable Progressive vote in States like California, and more astonishing developments are possible than the successful candidature at the Presidential election of 1920 of a politician of the type of Governor Hiram Johnson, running as a Progressive-Democrat on a programme of social reform.

That, however, is purely hypothetic speculation. Many things may happen, in America and out of it, before 1920. What is certain is that the West, where the Progressives are strongest, is going from this time on to play a new part in American political life. It elected Mr. Wilson in 1916, and it will elect more Presidents after him. From the days of Washington onwards the centre of political gravity in America has been steadily moving westwards. The same impulse that drove the President's grandfather, James

Wilson, from Philadelphia across Pennsylvania into Ohio a century ago has in the intervening decades been driving millions of his fellow-countrymen across the Alleghanies, across the Mississippi, across the Rockies, across the Sierras, to the undiscovered and undeveloped lands of the Far West. That great migration has reached its geographical limit on the shores of the Pacific, but its political limit is still unattained. The broad States beyond the Missouri are as yet thinly peopled, but for generations to come every successive census will add to their representation in the House, and therefore to their Presidential vote.

No man in America has been more sensible than the President of the new meaning of the West. It was not till the tide of migration had swept forward over what is now termed the Middle West, he had told a New Jersey audience as long ago as 1895, that the type of the true American had been evolved. "The West," he declared, "is the great word of our history. The Westerner has been the type and master of our American life." The twenty odd years that have passed since those words were spoken have given them a new force. The West has become a factor that cannot be ignored. It is no mere extension and development of the East. It is essentially different in character. There is a strain of natural and vigorous democracy running through the Western States peculiar to men whose life is spent in a free air and amid wide spaces, who till their own land and call no man master,

"All through American history," says a professor of a Western University,[1] "democracy has been like a trade wind, blowing ever from the sunset." And speaking of an area no farther from New England than the basin of America's great river-highway he writes: "By its geographical position the Mississippi Valley escapes the temptation to look constantly across the water and model itself upon Old-World, especially English, patterns. Screened in a measure from the sapping seductiveness of foreign example, it seems destined to be the most American part of our country. Moreover, growth in wealth, prestige, and political power will lend it courage to break away from Eastern example and be itself."[2]

What the West will be when its broad plains are populated, and the city population increasingly outnumbers the rural, the future will disclose. To-day it is the home of a robust, if restrained, radicalism, a fertile seed-bed for Mr. Bryan's idealist pacifism, and the main factor in the renewal of Mr. Wilson's commission. Its development will affect more than America's domestic politics. Now and henceforward the New England peoples whose eyes turn across the Atlantic to Europe must reckon with another people, of the same citizenship but with a different orientation, three thousand miles across the continent, whose ships furrow the Pacific and whose ties will be with the awakening nations of Asia.

[1] Prof. E. A. Ross of Wisconsin, in *Changing America*.
[2] Ibid.

There is peril as well as hope in that prospect. But its full realization would give America a function such as no nation has ever exercised as interpreter and mediator between the Eastern and the Western worlds.

President Wilson's consciousness of the potentialities of the West bears a relation, direct if not at once apparent, to his belief in the possibility of an international guarantee of peace. The promotion of an organization directed towards that end—whether under the name of a League to Enforce Peace or any other—is the highest and the greatest work he has set before him. The whole of his foreign policy has been influenced by that dominant purpose. He has laboured at America's practical contribution to such a League, by promoting the adoption of the numerous "cooling-off" treaties,[1] and he has gone far to banish the danger of war from the American continent by his assurances and proposals to the Latin-American Republics. He repelled the idea of entanglement in the European War, and committed himself to a formidable programme of preparedness, in order that America might be able to contribute to a future League of Nations the mediating influence attaching to a neutral among belligerents, and the material force on which the efficacy of such an organized constabulary must for a time depend. The President may have been quixotic. He may have been misguided. He may have been guilty of sacrificing his country's prestige beyond justification.

[1] See p. 152.

But at least he was moving towards a definite objective, and an objective so pregnant with beneficent possibilities for humanity that if ever his hopes were realized his part in the work of establishing peace would give him an imperishable name among the handful of men whose efforts have lifted the world to new moral levels.

This is not the time to idealize President Wilson. He is in the midst of his work, and he cannot be judged by it till he has succeeded or failed in carrying it through. He has had the interim reward of being sent back by his countrymen to finish what he has begun, and he has no title to ask more of them or of mankind yet than that his endeavours should be given free scope, and that both appreciative and adverse critics should for a while suspend their verdicts. That does not mean that there is no place for sober judgments on so much of a political career as is already part of history. It has been the aim of the present writer to provide a basis for such judgments. If this volume has been worth writing at all, it is because a plain record of a man's concrete actions through sixteen years of public, and six of definitely political, life affords a surer revelation of his principles and aims than the most acute and detailed psychological analysis.

President Wilson has not yet discarded, it may be that he never will discard, a certain academic chill that limits his personal appeal to the multitude, as compared, for example, with Mr.

Roosevelt's. It is something of the same contrast seen in English politics between such men as Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd George—though that comparison must not be carried beyond the point it is cited to illustrate. But whatever else Woodrow Wilson will stand for in history, posterity will look back to him as the exponent of a great political creed. No statesman living to-day has more consistently, more resolutely, or with deeper conviction applied in the government of a great commonwealth the lessons of a discerning, a sober, and a constructive liberalism. If his possible influence on the future is to be rightly gauged, it must be estimated in the light of his unconcealed aspiration to promote the application to the government of the world of the principles he has for four years applied to the government of America.

"I hope and believe," he said in his address to the Senate on the conditions of a world peace, "that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty. I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out." Such words, in the President's mouth, call for a wider interpretation than the special circumstances attending their utterance suggest. They betoken an unashamed idealism—and idealists in high places have in the course of history done as much to retard as to promote the progress of mankind. Mr. Wilson has four clear years in which to

justify his aims. By the time he takes his final leave of the White House we shall be better able than we are to-day to foreshadow the permanent verdict of history on his exercise of power.

APPENDIX

AMERICA AND WORLD-POLITICS

THE fullest expression of President Wilson's conception of the future rôle of the United States in international politics is to be found in his address to the Senate on January 21, 1917, and his second Inaugural on March 5, 1917. Speaking, in the one case to the assembly particularly associated with him by the Constitution and by usage in the direction of foreign policy, and in the other to the nation as a whole, the President enunciated principles whose acceptance would involve, in some respects the profound modification, in others the complete supersession, of the Monroe Doctrine.

The new policy thus unfolded had been foreshadowed in Mr. Wilson's declarations on the proposed League to Enforce Peace and in his address to the Pan-American Scientific Conference in January 1916, but it had never before been worked out in all its fullness in the light of the lessons of the European War. A leader who called on America to abandon frankly and irrevocably the detachment and isolation that for ninety years had been the corner-stone of her foreign policy was making heavy demands on

the loyalty of his followers. But there can be little question that the demand will be met, and that those who to-day are charging the President with embarking on perilous adventures will to-morrow be the first to acknowledge his prescience.

The two addresses in full are here subjoined.

THE SPEECH TO THE SENATE.

"GENTLEMEN OF THE SENATE,—

On the 18th of December last I addressed an identic Note to the Governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace.

"I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy.

"The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.

"The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely, and have stated, in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.

"We are much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace

that must end this war it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by a definite concert of the Powers which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted.

"I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind with regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come, when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

"It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

"That service is nothing less than this: To add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It

is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

"The present war must first be ended, but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended.

"The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms that will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged.

"We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards, when it may be too late.

"No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Government, elements consistent with the political faith and the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

"I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure.

"It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

"The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

"Fortunately, we have received very explicit assurances on this point.

"The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in

mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

"They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory.

"I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it, and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities, and to face them without soft concealments.

"Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last—only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

"The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend.

"Equality of territory or of resources there, of course, cannot be, nor any sort of equality

not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

"And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations.

"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from potentate to potentate as if they were property.

"I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

"I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable—because I wish frankly to uncover realities.

"Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable,

and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

"So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the seas.

"Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it no doubt can be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

"And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-operation.

"No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind; but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

"It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the

seas at once free and safe, and the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider, and perhaps more difficult, question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candour and decided in a spirit of real accommodation, if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice.

"There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great and preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry.

"The question of armaments, whether on land or on sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

"I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness, because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance.

"Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great Government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say.

"May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every

programme of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

"And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

"I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which

in international conference after conference representatives of the people of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty ; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

"These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And yet they are the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail."

THE SECOND INAUGURAL.

"MY FELLOW-CITIZENS,—

The four years which have elapsed since last I stood in this place have been crowded with counsel and action of the most vital interest and consequences. Perhaps no equal period in our history has been so fruitful in important reforms in our economic and industrial life, or so full of significant changes in the spirit and purpose of our political action. We have sought very thoughtfully to set those in order, to correct the grosser errors and abuses of our industrial life, to liberate and quicken the processes of national genius and energy, and to lift politics to a broader view of the people's essential interests. It is a record of singular variety and singular distinction, but I shall not attempt to review it. It speaks for itself, and will be of increasing influence as the years go by.

"This is not the time for retrospect. It is a

time rather to speak over thoughts and purposes concerning the present and the immediate future. Although we have centred counsel and action with such unusual concentration and success upon the great problems of domestic legislation to which we addressed ourselves four years ago, other matters have more and more forced themselves upon our attention, matters lying outside our own life as a nation and over which we have had no control, but which, despite our wish to keep free of them, have drawn us more and more irresistibly into their own current and influence. It has been impossible to avoid them. They have affected the life of the whole world and shaken men everywhere with passion and apprehension which they never knew before. It has been hard to preserve calm counsel while the thought of our own people has been swayed this way and that under their influence.

"We are a composite and cosmopolitan people, we are of the brood of all the nations that are at war, the currents of our thoughts as well as the currents of our trade run quick at all seasons back and forth between us and them. The war has inevitably set its mark from the first alike upon our minds, our industries, our commerce, our politics, our social action. To be indifferent to it or independent of it was out of the question. Yet all the while we have been conscious that we are not a part of it, and in that consciousness, in spite of many divisions, we have been drawn closer together.

"We have been deeply wronged upon the seas, but we have not wished to wrong or injure in return, and have retained throughout the consciousness of standing in some sort apart, intent upon an interest that transcended the immediate issues of the war itself. As some of the injuries

done to us have become intolerable we have still been clear that we wished nothing for ourselves that we were not ready to demand for all mankind—fair dealing, justice, and freedom to live and be at ease against organized wrong. It is in this spirit and with this thought that we have grown more and more aware and more and more certain that the part we wished to play was the part of those who mean to vindicate and fortify peace.

"We have been obliged to arm ourselves to make good our claim to a certain minimum of right and freedom of action. We stand firm in an armed neutrality, since it seems that in no other way we can demonstrate what it is that we insist upon and cannot forgo. We may even be drawn on by circumstances, not by our own purpose or desire, to an active reassertion of our rights as we see them, and to more immediate association in the great struggle itself, but nothing will alter our thought or our purpose. They are too clear to be obscured. They are too deeply rooted in the principles of our national life to be altered.

"We desire neither conquest nor advantage; we wish nothing that can be had only at the cost of another people. We have always professed an unselfish purpose, and we covet the opportunity to prove that our professions are sincere. There are many things still to do at home to clarify our own politics, and to add new vitality to the industrial processes of our own life, and we shall do them as time and opportunity serve; but we realize that the greatest things that remain to be done must be done with the whole world for a stage, and in co-operation with the wide universal forces of mankind, and we are making our spirits ready for those things.

They will follow in the immediate wake of the war itself, and set civilization up again.

"We are provincials no longer. The tragical events of thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved whether we would have it so or not, and yet we are not the less Americans if we but remain true to the principles in which we have been bred. They are not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of liberated mankind.

"These, therefore, are the things we shall stand for, whether in war or peace: that all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world and in the political stability of free peoples, and are equally responsible for their maintenance; that the essential principle of peace is the actual equality of all nations in all matters of right or privilege; that peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power, that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no other Powers should be supported by the common thought, purpose, or powers of the family of nations; that the seas should be equally free and safe for the use of all peoples under rules set up by common agreement and consent, and that so far as is practicable they should be accessible to all upon equal terms; that national armaments should be limited to the necessities of national order and domestic safety; that the community of interest and power upon which peace will henceforth depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist

revolution in other States should be sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented.

"I need not argue these principles to you, my fellow-countrymen. They are your own—part and parcel of your own thinking, of your own motive in affairs. They spring up native amongst us. Upon this, as upon a platform of purpose and action, we can stand together, and it is imperative that we should stand together.

"We are being forced into a new unity amidst fires that now blaze throughout the world. In their ardent heat we shall in God's providence, let us hope, be purged of faction and division, purified of errant humours of party and private interest, and stand forth in the days to come with new dignity of national pride and spirit. Let each man see to it that the dedication is in his own heart, that the high purpose of the nation is in his own mind, that he is ruler of his own will and desire.

"I stand here and have taken the high solemn oath to which you have been audience because the people of the United States have chosen me for this august delegation of power, and by their gracious judgment have named me their leader in affairs. I know now what the task means. I realize to the full the responsibility which it involves. I pray God that I be given wisdom and prudence to do my duty in the true spirit of this great people. I am their servant, and can succeed only as they sustain and guide me by their confidence and their counsel.

"The thing I shall count upon and the thing without which neither counsel nor action avail is the unity of America—an America united in feeling, in purpose, in its vision of duty and its opportunity of service. We have to beware of all men who would turn the tasks and necessities

of the nation to their own private profit or use them for the upbuilding of private power.

"Beware that no faction or disloyal intrigue break the harmony or embarrass the spirit of our people. Beware that our Government be kept pure and incorrupt in all its parts. United alike in the conception of our duty and in the high resolve to perform it in face of all men, let us dedicate ourselves to the great task to which we must now set our hand. For myself I beg your tolerance, your countenance, your united aid.

"The shadows that now lie dark upon our path will soon be dispelled. We shall walk with light all about us if we be but true to ourselves —to ourselves as we have wished to be known in the counsels of the world, in the thought of all those who love liberty, justice, and right exalted."

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